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CHAPTER I 
CITY COUBCIL BLBCTIOH POLITICS 
Those who seek public off ice in the city of Chicago are 
drawn into the political arena for a variety of reasons. 
Many want the opportunity to exercise political power and to 
satisfy their personal ambitions. Others seek office in 
order to serve the public and to improve their communities. 
Regardless of motivation, political ambition seems to define 
Chicago politics. In elections held between 1979 and 1995, 
1,135 candidates ran for the 50-member city council. 1 More 
importantly, the number of candidates who ran in 1995 (289) 
was 122 percent more than the number who ran in 1979 (130). 2 
Thus, interest in serving on the Chicago city council 
appears to have become more intense over time. 
Of the many candidates who seek local off ice, which 
ones are the most successful? Do incumbents dominate 
election outcomes and, if so, why? In what ways does the 
political environment affect when candidates run for off ice? 
How does campaign finance affect election outcomes? The 
1This total excludes candidates who ran in special 
elections. 
2The increase in the total number of candidates running 
for alderman occurred despite their being no real change in 
the average number of open seat contests in these five 
elections. The average number of open seat elections was 
6.2, with a standard deviation of 1.5. 
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purpose of this study is to assess these issues in local 
politics by examining four aspects of city council 
elections: the factors that determine election outcomes, the 
advantages of incumbency, the behavior of candidates 
challenging incumbents, and the role of money in local 
election campaigns. 
In order to answer these questions a dataset including 
more than 700 Chicago city council candidates who campaigned 
for alderman between 1979 and 1995 was collected. Although 
others have examined factors that explain election outcomes 
(see Lieske 1989), this study adds to the literature by 
studying a larger number of candidates over a longer period 
of time than is found in most studies of city council 
elections. The determinants of when candidates' decision to 
run for office and how money influences the local political 
process, however, are two areas of the urban politics 
literature that, to date, either have not been examined or 
have not been examined very thoroughly. As a consequence 
this study will enable us to more fully understand local 
politics and city council election dynamics. 
The first section of this chapter discusses how city 
councils and city council elections have been viewed in the 
urban politics literature, with specific attention paid to 
Prewitt•s (1970) work on San Francisco Bay Area cities. In 
this section I seek to set the context for a more political 
understanding of city council politics. The second section 
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discusses factors related to electoral success in city 
council elections. By way of comparison, I also discuss 
findings of scholars who study congressional elections, 
especially those relating to the advantages of incumbency. 
This is followed by a review of explanations for the 
incumbency advantage in legislative elections. A discussion 
of how the political environment influences decisions of 
potential candidates to enter elections, with specific 
attention paid to strategic politicians theory as developed 
by Jacobson and Kernell {1983), appears in this subsequent 
discussion. The fifth section discusses the importance of 
campaign finance in legislative elections. The final 
section offers a critique of local elections research and 
suggests ways to extend the literature in this subfield of 
political science. This section also discusses the analyses 
planned for subsequent chapters. 
City Councils, Electoral Competition, and Democratic Theory 
Electoral competition is an important topic because of 
its linkage to notions of electoral accountability. 
Democratic theory suggests that the fear of being voted out 
of off ice forces incumbent officeholders to pay close 
attention to the citizens they represent, while executing 
their political duties {Schumpeter 1987). Ignoring the 
needs of one's constituents creates fissures within the 
electoral environment and increases the probability that 
strong candidates will emerge to face current officeholders 
on election day. The pressure of the next election 
therefore forces incumbents to be accountable to voters. 
While the present study does not directly assess the 
correlation between constituent views and legislative 
action, it does assess the antecedent condition of 
accountability, or electoral competition. This may seen 
ironic insofar as city council elections and their 
importance to ensuring electoral accountability have been 
downplayed in the literature. In a study of 87 Bay Area 
cities, Prewitt (1970) argued that conventional notions of 
the value of political competition for democratic systems 
did not apply to local politics because of the peculiar 
structure and environment within which local politics 
occurred. By and large the councilmen that he studied were 
unfazed by electoral circumstances. Fully 25 percent 
reached off ice via appointment rather than after a tough 
election contest and incumbents won 80 percent of the time 
that they sought reelection. Turnover among councillors 
also occurred most frequently as a result of individual 
council members deciding to retire voluntarily, rather than 
being forced from office by an angry electorate. Finally, 
what distinguished city council members from other 
politicians were a desire to perform one's civic duty, the 
norm of volunteerism, and a lack of political ambition 
(Prewitt 1970, 210-212). 
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Due to the number of local governments in the United 
States and their varied political structures and cultures, 
drawing generalizations about particular aspects of urban 
politics is difficult. Prewitt studied cities in one region 
of one state, all with similarly-reformed political 
institutions. Do these findings apply in other cities with 
different political structures and different political 
cultures? Although Feld and Lutz (1972) reached conclusions 
similar to those of Prewitt in their study of recruitment to 
the Houston city council, Engstrom and Pezant (1975) showed 
that competition for the New Orleans city council was highly 
politicized and executed by politically skilled candidates 
with clear political ambitions. The statistics cited above 
on the number of candidates who ran for the Chicago city 
council between 1979 and 1995 suggest that this too is a 
city that is fundamentally unlike the cities studied by 
Prewitt. This research also adds to current literature a 
study of a midwestern city with a relatively unreformed 
political system. For these reasons, studying Chicago will 
broaden our understanding of city council elections 
specifically and local politics more generally. 
Uncovering what determines entrance to and exit from 
the Chicago city council is a central goal of this research. 
One way to examine electoral competitiveness is to look at 
factors shaping election outcomes. Below I discuss the 
major variables that have been identified in the literature 
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as important to shaping election outcomes. 
Election Outcoaes: Which Candidates Are Kost Coapetitive? 
The broader question of electoral competitiveness has 
been a special concern of legislative scholars for some time 
(for a summary of the literature, see Jacobson 1992) and 
only recently has become of interest to urban scholars (see 
Lieske 1989). Because incumbents comprise a large portion 
of all candidates, this section begins with a discussion of 
the incumbency advantage in city council elections. From 
there I focus on other factors that are expected to affect 
election outcomes, the incumbency advantage, how the 
political environment shapes candidates' decisions to run 
for office, and the role of campaign finance in city council 
elections. 
The Importance of Incumbency in City council Elections 
Like other legislative elections, city council election 
outcomes are dominated by incumbents (Hagensick 1964; Howell 
and Oiler 1981; Jamieson 1978; Kirlin 1975; Lieske 1989; 
Pohlmann 1978). A 1991 survey conducted by the 
International City Management Association showed that 84 
percent of incumbents were successful in their reelection 
attempts (Desantis and Renner 1994,40). A similar survey 
conducted in 1975 showed that between 1962 and 1975 
incumbent success rates increased to 78 percent from 72 
percent (Karnig and Walter 1977,66). Thus, incumbents' 
success in city council elections seems to be increasing, 
much like incumbents in other legislative bodies who have 
become more secure electorally (Mayhew 1974a). 
In addition to increased electoral security, recent 
surveys showed that incumbents were reelected most 
frequently in cities with populations over 500,000 (90%), 
compared with reelection rates of only 62.5 percent in 
cities with populations between 250,000 and 499,000. This 
may be related to the value placed on city council seats in 
these communities (Hagensick 1964). Because of greater 
prestige, incumbents may try harder to maintain their 
positions on city councils in large cities than they do in 
smaller communities. Incumbents also were most successful 
in cities with district election systems (61.6%) and in 
cities with partisan election ballots (63.4%) (Desantis and 
Renner 1994,41; see also Jamieson 1978,950-951). A recent 
study of the 1991 Chicago city council elections 
demonstrated that incumbents realized a 19 point advantage 
over their challengers (Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner 
1995,44). 
The value of incumbency is greater in nonpartisan 
elections (which characterizes most city council elections) 
as incumbents' name identification replaces the more 
traditional party cue for voters. Pohlmann (1978) studied 
voting patterns in New York City between 1967 and 1975 in 
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order to uncover the relationship between partisanship and 
incumbency in lower salience elections, such as those for 
city council and state assembly. He found that the power of 
incumbency was greater in lower salience elections than in 
high salience elections such as those for the U.S. Congress 
(Pohlmann 1978,500; but see Hagensick 1964). Incumbents' 
power to ward-off strong challenge is buttressed further by 
voters' propensity to evaluate incumbents individually, 
rather than as part of the city council on which they serve 
(Kirlin 1975,268). Thus, generally unpopular councils may 
not alter the political support that any individual council 
member may receive. Incumbency also is more important than 
any campaign activity such as research, personal contact 
with voters, mass and elite mobilization, and advertising 
(Howell and Oiler 1981,155) that might also affect election 
outcomes. 
Other factors besides incumbency also have been shown 
to be important in determining city council election 
outcomes. In discussing other variables that might 
influence election outcomes, I pay particular attention to 
factors that bestow legitimacy on individual candidates, 
before discussing how campaign spending, racial factors, and 
political parties might affect election outcomes. 
The Role of Legitimation in city Council Elections 
Incumbents are reelected most frequently because they 
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are better known and higher profile candidates. In addition 
to incumbency, factors that enhance candidates' name 
recognition and familiarity among voters are important 
variables. In this section I discuss these credentials and 
how they affect election outcomes. 
The first set of legitimating credentials is 
candidates' background characteristics. For example, 
candidates with high status occupations (e.g., attorneys) 
and experience in nonpartisan and civic organizations often 
perform better in city council elections than candidates who 
lack these experiences (Lieske 1989; Merritt 1977). These 
kinds of background factors permit candidates to develop 
their communication skills and the professional contacts 
necessary for waging effective political campaigns. 
Candidates who hold prior elective offices or appointed 
positions also realize electoral advantages over candidates 
lacking such experiences (Merritt 1977). 
Other studies of local elections have confirmed the 
importance of these variables. Byrne and Pueschel (1974) 
studied Democratic and Republican county central committee 
elections held in California between 1948 and 1970. They 
found that candidates' occupation, position on the ballot, 
ethnicity, gender, and use of a nickname were important 
predictors of candidates' share of the vote (Byrne and 
Pueschel 1974). In a survey of voters following local 
elections in Lexington, Kentucky during the mid-1980s, 
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Raymond (1992) found candidates' personal characteristics 
(whether they were perceived as hard working and honest) and 
background characteristics (job experience, volunteer 
service, and education) were the single most important 
predictors of the vote. Next in importance were candidates' 
name recognition, level of concern for the district, and 
ideology (Raymond 1992,253). 
As another source of legitimation, newspaper 
endorsements also have been shown to be important predictors 
of election outcomes. Perhaps the most extensive study of 
the effect of endorsements in determining local election 
outcomes was conducted by stein and Fleischmann (1987) who 
examined the effects of newspaper endorsements on city 
council election outcomes in Dallas, Fort Worth, San 
Antonio, Memphis, Peoria and Charlotte. They found that 
"those candidates receiving newspaper endorsements win at 
least 68 percent of their races" (Stein and Fleischmann 
1987,335; but see Raymond 1992). News media endorsements 
also were shown to be important predictors of the 1991 
Chicago city council election outcomes in a multivariate 
study conducted by the Chicago Urban League. Candidates who 
received endorsements from both of Chicago's daily 
newspapers received an increase of approximately 10 percent 
in their share of the vote (Lewis, Gierzynski and Kleppner 
1995,44). 
By far the most systematic examination of electoral 
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competition in local politics was conducted by Lieske 
(1989), who studied electoral outcomes in Cincinnati, a 
nonpartisan city with at-large elections, between 1969 and 
1977. He focused specifically on indicators of candidates' 
legitimacy and acceptability for public office. In 
bivariate analyses, he reported that factors such as 
incumbency, candidates' race, campaign spending, education 
level, news media and party endorsements, and candidates' 
occupational status were important predictors of total votes 
received (Lieske 1989,158). In multivariate models, 
newspaper and partisan endorsements were critical predictors 
of success for first-time candidates, while political 
following, race, and ability to secure partisan and media 
endorsements explained much of the variation in the outcomes 
of races involving incumbents and experienced candidates 
(those who had run at least once before) (Lieske 1989,163-
165). Because incumbents had the largest political 
followings among experienced candidates, they realized the 
largest electoral benefits. 
Those who study congressional elections also have noted 
the value of legitimating credentials for candidates' 
success. All else being equal, the most successful 
candidates are those with political experience and ample 
campaign resources to spend on advertising for their 
campaigns (Abramowitz 1991; Jacobson 1992). Like council 
elections, incumbency shapes many outcomes of congressional 
contests. In races that do not involve incumbents, 
c~ndidates and candidates' abilities to communicate their 
messages to voters shape election outcomes. 
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Besides background characteristics and media 
endorsements, the literature also suggests that other 
variables such as campaign spending, party endorsements, and 
candidates' race might affect election outcomes. Below I 
discuss each of these variables in turn before proceeding to 
a discussion of runoff elections, the political environment 
and how it affects candidates' decisions to run for office, 
and the role of campaign finance in elections. 
Caapaign Spendinq 
Campaign spending is an important determinant of 
election outcomes because spending permits candidates to 
communicate with voters about why they should be elected to 
office. It is far more effective (in terms of the number of 
voters candidates can contact) than campaigning door-to-
door. Experience and credentials are less useful to 
candidates if they cannot be promulgated to a wide audience. 
Spending on advertising allows candidates to do this. 
In study of ·partisan elections for a variety of local 
and state offices, including the city council, in Charlotte-
Mecklenberg, North Carolina, Arrington and Ingalls {1984) 
found that candidate spending was a significant predictor of 
vote outcomes. This was found to be the case in various 
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elections they examined even after controlling for 
incumbency, race, gender, and party affiliation of the 
candidates. Candidate spending was more important for 
predicting outcomes in district elections, while incumbency 
was most important in at-large contests (Arrington and 
Ingalls 1984,125). A report prepared recently by the 
Chicago Urban League on the 1991 Chicago aldermanic 
elections also showed that spending was a significant 
predictor of candidates' share of the vote (Lewis, 
Gierzynski and Kleppner 1995,44). 
Findings in the congressional elections literature also 
show that candidates who move thoroughly advertise 
themselves and their qualifications for off ice are likely to 
attract more votes (Abramowitz 1991; Jacobson 1980). 
Spending is especially important for challengers and 
candidates running in open seat elections who do not have 
the same amount of name recognition among voters as is 
typical for incumbents. The effect of incumbents' spending 
is somewhat vague (Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1980). 
While they receive and spend more than their challengers, 
the effects of more money are not as great as for 
challengers. 
Factors Affecting Election outcomes: A summary 
Both the literature on city council elections and the 
literature on congressional elections point to the 
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importance of experience in determining legislative election 
outcomes. Incumbents are the most widely known and 
typically the most politically-experienced candidates in 
these contests. For nonincumbents, occupational background 
and civic involvement often lend candidates a certain amount 
of credibility with voters and other political elites. 
These advantages often translate into success at the polls. 
In addition to background factors, other variables such as 
news media endorsements lend legitimacy to candidates and 
their campaigns. Voters use newspapers as important sources 
of information about local politics. News media 
endorsements provide short-cuts for voters desiring to make 
informed choices in what are typically low salience 
elections. Similar to congressional elections, candidates' 
spending also is a significant determinant of candidates' 
share of the vote. The more thoroughly candidates can 
saturate their districts with information about themselves, 
the more votes they will receive. 
The next section focuses on the role of local political 
parties in shaping local election outcomes and dynamics. 
Because of reform institutions (e.g., nonpartisan ballots), 
local parties play less of a role today than they did 
earlier this century (Welch and Bledsoe 1988). While their 
role in local elections may be less important, it is not 
altogether absent, especially in Chicago, a city that 
historically has had a very powerful Democratic party 
15 
influence in local politics. 
Political Parties in Nonpartisan Election systeas 
Political reformers sought to eliminate the role of 
political parties in local governments. In their opinion, 
local politics was apolitical (White 1890) and therefore 
should be rid of the influence of political parties. Their 
most enduring legacy has been the nonpartisan municipal 
ballot. This reform has had its effects on the nature of 
local politics, candidate emergence, and the types of 
candidates who win local office (Cassel 1985; Gilbert 1962; 
Gilbert and Cleague 1962; Hawley 1973; Lee 1960; Robinson 
and Dye 1978; Rogers and Arman 1971; Welch and Bledsoe 1988; 
Williams and Adrian 1959). 
A fundamental question in local politics is how 
official designations of nonpartisanship affect the behavior 
of local parties and political processes. Nonpartisanship 
has weakened parties but by no means has it resulted in the 
complete absence of partisan activity in cities with such 
ballot forms. Nonpartisanship has resulted in varying local 
political styles. Dutton and Northrop (1978), for example, 
found that reformed cities, in general, were more likely to 
be characterized by strong group politics, but lacking 
strong political parties. In contrast, unreformed cities 
had both high levels of political party activity and high 
levels of group activity (so-called "coalition politics") . 
16 
Not surprisingly, cities with partisan ballot 
structures have been found to have the highest levels of 
local party activity (Bledsoe and Welch 1987). But Bledsoe 
and Welch (1987) also found that party activity was lowest 
in cities with at-large election systems and nonpartisan 
ballots, that party activity was no greater in cities with 
district systems than in cities with at-large systems, and 
that among nonpartisan cities and those with larger 
populations were more likely to have more active political 
parties than those with smaller populations. This is 
clearly the case in Chicago where the Democratic Party has 
been, and to some extent, remains, one of the most powerful 
institutions in local politics. Similarly, the Democratic 
and Charter parties still play important roles in Cincinnati 
politics, influencing the outcomes of city council elections 
there (Lieske 1989). 
For cities with active and influential party 
organizations the center of the party's strength has been 
the cadres of precinct organizations and party workers who 
stimulate turnout and votes for the organization's 
candidates. Wolfinger (1963) showed that precinct 
organizations and precinct captains had a significant effect 
on charter reform in New Haven during the late 1950s. "It 
is just in this sort of low-salience election that political 
machines are supposed to be most potent because their 
workers encounter less sales resistance and because the 
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lower turnout enhances the importance of their pool of 
voters" (Wolfinger 1963,398; but see Katz and Eldersveld 
1961). In their study of 186 cities, Bledsoe and Welch 
(1987,264) found that "voter turnout is significantly linked 
to active parties," who also play a role in candidate 
recruitment (Merritt 1977,739-749). 
In an extensive look at the functioning of local 
political parties, Crotty and his colleagues (1986) found 
that parties in Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Houston, and 
Nashville, were very active in a variety of campaign 
activities. "Focusing on three critical areas of campaign 
activity - voter registration, door-to-door canvassing, and 
election-day get-out-the-vote drives - and comparing the 
parties across urban areas, two things stood out: all of the 
local parties engaged in each of the activities to a 
significant degree; and the intensity of effort invested in 
the individual activities is impressive, again higher than 
might be assumed" (Crotty 1986,29). Furthermore, the type 
of group activity (political action committees, business and 
labor groups) that one sees on the state and federal levels, 
was conspicuously absent in these cities (Crotty 1986,28). 
In summary, we see that nonpartisanship has had a 
profound effect on city politics. Campaigns and candidates 
are more individual- or personality-centered in nonpartisan 
cities than in cities with partisan systems, where parties 
have greater control over who runs and over election 
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outcomes. Incumbents are advantaged in nonpartisan systems 
as voters turn to other voting cues besides party to make 
summary judgments on candidates' qualifications and 
experience. But, while nonpartisan cities generally have 
lower levels of party activity than partisan cities, their 
presence is only depressed, not completely absent. 
Party organizations in nonpartisan cities assist 
candidates with their campaigns, stimulate voter turnout for 
endorsed candidates, and generally promote the party's slate 
of nominees. In addition to factors mentioned above, being 
chosen by the party for official support also confers 
recognition and credibility on candidates. In low salience 
elections, party endorsements represent significant 
organizational advantages for endorsed candidates. This is 
especially the case in Chicago, which has a very weak 
opposition party in the Republicans, and relatively weak 
group influences (Adrian 1959; Crotty 1986). The Democratic 
party has dominated Chicago politics since the mid-1950s. 
Thus, candidates running under the mantra of the Democratic 
party in their wards should reap large electoral advantages 
over other candidates who must organize their campaigns 
without the infrastructure of opposition parties or interest 
groups that might otherwise be influential in city politics. 
Race and Ethnicity in Local Elections 
Models of city council election outcomes and 
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competitiveness also have considered the racial or ethnic 
characteristics of candidates. In nonpartisan elections 
where voters have few other voting cues, we might expect 
candidate race to be an important predictor of the vote 
(Arrington 1978; Murray and Vedlitz 1978; Pomper 1966). 
Pomper (1966), in a study of nonpartisan and partisan cities 
in New Jersey, found that in nonpartisan cities voters used 
the ethnic and racial characteristics of the candidates as 
voting cues instead of party affiliation, or issue positions 
of the candidates. "The goal of nonpartisanship is 
fulfilled, as party identification does not determine the 
outcome. In the place of party, ethnic identification is 
emphasized" (Pomper, 1966,90). In an analysis of voting 
patterns in nonpartisan and partisan elections, Arrington 
(1978) also concluded that racial factors replace partisan 
ones in elections using nonpartisan ballots. This was true 
even when overtly partisan campaigns were run. "No change 
toward a partisan voting pattern and away from racial voting 
occurred until both a partisan campaign and a partisan 
ballot were present" (Arrington 1978,260). The effects of 
race also have been shown to vary according to voters 
socioeconomic status (i.e., the probability of choosing 
candidates on the basis of their racial characteristics was 
lower for voters with higher incomes) (Murray and Vedlitz 
1978,38). 
Several other studies also have concluded that 
20 
candidates' race is an important predictor of councilmanic 
election outcomes. Lieske and Hillard (1984) studied city 
council election outcomes in nonpartisan Cincinnati from 
1969 to 1977. Regressing vote proportions for black and 
white candidates on race, class, and partisanship of voting 
precincts, they found that the "councilmanic vote in 
Cincinnati is highly structured along racial and partisan 
lines" (Lieske and Hillard, 1984,553). Similarly, 
Vanderleeuw (1990) found that levels of own-race voting 
varied over time and became most extreme as the largest 
racial groups (in this case black and white) approached 
equality in size. In contrast to Vanderleeuw's conclusions, 
a recent study of nonpartisan, at-large councilmanic 
elections in Detroit showed that levels of racial voting 
were high among white voters even after blacks became the 
city's racial majority (Herring and Forbes 1994,444). 
Studies of Chicago politics also have demonstrated the 
importance of racial and ethnic voting in city politics 
(Kleppner 1985). In a study of mayoral elections between 
1955 and 1979, Inglot and Pelissero (1993) found that 
ethnicity affected voting patterns within the city's Polish 
community. Especially among the middle-class Polish wards 
of the city's Northwest Side, ethnic voting improved the 
electoral fortunes of Polish candidates running against 
candidates backed by the machine. Racial voting is clearly 
less important in aldermanic elections than in citywide 
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elections, due to the presence of majority race wards in the 
city. 
Candidates' race or ethnicity plays a considerable role 
in determining election outcomes in local politics. This is 
due, in part, to the fact that there is often little 
knowledge about candidates and what they propose to do once 
elected. And, although candidates' race or ethnicity 
provides voters with minimal information, it can signal to 
voters that candidates are in some way either like them or 
unlike them in terms of goals, values, and experiences. The 
finding that candidates' race or ethnicity provides voters 
with information about candidates can have powerful 
influences on elections. As Lieske (1989,169) concluded in 
his study of Cincinnati: "In sum, there is nothing ••. to 
alter our ethnocultural interpretation of urban electoral 
politics. If anything, the results of this research provide 
support to a growing body of thought that is reinterpreting 
American electoral politics within a framework of racial, 
ethnic, and cultural conflict." Because voters often choose 
candidates on the basis of racial or ethnic reasons, it is 
important to control for this variable in models of election 
outcomes. 
Runoff Elections 
One feature that distinguishes city council elections 
from other legislative elections is the runoff . 3 In 
nonpartisan elections all candidates compete against one 
another at the same time, and the one who receives a 
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majority of the votes is declared the winner. If no 
candidate receives a majority, then the two top vote-getters 
compete against each other in a runoff election. 
Fleischmann and Stein {1987) examined nonpartisan city 
council runoff elections in Dallas, Fort Worth, and San 
Antonio, by testing three hypotheses about runoff elections 
developed in studies of state and congressional elections. 4 
First, that minority candidates are disadvantaged in runoffs 
when facing white candidates. Second, that primary leaders 
lose runoffs as voters move to support the underdogs. 
Third, that incumbents typically lose runoff elections 
because being forced into runoffs shows incumbent weakness 
and provides solid reasons for voters to ultimately reject 
3Although partisan runoff primaries in state and 
congressional elections are more common in the South. See 
Bullock and Johnson, 1985. 
4In an attempt to explain the factors that affected 
runoff election outcomes, Bullock and Johnson {1985) 
examined primary runoffs for statewide, state legislative 
and congressional races. They found empirical support for 
the notion that incumbents were disadvantaged in runoff 
elections. Examining the minority disadvantage hypothesis 
in a variety of partisan runoff primaries held in 
Mississippi during 1967, 1971 and 1975, Stewart, Sheffield 
and Ellis (1995) found that black candidates who won the 
first primary {the primary before the second runoff primary) 
did not do so because a large number of white candidates 
split the vote. Only when the first primary election 
outcome was close and the black candidate led the field of 
candidates, were black candidates disadvantaged vis-a-vis 
whites. 
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current officeholders in favor of new ones. 
Their study found no support for the notion that 
minorities or primary leaders lose most frequently in runoff 
elections. However, they did find that incumbents forced 
into runoffs in district electoral systems did worse than 
incumbents forced into runoffs in at-large systems. They 
also found that candidates backed by nonpartisan slating 
groups did worse in runoff elections, on average, than did 
those candidates without formal organization support 
(Fleischmann and Stein 1987,383). 
Wanting to test these hypotheses in a non-southern 
setting, Bullock and Gaddie (1994) applied these hypotheses 
to Chicago aldermanic runoff elections held between 1975 and 
1991. They found that primary leaders and incumbents fared 
less well, vis-a-vis their southern counterparts in runoffs, 
than did second place finishers and nonincumbents. They 
also found that female and minority candidates were not 
systematically disadvantaged in runoff elections. 
As this brief review has shown, studies of runoff 
elections suggest a number of variables worthy of 
consideration in any treatment of these contests in city 
council elections: candidates' race or ethnicity, status as 
primary leader, and incumbency. In addition to these 
variables, other factors such as candidates' political 
experience, media and party endorsements, and spending also 
should be controlled. By testing fully-specified models in 
the Chicago case, one will be able to make more concrete 
determinations about the dynamics of runoff elections. 
Explaininq the Incumbency Advantaqe 
24 
As I have shown above, legislative elections, in 
general, are not very competitive, despite theoretical 
principles underlying the value of electoral competition for 
democratic systems. This is because incumbents are involved 
in most of these contests. In city council elections, 
incumbents win reelection with great frequency and are 
especially invulnerable in the country's largest cities. 
Incumbency advantage has not been addressed by urban 
scholars. However, it has been one of the major issues in 
the congressional elections literature. In order to 
illuminate possible explanations for the advantage of 
incumbency in city council elections, I turn now to a 
discussion of some of the reasons given by congressional 
scholars for why incumbents are so invulnerable. 
Numerous studies have offered alternative explanations 
for the incumbency advantage in congressional elections. 
Mayhew (1974a) coined the expression "vanishing marginals" 
to describe how more incumbents were winning U.S. House 
elections with high reelection vote percentages (i.e., 
greater than 55 percent). He concluded that greater use of 
taxpayer-funded ("frank") mail allowed incumbents to 
campaign year-round by providing a means through which they 
25 
could claim credit for district improvements and advertise 
their performance in off ice at no cost, an advantage 
unavailable to would-be challengers (Mayhew 1974a). Others 
argued that incumbents solidified their electoral position 
by paying careful attention to solving constituents' 
problems with federal agencies, and by providing other 
constituency services (Fiorina 1977). The ability of 
incumbents to ensure safe congressional districts by 
exercising influence over legislative redistricting also has 
been advanced as a possible explanation for increased 
incumbent electoral security (Tufte 1973; but see Cover 
1977). 
Congressional studies also have shown that incumbents 
face few serious electoral threats because they face few 
strong challengers (Jacobson 1987). 5 In support of this 
notion, Abramowitz (1991) argued that politically-
5Banks and Kieweit (1989,1000) have argued that the 
reason weak candidates enter the electoral fray knowing that 
they may eventually challenge an incumbent is because the 
primary fight is less ·intense. Strong candidates (those 
with prior elective off ice experience) avoid the 
opposition's party primary knowing that the odds of 
defeating the incumbent in the general election are slim. 
This increases the odds that a weak candidate (facing other 
weak candidates in the primary) will emerge victorious at 
this stage of the electoral process. Losing the general 
election to the incumbent is less troublesome for candidates 
with little political experience because they are not 
expected to win anyway. For experienced candidates a 
general election loss is more devastating and shows 
electoral vulnerability. Furthermore, unknown candidates 
who perform reasonably well against an incumbent can 
increase their chances of success in subsequent elections 
(Banks and Kieweit, 1989,1013). 
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experienced challengers with plenty of resources at their 
disposal can cut into or decrease incumbents' electoral 
strength. He also found that incumbents' vote share is 
significantly affected by unfavorable national party tides 
and such factors as whether or not incumbents' records were 
damaged by scandal at the time of their elections 
{Abramowitz 1991). Still others point to the value of past 
electoral success and close attention paid by incumbents to 
district opinion on policy matters (DeBoef and Stimson 
1995), the value of fundraising (Epstein and Zemsky 1995), 
and the role of campaign warchests in warding-off serious 
challengers (Box-Steffensmeier 1996). 
While incumbents enjoy large electoral advantages over 
their opponents, challengers can overcome these initial 
disadvantages by spending large sums of money advertising 
themselves and their campaigns. Challengers with political 
experience also tend to perform better than political 
amateurs. Incumbents are hurt by unfavorable national 
political tides that favor one party over the other. 
Incumbents also are hurt by short-term political forces such 
as scandal or a series of unpopular floor votes that 
mobilize voters in support of the opposition. 
While there is little agreement in the literature about 
why incumbents are advantaged, several areas of inquiry have 
been identified. Because of official nonpartisanship in 
Chicago, such factors as national political tides and short-
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term forces that might affect the popularity of one party 
over another are unimportant in explaining the incumbency 
advantage in city council elections. Other factors such as 
incumbents' institutional positions, seniority, scandal, 
redistricting, political experience of the opposition, 
opposition spending, and organization support, however, may 
be important to explaining why incumbents enjoy large 
electoral advantages. 
The Political Environment and Decisions to Run for Office 
At this point we are safe in concluding that elections 
involving incumbents are relatively uncompetitive and that 
open seat elections are much closer and hinge upon such 
factors as candidate quality and candidate spending. In 
addition to these factors, the issue of when candidates 
decide to enter particular races is a critical factor 
shaping election outcomes. If, for example, the weakest 
candidates run against the most secure incumbents, turnover 
in these seats is highly unlikely. Similarly, if the 
strongest candidates only run in open seat elections, these 
will be the most competitive races. 
In this section, I discuss how the political 
environment influences when candidates run for office, an 
important question if highly qualified candidates only run 
in open seats or against vulnerable incumbents. Because 
congressional scholars have addressed this issue more 
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thoroughly than urban scholars, I turn to that literature to 
inform my discussion. 
Incumbents' electoral positions in both House and 
Senate elections are threatened most significantly when they 
are faced by high quality challengers, who emerge when 
incumbents appear vulnerable (Jacobson and Kernell 1983; 
Lublin 1994; but see Squire 1989). Incumbents attract high 
quality challengers during periods of economic downturn 
(when such downturn can be attributed to the policies of the 
incumbent's party), presidential unpopularity (when the 
president and the incumbent are of the same party), when 
national party tides favor the opposition party, and when 
the incumbent•s issue positions are inconsistent with 
prevailing district sentiment (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 
1985; Jacobson and Kernell 1983). 
Incumbents' electoral strength is decreased most 
significantly when challengers behave "strategically," 
running when electoral circumstances favor their candidacies 
(Canon 1993; Jacobson and Kernell 1983). High quality 
challengers (typically those with prior elective office 
experience), attract more campaign contributions from local 
organizations, individuals, and political action committees 
than less qualified candidates (Jacobson 1980). Because of 
this, they can run more effective campaigns (Jacobson 1980). 
"Strategic" behavior is exhibited on the part of both 
candidates and contributors, neither of whom wants to risk 
losing an election. 6 Incumbents' stronghold on election 
outcomes can be loosened, and even broken, when competent 
challengers decide to run. Thus, in addition to candidate 
quality and campaign expenditures, when challengers decide 
to run for off ice is critically important to the 
competitiveness of elections (Bond, Covington and Fleisher 
1985; Canon 1993; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Lublin 1994). 
Popular incumbents are almost always going to win, 
regardless of their opposition. Vulnerable incumbents, 
while still more likely to win than challengers, are more 
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likely to lose when faced by highly qualified, politically-
experienced challengers. 
The urban politics literature has not really addressed 
this issue in any systematic fashion. Sheffield and Goering 
(1978), however, in a study of school board elections, found 
that incumbents ran unopposed more frequently than 
nonincumbents, suggesting a certain amount of strategy on 
the part of candidates to avoid races with incumbents. 
Bledsoe (1993) in his study of city council careers, found a 
relationship between incumbents' vulnerability and vote 
share in subsequent elections. Marginal incumbents, who won 
their first election in close contests, were more likely to 
6Candidates are risk averse because losing might be the 
end of their political careers. For contributors, the 
difficulty of supporting a candidate who does not win is 
that one's political access to the winning candidate may be 
closed. Winning candidates are not always eager to open 
their doors to those who supported their opponents in the 
most recent election. 
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be defeated in their reelection bids than incumbents who had 
won their first election by large margins (Bledsoe 1993,88-
90). One reason for this might be that vulnerable 
incumbents found their opposition to be more skilled than it 
would have been were they less vulnerable politically. 
Interestingly, inter-election vote swings for 
incumbents were more volatile in nonpartisan elections than 
in partisan ones. As Bledsoe (1993,90) states: 
Nonpartisan councilors are more volatile in their 
marginality than partisan councilors - they are more 
likely to build on initially close margins and become 
secure, and they are more likely to see what should be 
secure margins evaporate and lose the next election. 
Council members in legally partisan environments show 
more stability over time. 
He argued that in the more candidate-centered nonpartisan 
contests, individual political entrepreneurs were more 
likely to emerge and defeat incumbents. One may reasonably 
infer from this that in nonpartisan systems, candidates who 
can build organizations and run effective campaigns, might 
be better able to defeat vulnerable incumbents. In systems 
more tightly controlled by political parties, incumbents are 
more securely shielded from strong opposition. 
In this section, we once again see how incumbency 
shapes the political landscape. Whether or not an incumbent 
is in the race is a strong predictor of the kinds of 
candidates who seek office. Generally speaking, the 
congressional literature shows that higher quality 
candidates choose to run in open seat elections and against 
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politically vulnerable incumbents (Bond, Covington and 
Fleisher 1985; Jacobson and Kernell 1983). On the local 
level, incumbents who win with impressive margins increase 
their share of the vote in subsequent elections more rapidly 
than incumbents who win with less impressive totals. In 
other words, close elections for incumbents signal to the 
political environment that incumbents are weak and capable 
of being defeated. The important point is that the most 
politically experienced candidates make decisions to run for 
office on the basis of strategic considerations, which 
inform them about their chances of winning. 
The Role of Money in Leqislative Elections 
A fourth area of electoral competition in local 
politics that I examine is campaign fundraising. Campaign 
fundraising is a critical part of most campaigns, be they 
for local, state, or national office (see Sorauf 1988). As 
discussed above, how much money candidates are able to spend 
to communicate with voters is directly related to number of 
votes they receive on election day. In order to spend 
money, candidates must first raise money. An overlooked and 
under-researched area of the urban politics literature is 
that of campaign fundraising. Below I discuss the issue of 
campaign finance in legislative elections. 
Campaign spending is a critical campaign activity 
because it permits candidates to communicate with voters 
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about their qualifications for off ice. Candidates 
communicate with voters through television, radio, 
newspaper, and billboard advertisements. Congressional 
scholars who have examined campaign finance point out that 
candidates also spend money on direct mail, campaign 
rallies, phone banks, and get-out-the-vote drives 
(Ansolabehere and Gerber 1994,1109). Through advertising, 
candidates are able to promote positive images of themselves 
and to define their opponents. These factors ultimately 
increase candidates' name recognition and chances for 
political success (Abramowitz 1991; Green and Krasno 1988; 
Jacobson 1980). 
In addition to examining the relationship between 
spending and votes, other analyses have examined the 
dynamics of campaign fundraising. These studies have 
attempted to describe and explain the relationship between 
campaign fundraising and the election cycle (Epstein and 
Zemsky 1995; Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994). Because 
Federal Elections Commission reports are disaggregated by 
reporting periods (usually a period of months), it is 
possible to understand the "flow" of fundraising during a 
campaign and how this might vary among candidates. Krasno, 
Green and Cowden (1994), in a study of fundraising in 1985 
and 1986, showed (not surprisingly) that incumbents raised 
more money than challengers in every reporting period of the 
campaign, especially directly before the election, and that 
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incumbents could generate revenue quicker than other 
candidates in response to well-financed challengers. More 
importantly, overall levels of challenger fundraising were 
significantly related to the amount of money they could 
generate early in their campaigns, suggesting that 
contributors do not invest in hopeless candidates (Krasno, 
Green and Cowden 1994). 
Campaign fundraising also is an important campaign 
activity in city council elections. 7 A report prepared by 
the Urban League on campaign fundraising in the 1991 Chicago 
city council elections, however, showed that fundraising 
success was primarily a function of candidates' race, 
political organization support, pre-election name 
identification, and number of opponents. While incumbents 
outraised nonincumbents in dramatic fashion, this effect did 
not show up in multivariate analyses (Lewis, Gierzynski, and 
Kleppner 1995,45). Other than this study, very little work 
has been done on this issue in the urban politics 
literature, despite its importance to cities such as Los 
Angeles and New York that, in recent years, have moved to 
reform their campaign finance systems for local candidates 
(Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner 1995,31-38). 
In summary, campaign finance plays an important in 
legislative elections. Spending is a critical predictor of 
7Similar to campaign research, personal contact with 
voters, mass and elite mobilization, and advertising (Howell 
and Oiler 1981). 
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election outcomes, while fundraising represents an important 
campaign activity. Who is able to raise the most money and 
at what time during the campaign are two factors that will 
likely affect election outcomes. The urban politics 
literature, however, has not examined these issues in any 
depth. 
overview of the study 
As this review of the literature has shown, local 
election outcomes and the outcomes of congressional 
elections are shaped by many of the same factors. 
Incumbency, candidates' personal qualifications for office, 
political experience, and campaign spending all are 
important predictors of election outcomes. Local elections 
and those for federal office, however, are different in a 
number of respects. They occur in different contexts, with 
different rules that govern outcomes. Nonpartisanship, 
runoff elections, and the role of political parties are 
central among these differences. 
Two areas of inquiry that have received considerable 
attention elsewhere but have received no attention in the 
urban politics literature are (1) incumbency advantage and 
how the political environment affects candidates' decisions 
to run for office; and (2) the role of money in local 
elections. Furthermore, while there have been more attempts 
in the urban politics literature to understand local 
election outcomes, these models, in general, have not been 
fully specified. In some cases, these models have not 
controlled for particular variables such as campaign 
expenditures or important background characteristics of 
candidates (Howell and Oiler 1981), while others have 
examined only small numbers of candidates (Lieske 1989). 
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In order to understand more fully local election 
dynamics, scholars need to examine larger numbers of 
candidates, test fully specified models, and utilize time-
series designs. The aim of this research is to begin 
bridging the gap between what we know about congressional 
elections and what we know about city council elections, 
while being sensitive to the obvious differences between the 
two political settings. 
To begin this process, Chapter Two establishes the 
political context of Chicago city council elections and 
presents the study's research design. Using data collected 
on city council candidates who ran for office between 1979 
and 1995, Chapter Three presents an analysis of election 
outcomes in both regular and runoff aldermanic elections. 
Chapter Four examines the value of incumbency in shaping 
election outcomes and patterns of candidate emergence in 
local elections. In Chapter Five, I examine fundraising in 
local campaigns, by analyzing candidates' campaign 
disclosure reports. A concluding chapter addresses the 
implications of the findings for our understanding of 
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electoral competition in city council elections. 
CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
As indicated in the preceding chapter, the central 
purpose of this study is to understand more fully 
competition in city council elections. Electoral 
competition is an important topic because of its linkage to 
democratic theory, which suggests that elections in a 
democracy ought to be free and fair and that voters should 
be able to choose from among a wide range of candidates in 
determining who their representatives will be. 
The following discussion describes how this research 
attempts to understand electoral competition in local 
politics. It describes the study's setting, research 
methods, variables that will be used, and hypotheses to be 
tested in subsequent chapters. A final section discusses 
the data that are used in this analysis. Four research 
areas are ~dentified for analysis: predicting election 
outcomes, incumbency advantage, the factors that predict 
candidate emergence, and campaign fundraising in city 
council elections. Because the study focuses only on 
Chicago, considerable .attention is given to that city's 
history and political culture. Below I present a 
justification for studying Chicago city council elections 
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and then I examine the literature on Chicago politics and 
urban political machines. 
Chicaqo Politics 
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Why study Chicago city council elections to understand 
electoral competition in city council elections? First, the 
city's 50 city council seats are highly sought-after posts. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, 289 candidates ran for alderman 
in 1995 (an average of 5.78 per seat). While I do not 
analyze the motivations of aldermanic candidates, there are 
several aspects of the job that might make it attractive for 
would-be aldermen. The salary paid to aldermen is one 
possible reason for seeking the office. Before the 1995 
election, aldermen were paid $55,000 annually. After the 
1995 elections, the outgoing city council and the mayor 
agreed to increase salaries for the new city council to 
$75,000. They serve four-year terms and, because the 
position is technically part-time, do not have to relinquish 
outside income. Quite often this is the first elective 
off ice for many aldermen, thus service on the city council 
provides aldermen with practical experience in government 
and politics and increases their name recognition with 
voters, two factors that might be useful in election 
campaigns for higher office. 
Policy-related motivations for would-be aldermen also 
are apparent. Aldermen are largely responsible for ensuring 
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that their wards get a fair share of city services and 
development funds, therefore a certain amount of power and 
prestige is conferred on these officeholders. Although the 
Chicago city council is typically a rubber stamp for the 
mayor (Rakove 1975), it does have the legislative authority 
to function as a powerful policy-making body as well 
(Kleppner 1985,241-249). Thus, in addition to the 
individual factors that might entice someone to run for 
alderman, there are policy-related reasons for running as 
well. For these reasons, competition for the office of 
alderman tends to be intense (at least in terms of the sheer 
number of candidate seeking the office), a prerequisite for 
any study of electoral competition. 
Second, both structural and cultural aspects of local 
politics make Chicago a worthy setting for a study of 
electoral competition. Chicago is a fairly unreformed city 
when compared to Cincinnati, the other major city whose city 
council elections have undergone analyses similar to those 
conducted here (Lieske 1989). Cincinnati's city council is 
elected in nonpartisan, at-large elections. Because Chicago 
uses a district format, the differences between these two 
types of cities can be explored. Cincinnati has reformed 
political structures and no political machine activity of 
note. 1 Chicago is reformed in only two ways: its city 
1Cincinnati does, however, have a number of political 
party organizations that are active in city politics (see 
Lieske, 1989). 
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council elections are nonpartisan and they are held in off-
years (years in which state and national elections are not 
held). As we will see below, Chicago also has a strong 
history of political machine activity. Thus, in general, 
there might be interesting differences between what we know 
about a reformed city and what will be learned about a 
relatively unreformed city. 
Third, there is a long history of understanding urban 
politics through the lens of Chicago. Chicago has been used 
as a laboratory for understanding local government and 
politics in countless studies of political machines, 
bureaucracies, mayoral politics, and ethnic and racial 
politics. 2 While these studies have covered almost all 
aspects of urban government and politics, they have largely 
excluded the politics of city council elections. As I have 
shown in Chapter One, only a couple of studies have been 
conducted specifically on Chicago city council elections 
(Bullock and Gaddie 1994; Lewis, Gierzynski and Kleppner 
1995). This study builds on these two works, as well as the 
2The following is a sampling of the literature that has 
used Chicago as the setting for studies in these substantive 
areas. On machine politics see Banfield (1961); Banfield 
and Wilson (1963); Gottfried (1962); Gosnell{l968); Rakove 
(1975); Allswang (1977); Guterbock (1980); and Erie {1988). 
On bureaucratic politics see Mladenka (1980); Jones (1981); 
Koehler and Wrightson (1987); and Mladenka (1989). On 
mayoral politics see O'Connor (1975); Gove and Masotti 
(1982); Holli and Green (1984); Kleppner (1985); and Holli 
and Green (1989). on ethnic and racial politics see Zikmund 
(1982); Pinderhughes (1987); and Inglot and Pelissero 
(1993). 
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work of Lieske (1989), who studied Cincinnati. It does so 
by examining the factors that shape election outcomes, by 
looking at the value of incumbency and challenger behavior, 
and by studying the role of money in local politics. 
Furthermore, there have been no multivariate, time-series 
analyses of Chicago aldermanic elections to date. 
Below I discuss Chicago's political machine heritage. 
As I demonstrate, the Chicago political machine is not a 
monolithic, immutable force. In fact, most agree that the 
machine does not exist today (Granger and Granger 1987; 
Grimshaw 1992). In addition to changes to the political 
machine, demographic changes and redistricting have altered 
the Chicago political landscape in dramatic ways, especially 
on the ward level where city council elections occur. I 
turn now to a discussion of machine politics in Chicago. 
Political Machines and Election outcomes 
Chicago is unique among cities because of its ability 
to resist changes sought by political reformers. As 
mentioned, nonpartisanship in city council elections and 
off-year council and mayoral elections are the only two 
reform elements adopted by city leaders this century. 
Although ballots are officially nonpartisan, local politics 
in this city has been dominated by the Cook County 
Democratic Party ("machine") for the past 60 years (see 
Rakove 1975). 
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Under the leadership of Mayor Richard J. Daley, the 
machine was able to elect its slated candidates in citywide, 
aldermanic, party committeeman, county, state and federal 
elections with remarkable consistency. Candidates running 
with machine endorsement enjoyed the benefits of large 
numbers of campaign workers, financial support, and the aid 
of party elites (Guterbock 1980,226-227). To a large degree 
they still enjoy the benefits of voter registration drives, 
door-to-door campaigning, and election day assistance from 
the party organization (Crotty 1986,187). The political 
structure of ward committeemen and precinct captains that 
made the Daley machine powerful is still in place, although 
there currently is no clear leader among the party 
hierarchy. 
Political organizations derive their power from a 
variety of sources. Some have argued that machines maintain 
power because of their ability to distribute particularized 
benefits to supporters of machine-backed candidates (Merton 
1949). Others have argued that in addition to engaging in 
this type of "exchange" behavior, machine leaders ensure 
that benefits (offices, patronage jobs, constituent 
services) are distributed widely to incorporate and appease 
competing interest groups (Dahl 1961). A more recent 
treatment of machine politics suggested that machines stay 
in power because of their ability to balance the supply of 
divisible benefits with the number of demands placed on the 
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organization (Erie 1988). 
In general, the machine in Chicago is considered to be 
in a state of decline, or even nonexistence (Grimshaw 1992; 
Granger and Granger 1987; Kemp and Lineberry 1982; Kleppner 
1985; Erie 1988). The evidence supporting this view is 
substantial. Kemp and Lineberry (1982), for example, 
posited that the Chicago machine relied upon a large number 
of "deliverable" (high turnout, high degree of machine 
support) and "controllable" (low turnout, high degree of 
machine support) wards for its electoral domination. As 
they have demonstrated, however, in the 1977 special 
election primary following Daley's death, the number of 
deliverable wards decreased substantially at the same time 
that the number of "renegade" (high turnout, anti-machine 
vote) increased (Kemp and Lineberry 1982,11). Beginning 
with the 1967 general election, the number of deliverable 
black wards also decreased. Prior to this time, these wards 
were critically important for machine success (Kemp and 
Lineberry 1982,17). As support from predominantly black 
wards became less certain during the 1970s, the machine grew 
more dependent on votes from white ethnic wards, which were 
shrinking in number vis-a-vis minority wards (Kemp and 
Lineberry 1982,23). 
Grimshaw (1982,65) also has argued that the machine 
lost black support in the late 1960s. By the early 1970s, a 
split in the city's politics along racial lines was evident. 
44 
The machine could no longer assume unified black support, 
nor could it appease the demands of the black middle-class 
for equality in education, housing, and jobs, without the 
risk of alienating its white ethnic voters, who preferred a 
more conservative approach on matters of racial integration 
and equality. Because of increased minority power and a 
smaller white ethnic presence in the city, the machine lost 
its grip on party primary election outcomes. Primary 
election outcomes (in partisan elections) were critical to 
the machine because in a one-party area, primary election 
winners typically win the general election (Grimshaw 
1982,71-85). 
The Michael Bilandic and Jane Byrne administrations 
that followed Daley further antagonized relations between 
the machine and the black community. Bilandic angered the 
black community when he and aldermen Edward Vrdolyak (Tenth 
Ward)and Edward Burke (Fourteenth Ward), convinced black 
alderman Wilson Frost (Thirty-Fourth Ward), who was 
President Pro-tempore of the city council, to support 
Bilandic as Daley's successor, in exchange for becoming the 
chairman of the city council's powerful finance committee 
(Grimshaw 1992,150). Byrne, who had won the 1979 mayoral 
election with support from the discontented black, lakefront 
liberal, and Northwest Side Polish wards, quickly lost 
support from the black community when she sought, 
unsuccessfully, to expand her political base to include more 
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white ethnics. Fearing a reelection fight with Richard M. 
Daley in 1983, she began to place white ethnics in control 
of Chicago public schools, public housing and the ward 
redistricting process, three areas of city government where 
blacks either had, or had wanted, to exercise more power. 
In doing so, Byrne alienated herself from the coalition of 
voters that comprised two-thirds of her winning coalition in 
1979, blacks and lakefront liberals (Grimshaw 1992,160). 
Anger in black and liberal wards in response to Byrne 
administration policies, a massive voter registration drive 
in the black community, and Richard M. Daley's bid for the 
Democratic nomination for mayor in 1983, opened the door for 
Harold Washington, a black congressman from the city's South 
Side (Grimshaw 1992,164). 
In addition to broad political changes that decreased 
machine strength, the internal dynamics of the machine 
changed in the aftermath of Daley's death. The positions of 
mayor and party chairman, unified under Daley, were 
separated. Bilandic, an alderman from Daley's own 11th Ward 
became mayor, and George Dunne, an administrator and long-
time party activist, became party chairman. While Daley had 
centralized his control over ward committeemen (and thus 
over election outcomes in the wards), "the party 
organization, under Dunne, became a much more decentralized 
structure, with power devolving to the ward committeeman to 
a degree unknown during the Daley years" (Rakove 1982,227). 
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In addition, control of patronage shifted from the 
organization to the mayor's office (Rakove 1982,227). With 
fewer resources to control and faced with an increasingly 
powerful set of ward committemen, the centralized machine 
that had existed under Daley lost control. In the 1979 
mayoral primary, the machine even failed to perform its 
"gatekeeper" control over the election ballot, as Byrne 
emerged and successfully exploited a natural disaster (the 
blizzard of 1979) to win the primary election over incumbent 
Mayor Bilandic (Kemp and Lineberry 1982,24). Upon assuming 
off ice, Byrne gutted the bureaucracy of its top-level 
officials who controlled most of the policy expertise in the 
city. She was then forced to turn to lower-level party 
operatives who "were unfamiliar with the dynamics, informal 
relationships, and policies of the system that Daley had 
created and Bilandic had retained" (Rakove 1982,232) for 
policy and political advice. This further increased the 
power of the city council and ward committeemen at the 
expense of the professional bureaucracy and the city's 
business leaders (Rakove 1982,232-243). 
During the 1980s, regular Democrats (those slated by 
the leadership of the Cook County Democratic Party) lost the 
mayoralty twice. In the 1983 mayoral election, the machine 
lost again as Democratic primary voters backed Harold 
Washington, the city's first black chief executive, against 
two white candidates, incumbent Mayor Byrne and the late 
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Mayor Daley's son, Richard. Washington was reelected in 
1987. "Thus, for some years, there has been more myth than 
reality to the notion of the Machine's invincibility, and 
there are solid reasons to suppose that its decade-long 
decline is not going to be reversed" (Kleppner 1985,246). 
In a recent interview, Richard M. Daley supported this 
conclusion about the weakened Chicago machine "There's no 
machine. There's nothing" (Kass 1996,17). 
Despite these setbacks, a 1981 survey of party leaders 
in Cook County suggested that politics on the ward level in 
Chicago has changed very little over time (Crotty 1986). In 
particular, Democratic party leaders have been reluctant to 
embrace new forms of campaigning - high technology polling, 
telephone canvassing, and television appeals - preferring to 
cling to "retail" politics, based on one-on-one contact with 
voters (Crotty 1986). Ward-level party officials have deep 
community roots and are still very committed to maintaining 
political control of their wards (Crotty 1986). Thus there 
may be reason to believe that these activists did not 
suddenly disappear following the Bilandic def eat and 
Washington's watershed victory in 1983. In characterizing 
the Chicago Democratic Party today, it is reasonable to 
suggest that it represents a loose factionalism, composed of 
50 separate fiefdoms (wards) controlled by ward committeemen 
and aldermen. In this respect it more closely resembles the 
decentralized organization that existed prior to Daley being 
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elected mayor in 1955, when he immediately moved to 
consolidate both governmental and political authority in the 
mayor's office. The major difference between ward politics 
today and ward politics prior to 1955 is that the current 
ward committeemen do not have the same power and patronage 
resources to divide among the party faithful (see Rakove 
1982,217-218 for a description of the pre-1955 Cook County 
political machine). 
city council and ward Politics in the 1980s and 1990s 
The election of Harold Washington in 1983, and the 1986 
special elections that sent four new minority 
representatives to City Hall, had profound effects on the 
city council and ward politics. 3 During the 1983 election, 
"an unprecedented number of new and reform-minded black and 
Hispanic ward leaders were swept into off ice, clinging to 
Washington's long coattails. By 1987, over 80 percent of 
the black aldermen in the council had been elected during 
the Washington era, and nearly all of them had built their 
political careers outside the machine" (Grimshaw 1992,182). 
Despite these victories, in the early 1980s the council was 
still controlled by white ethnic politicians determined to 
block Washington's reform agenda. They immediately moved to 
assign loyal supporters to committee chairmanships, block 
3Between 1979 and 1995, the ward boundaries in Chicago 
were redrawn six times (1981, 1982, 1983 (twice), 1986, and 
1992). 
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mayoral appointments, and pass their own budget. Not since 
Daley removed much of the policy-making authority from the 
council in 1955 had the council exercised such power 
(Grimshaw 1992,185). 
White ethnic control of the city council and minority 
control of the mayor's office ushered in a period of intense 
political and racial fighting between the executive branch 
controlled by Washington, and the city council, controlled 
by 29 anti-Washington aldermen (25 of whom were 
white) (Kleppner 1985,247-248). This period is commonly 
ref erred to as the "council wars." Only as a result of 
court-ordered redistricting and special elections in 1986 
did this period end. Following the special election, 
reform-minded members of the council were joined by four new 
minority members sympathetic to Washington's agenda. The 
balance of power in the council was split evenly, with 25 
members supporting Washington and 25 members opposing him. 
Because the mayor is entitled to cast tie-breaking votes in 
the city council, the pro-Washington forces now controlled 
the agenda and policy outcomes. Thus the political 
exclusion experienced by blacks and other minorities during 
successive administrations in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, and during the period of the "council wars," 
motivated blacks and other minorities in city council 
contests as well as in citywide races. 
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Redistricting. As mentioned above, increased minority 
presence on the city council resulted from a series of court 
decisions that substantially re-worked the city's ward 
boundaries, largely in favor of minority interests. The 
transformation of the city's ward boundaries reflected 
profound demographic shifts that have occurred in Chicago 
during the past 25 years. For example, in 1970, 65.6 
percent of Chicago's population was white. By 1980 that 
total had decreased to 42.9 percent and in 1990 whites 
comprised only 37.9 percent of Chicago's population. In 
1970 blacks comprised 32.6 percent of the population, a 
total that increased to 39.7 percent in 1980, and decreased 
only slightly in 1990 to 38.5 percent. Hispanics are the 
only group that has seen a steady increase in their 
percentage of the population, going from 7.4 percent in 1970 
to 14 percent in 1980 and 19.6 percent in 1990. 4 
For the most part, these demographic changes have only 
slowly translated into greater minority representation in 
the city council. After the 1979 election, blacks and 
Hispanics held only 32 percent of the seats in the city 
council, despite being over 50 percent of the population. 
By contrast, whites held 68 percent of the seats in the city 
council, despite comprising only slightly over 40 percent of 
4This information was taken from the 1970 and 1980 
Chicago Statistical Abstracts and from the Metro Chicago 
Political Atlas-1994, Metro Chicago Information Center, 
Northern Illinois University. p.6. 
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the population. After the 1983 election, whites still 
controlled 64 percent of the city council, while blacks and 
Hispanics held only 36 percent. 
The relationship between population and seats began to 
change after the 1987 elections, which were the first 
regularly scheduled elections following court-ordered 
redistricting and special elections in 1986. Whites saw 
their percentage of seats drop from 64 to 56, while blacks 
and Hispanics saw their percentage of seats increase from 36 
to 44. These numbers remained constant after the 1991 
elections, despite a third decrease in size of the city's 
white population in as many decades. As a result of the 
1995 elections, the council is now majority-minority. 
Blacks and Hispanics make-up 54 percent of the council 
(roughly equivalent to their numbers in the population). 
For the most part, between 1979 and 1995 what whites lost in 
terms of seats, Hispanics gained. Hispanics increased their 
representation on the city council 14 percent, and whites 
saw their representation decrease 22 percent. 
These changes have dislodged the old guard, white 
ethnics who dominated Chicago politics for most of this 
century. Now there are only seven aldermen on the city 
council who were elected prior to 1980, all of whom are 
white ethnics. 5 The distribution of white and minority 
5Edward Burke {Fourteenth Ward) was first elected in 
1969; Theris Gabinski (Thirty-Second Ward) was first elected 
in 1969; Burton Natarus (Forty-Second Ward) was first 
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aldermen reflects settlement patterns in the city, with 
blacks dominating the city's South and West Sides, and 
whites controlling the city's North and Southwest Sides. In 
general, the relationship between the current Mayor Daley 
and the city council is congenial, more closely resembling 
the relationship between the first Mayor Daley and the city 
council than anything else. The city council has routinely 
passed the mayor's budgets by overwhelming majorities. Much 
of this support is attributable to Daley's close work with 
the aldermen in ensuring that their wards get a fair share 
of city revenues (Kass and Kirby 1995). 6 
Ward Politics. The late 1980s represented a significant 
turning point for minority representatives in ward politics 
as well. As.Grimshaw (1992,182) points out, "Only one-third 
of the eighteen black committeemen elected in 1988 had been 
put in office before Washington's election." Minority group 
elected in 1971; Bernard Stone (Fiftieth Ward) was first 
elected in 1973; Richard Mell (Thirty-Third Ward) was first 
elected in 1975; Eugene Schulter (Forty-Seventh Ward) was 
first elected in 1975; and Patrick Huels (Eleventh Ward) was 
first elected in 1977. 
6It also is related to the fact that during the 1990s, 
Mayor Daley has made 17 appointments to the council, thus 
ensuring himself a certain amount of political loyalty. 
Therefore, while there were dramatic political changes in 
the city council, the governing relationship between the 
mayor and council has been relatively calm, despite the fact 
that the council was increasingly composed of minority group 
members during this time. This stands in sharp contrast to 
the early 1980s, when the executive and legislative branches 
of city government also were controlled by different racial 
groups. 
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success in ward elections has profoundly affected the racial 
composition of the city's ward committeemen. In 1995, the 
cook County Democratic Party, the chief organ for past 
electoral domination, is still led by a long-time party 
regular (Thomas Lyons), but only a bare majority of 
Chicago's ward committeemen are white. 7 More importantly, 
there are more political independents among the city's ward 
committeemen than at any time before. 8 (A political 
independent in Chicago is a Democrat who opposes machine or 
regular Democrats.) Ward committeemen today play the role 
of independent power broker more often than party loyalist, 
supporting candidates in their own and neighboring wards. 
Candidates who are supported by high profile committeemen 
also are not entirely beholden to them once they are 
elected. In the 1995 city council elections, committeemen 
in the Second and Twenty-Ninth Wards supported challengers 
to their incumbent patrons (Ryan 1995,2:1). According to 
Ryan (1995,2:1 and 2:6): 
Such broken alliances have become increasingly common 
in Chicago politics as former proteges find it easier 
to break ranks with their mentors ..• That kind of tiff 
was unheard of during the Democratic machine's vaunted 
days of monolithic control. Then, the political lives 
7In 1995, 25 of the city's 49 ward committeemen were 
white, 19 were black, and 5 were Hispanic. There was one 
vacancy. 
8Current or former committeemen, such as Bobby Rush 
(Second Ward), Dorothy Tillman (Third Ward), Toni 
Preckwinkle (Fourth Ward), Luis Gutierrez (Twenty-Sixth 
Ward), and Danny Davis (Twenty-Ninth Ward), are long-time 
independent Democrats. 
54 
of such ungrateful benefactors would have been abruptly 
snuffed out. 
Another important change in ward politics today is that a 
majority of committeemen also are elected officials {19 of 
whom are incumbent aldermen). This is contrary to an 
earlier period when committeemen stayed "in the background, 
in control of the ward organization, its patronage, and its 
perquisites but out of the public eye. There they are not 
subject to criticism by the mass media and reform groups 
whose normal targets are public officeholders" {Rakove 
1975,109). 
Thus, as this section has shown, there have been large 
changes in Chicago politics during the past forty years. 
The Chicago political machine controlled election outcomes 
during most of the period between 1931 and 1975. The degree 
of electoral control, however, began to decrease in small 
amounts during the middle 1970s and accelerated during the 
1980s with Washington's mayoral election victories and 
minority group success in ward redistricting, city council 
and ward committeeman elections. Today, the party is 
loosely organized at the county level. Ward committeemen 
are not beholden to party leaders and incumbent aldermen are 
more independent from their ward's committeeman than ever 
before {as mentioned, however, in many cases the positions 
are held by the same person). Individualized power is now 
exercised in city council elections and ward politics, 
rather than collective power being exercised through central 
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party organs. These changes are expected to affect Chicago 
city council elections because now it might be easier for 
relatively independent, unknown candidates to compete in 
open seat races, to challenge incumbents, and to raise 
campaign funds, than it was when the political machine was 
organized and centrally directed. 
Now that I have discussed the nature of Chicago 
politics and some of the broader factors in the political 
environment that have fundamentally altered the course of 
politics in this city, I move to a general discussion of the 
research methods used in the study and the models that I 
will test in subsequent chapters. The models presented 
below reflect both what is known about local elections, 
generally, and what is known to affect local election 
dynamics in Chicago, specifically. 
Data and Methods 
This study examines candidates who ran in regularly 
scheduled Chicago city council elections held between 1979 
to 1995 and who received five percent or more of the vote. 9 
The year 1979 was chosen as the starting point because that 
was the first election for which reliable campaign 
9Because this study is concerned with competitive 
candidates, I have limited it to only those candidates 
receiving five percent or more of the vote in their 
elections. 
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disclosure data were available. 1° Five elections {1979, 
1983, 1987, 1991, 1995) are analyzed. Below I develop 
models to explain election outcomes, incumbency advantage 
and candidate emergence, and the role of money in city 
council elections. 
Pre4ictinq Al4erm.anic Blection outcomes 
The first area of inquiry that I address is election 
outcomes. The dependent variable is measured by taking the 
percentage (share) of the vote won by each candidate. Using 
share of the vote won by each is a more suitable method for 
measuring election outcomes than using total number of votes 
received because it accounts for differences in voter 
turnout across wards. The literature reviewed in Chapter 
One points to a number of independent variables that are 
useful in predicting election outcomes. These variables can 
be broken down into four general categories: political, 
financial, endorsements, and environmental. 
Political Variables. In general, we know that incumbents 
typically win reelection. This is due to their greater name 
10The law that governs campaign finance disclosure in 
Illinois (P.A. 78-1183) went into effect on September 3, 
1974 {State of Illinois Board of Elections, 1993:1). Data 
from the 1975 elections are not included because many of the 
candidates either failed to report, were not required to 
report because they did not meet the minimum threshold for 
reporting purposes, or their records were mishandled by the 
State of Illinois Board of Elections, the unit of state 
government responsible for implementing the act. 
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recognition among voters, experience in office, ability to 
claim credit for ward improvements, and greater access to 
media. In my analysis of election outcomes, I hypothesize 
that incumbency will be the strongest predictor of electoral 
outcomes. The effect of incumbency was measured by 
including a dummy variable coded 1 for incumbents and O for 
nonincumbents. 
Like incumbents, politically-experienced nonincumbent 
candidates are expected to have greater name identification 
with voters and thus are likely to win more votes than 
political amateurs. These highly qualified candidates 
typically have volunteers or elite connections they can call 
to work in their campaigns (i.e., to have an organization 
they can mobilize) and to have greater experience raising 
money for political purposes. Lieske {1989), in his study 
of Cincinnati city council elections, used a variety of 
indicators of political quality such as candidates' achieved 
status (e.g., professional occupation, education) and 
experience in previous campaigns to measure candidate 
quality (all of his measures were dummy variables). 
In this study, nonincumbent candidates who had 
experience in elective office (state legislator, Democratic 
Committeeman) or some other high-level government position 
(e.g., an appointed official in a public bureaucracy) were 
coded 2. Nonincumbents with other types of political 
experience such as being a political aide, precinct captain, 
ward secretary, former alderman, former Democratic 
committeeman, or a former candidate were coded 1. 
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Especially in Chicago, candidates with connections to ward 
organizations or to ward voters might have an advantage over 
candidates lacking such connections and experience. Those 
who lacked any political experience at the time of their 
election were coded o. I expect a positive and significant 
correlation between political experience and candidates' 
vote share. 
Financial Variables. A second category of variables is 
financial. As the literature has shown, candidates who are 
able to spend large sums of money in their campaigns are 
able to make themselves and their qualifications for office 
more widely known. Being more widely known improves 
candidates' ability to garner votes. Among other things, 
candidates use money to advertise themselves in the 
newspapers, on radio and television, through direct mail, 
and via billboard ads. Advertising enables candidates to 
overcome the disadvantages of obscurity (which is the 
situation most nonincumbents find themselves in at the start 
of a campaign). Thus I included in the model a variable for 
candidates' spending. Candidates' spending for 
nonincumbents was measured as the total of all spending from 
the date they created their campaign committees through June 
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30 of the election year. 11 For incumbents (and those who had 
run in previous elections), campaign spending is the total 
of all expenditures made from July 1 in the year of their 
previous election to June 30 of their current election. 12 
All spending was measured in 1995 dollars and is expected to 
be positively correlated with candidates• vote share. In 
addition to candidate expenditures, total opposition 
expenditures also was included to measure how effectively 
candidates' opponents were able to campaign and advertise. 
This spending is expected to be negatively correlated with 
candidates• vote share. 
Endorsements. A third category of independent variables is 
endorsements. News media endorsements are likely to be 
strongly related to election outcomes because in many cases 
these might be the only publicity given to candidates' 
campaigns. Media endorsements often serve as convenient 
cues for voters when evaluating candidates in nonpartisan 
elections, when voters cannot rely on party cues. The two 
major daily newspapers in Chicago are the Chicago Tribune 
and Chicago Sun-Times. Candidates were coded O if they 
received neither of these endorsements, 1 if they were 
11Even though the elections are over in February, I 
assume that spending after the election through June 30 is 
to cover costs associated with the aldermanic election and 
is not being used to campaign for some other office. 
12All spending for other candidates and other elections 
has been factored out. 
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endorsed by one newspaper, and 2 if they received both 
newspapers' endorsements. Because endorsements from the two 
major papers often overlap, this scale permits one to 
measure the effects of media endorsements without 
experiencing multicollinearity that would likely result if 
the Tribune and Sun-Times endorsements were treated 
separately. 
A second type of endorsement is that which is conferred 
on candidates from local political parties or political 
organizations. Lieske (1989) showed that candidates who 
received either the Republican, Democrat, or Charter party 
endorsements were stronger candidates than those candidates 
who did not receive such support. As discussed above, a 
critical feature of Chicago politics is the ward political 
organization. Ward organizations endorse candidates in 
local elections and then work to get voters to the polls, to 
advertise their slated candidates, and, in general, to 
thwart the opposition. To measure the political value of 
ward endorsements, a dummy variable was included with 
candidates who received the organization endorsement coded 
1, all other candidates o. Given Chicago's strong 
Democratic party organization history, I expect a strong, 
positive correlation between this variable and candidates' 
vote share. 
Environmental Variables. A fourth category of environmental 
r 
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variables are important for understanding election outcomes 
in both aldermanic and runoff elections. Several aspects of 
the political context that candidates find themselves in 
might affect election outcomes. one of these is the number 
of opponents candidates have in their elections. Because 
all candidates for a seat on the city council compete 
against each other at the same time (similar to a party 
primary election), a candidate's vote share is likely to be 
inversely related to the total number of opponents one 
faces. In order to determine the independent effect of this 
possibility, I included a variable for total number of 
opponents one has in an election. Number of opponents is a 
continuous variable ranging from one to seven. 
Ward demographic factors also should influence 
candidates' share of the vote. As the literature has 
suggested, voters often turn to other factors such as a 
candidate's race or ethnicity in making their choices when 
other voting cues such as party affiliation are absent 
(Herring and Forbes 1994; Pomper 1966; Vanderleeuw 1990). 
In order to control for this, I have coded candidates on the 
basis of whether or not they were members of the minority 
population in their ward at the time of the election. 
Candidates who were in the minority were coded 1 and those 
who were part of the majority population group were coded o. 
Because of the propensity of voters in nonpartisan elections 
to use race or ethnicity as a voting cue, I expect minority 
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candidates to be disadvantaged in these elections vis-a-vis 
those candidates who are members of the majority population 
group. 
Pre4ictinq Runoff Election outcomes 
Elections to the Chicago city council require a runoff 
in cases where no candidate receives more than 50 percent of 
the vote in the first election. This system ensures that 
the eventual winner has the support of a majority of voters 
in the ward. Runoff elections are different than regular 
aldermanic elections because they pit the strongest two 
candidates from the first election against one another. 
They also are different than regular aldermanic elections 
because voters pay greater attention to the runoff and 
because candidates and campaigns are intensely focused on 
winning the support from voters who supported other 
candidates in the first election. A third way in which 
runoffs are different than regular aldermanic elections is 
the length of time candidates have to campaign. Runoffs 
occur approximately six weeks after the first election, thus 
candidates have a relatively short period of time to shop 
for votes. For these reasons, I expect the election 
dynamics in these contests to be substantially different 
than the dynamics of regular aldermanic elections. Two 
variables in particular, money and organization support, 
should assume greater importance in these contests than they 
do in the earlier elections. Below I develop a model to 
predict the outcomes of these elections. 
The outcomes of runoff elections are analyzed using 
percentage of the vote won by each candidate as the 
dependent variable. The rationale for using share of the 
vote won is the same one discussed above. In general, it 
shows how well each candidate performed in the election. 
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Analyses of the runoff election outcomes will test all 
of the predictor variables described thus far (with the 
exception of number of opponents and minority status of the 
candidates, 13 plus two other variables that have been 
identified in the literature as being important in 
predicting outcomes of these elections. In addition, 
candidate spending was calculated differently in this model 
than it was in the model of aldermanic election outcomes. 
In this model, runoff election spending is the total 
election spending through June 30 of the election year minus 
all spending up to the date of the aldermanic election. I 
assume that pre-aldermanic-election spending produces a 
higher share of votes only in the first election and not in 
the runoff election. Candidates with a large amount of 
resources left over to spend in the runoff campaign can 
flood their wards with advertising during this relatively 
13In these elections, number of opponents is constant 
(each candidate has only one opponent). Ward demographics 
are likely to be unimportant here as the runoff candidates 
typically represent the ward's majority population group. 
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short, but intense, campaign period much more effectively 
than candidates with few resources. 
In the preceding chapter it was noted that three 
"myths" pervade the study of runoff elections. One suggests 
that incumbents lose when forced into runoffs because they 
are perceived as weak, a perception which causes voters to 
gravitate toward the nonincumbent. A second suggests that 
minority candidates lose in mixed-race runoffs because white 
voters rally behind white candidates. A third suggests that 
the primary election leader loses in the runoff because 
voters move to support the underdog. 14 
Because Chicago's wards are racially and ethnically 
concentrated, the second myth (minority loss) cannot be 
tested adequately because most of these contests involve 
candidates of the same race or ethnicity. The other two 
myths, however, can be tested. In order to accomplish this, 
a dummy variable was included in the model for the leader in 
the first election and for the incumbent. Both of these 
variables are expected to be negatively correlated with 
candidates' share of the vote. 
In summary, election outcomes are expected to be 
affected by factors that are specific to each candidate, 
such as political experience or qualifications for off ice, 
campaign spending, the ability to obtain critical media and 
14See Bullock and Johnson (1985); Fleischmann and Stein 
(1987); Bullock and Gaddie (1994); and Stewart, Sheffield 
and Ellis (1995). 
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party endorsements, and a variety of environmental factors 
beyond the immediate control of individual candidates {see 
Table 1). In addition to examining aldermanic elections, 
this portion of the study also focuses on runoff elections. 
By testing multivariate models of runoff election outcomes, 
one can move beyond the descriptive analyses that dominate 
the literature in this area. 
Th• Incumbency Advantaqe and candidate Emerqence 
An ever-present concern in electoral politics is the 
domination of election outcomes by incumbents. This is 
problematic because of its relationship to democratic theory 
and the notion that elections in a democratic system should 
be competitive. In theory, all candidates should start from 
a level playing field and attempt to capture as many votes 
as they can based on their ideas for how to improve either 
the political process, policy outcomes, or both. This 
ensures that voters have equal information about candidates 
and can make their decisions about who to vote for on the 
basis of rational criteria. Of course, election dynamics 
rarely reflect this ideal. The major factor that affects 
the ideally competitive election is incumbency. This 
portion of the analysis considers in greater detail the 
factors that affect incumbents' share of the vote. 
The advantage of separating incumbents from 
nonincumbents is that it enables one to explore the effects 
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TABLB 1 
Model of Blection outcomes, Chicago city Council Elections, 
1979-1995 
MODBL OP CANDIDATES' VOTE SHARB 
I. Dependent Variable: candidates' share of the vote {both 
aldermanic and runoff elections) 
II. Independent Variables: 
A. Political 
1. incumbency {+) 
2. Democratic Committeeman {+) 
3. former Democratic Committeeman {+) 
4. Republican Committeeman {+) 
5. former Alderman {+) 
6. current or former state legislator {+) 
7. former candidate {+) 
8. political aide {+) 
9. political volunteer {+) 
10. current or former ward secretary {+) 
11. appointed official {+) 
12. incumbent in the runoff {-) 
13. aldermanic election leader {-) 
B. Financial 
1. candidate spending {+) 
2. opposition spending {-) 
c. Endorsements 
1. Chicago Tribune {+) 
2. Chicago Sun-Times {+) 
3. regular Democratic Organization {+) 
D. Environmental 
1. number of opponents {-) 
2. candidate's minority status {-) 
Note: The predicted direction of the relationship is in 
parentheses. 
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of variables that would be irrelevant in an analysis of 
nonincumbents only. Here, the dependent variable is 
incumbents' share of the vote. A second dependent variable, 
incumbents' electoral margin (which can be either positive 
or negative depending on if the incumbent wins or loses), 
also is used to measure the competitiveness of elections 
involving incumbents (see Abramowitz 1991). To measure this 
variable, the difference between an incumbent's vote share 
and that of their closest competitor was calculated. In 
both models, the same independent variables will be 
employed. They are discussed below. 
The literature suggests several independent variables 
that are useful in understanding these specific election 
outcomes. For the sake of organization, the independent 
variables can be divided into four categories: incumbent-
related, financial, endorsements, and environmental. 
Incumbent-Related Variables. Incumbent-related variables 
include seniority, committee assignments, scandal, quality 
of the opposition, and method of election. Contrary to what 
one might think, the literature on congressional elections 
has consistently shown that incumbents with longer tenures 
in off ice are at an electoral disadvantage (and thus at 
greater risk of losing) compared to those who are just 
beginning their careers or who are in the middle of their 
careers (Abramowitz 1988, 1991). Some incumbents are 
probably more adept at knowing when to retire, rather than 
waiting to be strongly challenged or even defeated at the 
polls. In applying this theoretical principle to city 
council elections, I hypothesize that as incumbents' 
seniority increases, their share of the vote and electoral 
margin will decrease. 
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A second incumbent-related variable measures the effect 
of incumbents' institutional positions on their electoral 
performance. The congressional literature points to the 
value of committee assignments for reelection purposes 
(Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974b). To test the effect of these 
institutional factors on city council election outcomes, all 
incumbents were coded according to whether or not they were 
committee chairman at the time of the election. One might 
expect that being a committee chairman, especially on high 
profile committees such as Finance, Budget or Zoning, to be 
a strong predictor of incumbent's share of the vote and 
election margin. Theoretically, one might expect that 
committee chairmen are better able to steer local tax 
dollars and development projects into their wards and to 
claim credit for doing so, than rank and file committee 
members. They also might be able to be more effective 
ombudsman for business interests in their wards. I expect 
committee chairmen to reap larger electoral benefits than 
rank and file committee members. 
A third incumbent-related predictor of these election 
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outcomes is the question of whether or not the incumbent 
candidate has been tainted by scandal. As Abramowitz (1988, 
1991) has shown, scandal was a significant predictor of the 
vote in both House and Senate elections involving 
incumbents. Admittedly, the measurement of this variable is 
subjective. If, for example, incumbents were implicated in 
a bribery scandal, then they were coded as having been 
tainted by scandal whether they were eventually convicted of 
illegal activity or not. Petty campaign squabbling or 
innuendo about corruption are not sufficient enough to 
classify an incumbent as having been tainted by scandal. 
This also is the type of factor that does not affect many 
incumbents overall and when it is a factor, many incumbents 
are affected at the same time. For example, "Operation 
Incubator," a 1980s federal investigation into bribery in 
Chicago politics, resulted in numerous indictments of city 
aldermen at about the same point in time. Nonetheless, its 
effect on incumbents' electoral success is expected to be 
strong. Using dummy variables coded 1 for incumbents 
involved in scandal, O otherwise, I hypothesize that this 
variable will be negatively correlated with incumbents' 
share of the vote and electoral margin. 
A fourth incumbent-related variable refers to the 
quality of an incumbent's opposition. As much of the 
literature on election outcomes has shown, incumbents who 
face high-quality challengers are more likely to experience 
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tough reelection contests (Bond, Covington and Fleisher 
1985; Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1978). Challenger 
quality was measured by including a variable for the most 
experienced challengers in races against incumbents. The 
measurement of this variable is the same as that described 
above for nonincumbent candidates generally. Challengers 
were coded O if they had no political experience at all. If 
they had experiences such as being political aides, precinct 
captains, or political volunteers (among other variables), 
they were coded 1. If the most experienced challengers had 
experience in elective positions or were high ranking 
governmental officials, they were coded 2. Experienced 
challengers are expected to be more politically-effective 
than those who have lower levels of experience, thus I 
expect a negative correlation between incumbents' vote share 
and margin of victory in the face of stronger opposition. 
A fifth incumbent-related variable is incumbents' 
method of selection to the aldermanic post. Most incumbents 
are initially elected to office. Others, however, are 
appointed by the mayor to fill a vacancy on the council and 
then run in the next regularly scheduled election for a full 
term of office. As mentioned above, there have been 
numerous appointments to the city council during the time 
frame under study, especially during the 1990s. Thus many 
incumbents are running as appointed candidates who have been 
in off ice only a short period of time and should not be 
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expected to enjoy the full advantages of incumbency in their 
first aldermanic election. To determine if this holds true, 
appointed incumbents were coded 1, all others o. I expect a 
negative correlation between appointed incumbents and their 
share of the vote and electoral margin. 
Financial Variables. The financial variables include both 
incumbents' spending and challengers' spending. For 
incumbents, this variable was measured the same way it was 
described above. All spending was adjusted to 1995 dollars 
to account for inflation. Challengers' spending in this 
model was aggregated to indicate the total amount of 
spending by all challengers. While challengers spend money 
to promote themselves, the practical effect is to decrease 
an incumbent•s share of the vote and electoral margin since 
most are targeting their actions toward def eating the 
incumbent rather than other challengers. Thus I expect that 
as aggregate challenger spending increases, incumbents• 
share of the vote and electoral margin will decrease. 
Conversely, incumbent spending should be positively 
correlated with incumbents• share of the vote and margin of 
victory. 15 
15The effect of incumbents' spending on share of the 
vote is an interesting theoretical question due to the 
debate on this issue in the congressional literature (Green 
and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1978). Because this has not been 
examined in the local politics literature, I hypothesize 
that their spending will be positively correlated with their 
share of the vote. The results of the analysis will 
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Endorsements. The endorsement variables are expected to 
work the same way as described above. Incumbents were coded 
on the basis of how many news media endorsements they 
received from Chicago's daily newspapers (0,1,2). 
Incumbents also were coded 1 if they received their ward 
organization's official endorsement. The effect of both of 
these variables is expected to be significant and positive. 
Environmental Variables. A final category of variables 
relates to the environment of elections involving incumbent 
candidates. Similar to the general model of election 
outcomes the number of challengers (amount of opposition) is 
included as a control variable. One new environmental 
variable is redistricting. Redistricting is expected to 
affect only incumbents because they have a stake in old ward 
boundaries. By contrast, open seat candidates and 
challengers have no stake in old ward boundaries and thus 
are unaffected by any changes generated from redistricting. 
Conceivably, the effect of redistricting on incumbents' 
share of the vote could be neutral, depending on the number 
of incumbents whose districts were made safer, rather than 
less secure. Practically, however, I expect that the 
effects of a safer seat will not balance out the negative 
effects wrought by an unfavorable redistricting. Thus 
determine the exact effect of incumbent spending in local 
elections, and whether or not it operates the same way that 
it does in House elections. 
incumbents whose districts were redrawn as a result of the 
1980 or 1990 censuses, are expected to receive fewer votes 
than those whose districts were not redrawn. 
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In summary, the ability of incumbents to win votes is 
expected to be a function of certain variables specific to 
them such as institutional positions (e.g., committee 
chairmanships), seniority, scandal, running as appointees, 
and spending. It also is expected to be vary in relation to 
challenger quality and spending, media and party 
endorsements, and environmental factors that affect 
incumbents and challengers alike (see Table 2). 
These models, however, do not explain candidate 
behavior. In the following section I propose models to 
explain how the political environment affects decisions by 
candidates to enter particular races. I discuss how the 
political environment affects nonincumbents generally, 
before presenting a model to explain the emergence of 
challengers. The unit of analysis is the ward. In both 
cases, I focus on the number of candidates who choose to run 
at any given time, as well as the political experience of 
those candidates. 
Predictinq Nonincumbent candidate Emerqence and 
Candidate Quality 
Chapter One discussed how candidates in legislative 
elections make decisions to run for off ice on the basis of 
TABLE 2 
Th• Incumbency Advantage and Challenger Behavior Models, 
Chicago City Council Elections, 1979-1995 
INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE MODEL 
I. Dependent Variables: 
1. incumbents' share of the vote 
2. incumbents' electoral margin 
II. Independent Variables: 
A. Incumbent-Related 
1. seniority (-) 
2. committee chairman (+) 
3. challenger quality (-) 
4. method of selection (not appointed/appointed) (-) 
5. scandal (-) 
B. Financial 
1. incumbent spending (+) 
2. aggregate challenger spending (-) 
c. Endorsements 
1. Chicago Tribune (+) 
2. Chicago Sun-Times (+) 
3. regular Democratic organization (+) 
D. Environmental 
1. number of challengers (-) 
2. redistricting (-) 
CANDIDATE BEHAVIOR MODEL 
I. Dependent Variables 
1. challenger quality 
2. number of challengers 
II. Independent Variables: environment variables only. 
1. redistricting (-) 
2. machine ward (-) 
3. open seat/non-open seat (-) 
4. percent black in the ward (+) 
5. percent Hispanic in the ward (+) 
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TABLB 2 (continued) 
Th• Incuml>ency Advantage and Challenger Behavior Models, 
Chicago city council Elections, 1979-1995 
CBALLBNGBR BBRAVIOR MODBL 
I. Dependent Variables 
1. number of challengers 
2. challenger quality 
II. Independent Variables 
A. Incumbent-Related 
1. previous election margin (+) 
2. seniority (+) 
3. scandal (+) 
4. method of selection (not appointed/appointed) (+) 
5. cash-on-hand (-) 
6. committee chairman (-) 
B. Environmental 
1. redistricting (+) 
2. percent black in the ward (+) 
3. percent Hispanic in the ward (+) 
4. machine ward (-) 
Note: The predicted direction of the relationship is in 
parentheses. 
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objective criteria. In a general sense, these criteria 
indicate to candidates their odds of winning. For example, 
more candidates may choose to run in open seat elections 
thinking that their chances of victory are greater because 
they do not have to face incumbents. Or, more candidates 
may choose to run against incumbents who are perceived as 
politically vulnerable. In other words, the more 
politically-savvy candidates behave "strategically." 
Does this idea, developed in the congressional 
elections literature, apply in local elections? To answer 
this question, I examine the behavior of all nonincumbents. 
Two dependent variables are employed: total nonincumbents in 
each race and political experience of the most experienced 
nonincumbent in each race. If more candidates run in open 
seat races than against incumbents, then there would be 
evidence to suggest that these candidates made their 
decisions to run for off ice on the basis of some objective 
criterion (e.g., absence of an incumbent on the ballot). In 
addition, knowing when experienced candidates decide to run 
for aldermen is important because of all nonincumbents, ones 
with experience are expected to be the most successful. 
Moreover, it is important to know if experienced candidates 
are more strategic in their behavior than candidates without 
experience. I first analyze all nonincumbents together, 
before examining challengers specifically. 
In looking at nonincumbents generally, I expect to find 
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that more and better candidates run in wards that are 
recently redistricted than in wards that are not. I expect 
this to be the case because the political environment in 
redistricted wards is typically less stable, a 
characteristic that should encourage candidates to run. 
Another feature of wards, whether they can be characterized 
as machine or independent, might affect the behavior of 
nonincumbents. Due to the ability of machine organizations 
to control which candidates run for off ice in particular 
elections, I expect to find fewer candidates running in 
these wards. Furthermore, of the candidates who do run, I 
expect them to have less political experience than 
candidates who run in non-machine (independent) wards. 
Likewise, whether a seat is open or not should affect 
both the number and quality of nonincumbent candidates who 
decide to run for off ice. Knowing how difficult it is to 
defeat incumbents, candidates will likely avoid running in 
these races. In addition to these factors, I also control 
for the demographic composition of wards {percent black and 
percent Hispanic in each ward). It might be the case that 
more candidates run in majority minority wards than in 
majority white wards. Historically, the opportunities for 
minorities to exercise political power in Chicago have been 
limited. Because the city's population has become more 
black and Hispanic over time, I expect this to have some 
effect on candidate emergence. With the exception of the 
demographic characteristics, all of these predictors are 
dummy variables. 
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In addition to examining the political factors that 
might affect candidate emergence generally, I also examine 
factors that might affect the behavior of political 
challengers. Chapter One demonstrated that high quality 
candidates emerge to challenge incumbents when political 
conditions show that incumbents are vulnerable (Bond, 
Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Jacobson and Kernell 1983). 
On the local level, national political circumstances will 
have no effect (especially in a city dominated by one party) 
on the quality of challengers or the number who emerge to 
face incumbents. Thus we turn to purely local factors 
concerning incumbents themselves. 
The dependent variables in this analysis are number of 
challengers incumbents face in their reelection contests and 
political experience of the most experienced incumbent 
challenger in each race, measured according to the scale 
identified above. Both of these variables are continuous. 
I expect that as an incumbent's vulnerability increases, 
both the number and quality of challengers will increase. 
The premise of this analysis is that strategic challengers 
emerge to face weak incumbents. 
How might one measure incumbent vulnerability? 
Incumbent's previous election margin might be the first 
signal to potential candidates that incumbents are 
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vulnerable to strong challenges. Thus as incumbents• margin 
of victory in their previous election increases, both the 
quality and number of challengers will decrease. Similarly, 
incumbent seniority might precipitate the emergence of a 
highly qualified and large challenger pool. Challengers 
often charge that long-time incumbents are out of step with 
district opinion or that they lack the energy to effectively 
represent district voters. Therefore, I hypothesize that as 
an incumbent•s seniority increases, more and better 
qualified candidates will emerge to challenge them. 
Incumbents tainted by scandal and incumbents who were 
originally appointed to office and who are in their first 
election for the seat, also should attract a larger number 
of well-qualified challengers than incumbents who are 
scandal-free or who have already won the off ice in an 
election. 
A final incumbent variable is their cash-on-hand at the 
start of the campaign. Assuming that challengers make 
decisions to run sometime during the summer or fall of the 
year before the election, one might expect that the amount 
of money an incumbent has on hand in July (the summer 
finance disclosure report deadline is June JO) prior to the 
election might have a deterrent effect on the quality and 
number of challengers who emerge to face incumbents. In 
other words, incumbents with large campaign war chests are 
better able to deter strong challengers than incumbents with 
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fewer resources. In order to test this proposition, I 
included in the analysis the amount of money incumbents had 
in their campaign accounts on July 1 in the year before the 
aldermanic election. I expect that as incumbents• cash-on-
hand at the start of the campaign increases, the quality and 
number of challengers will decrease. 
Redistricting also is expected to play a part in the 
decisions by potential candidates to challenge incumbents. 
Incumbents who are running for the first time under new ward 
boundaries are more likely to face high quality challengers, 
as well as a greater number of challengers, than incumbents 
whose ward boundaries are not redrawn. Redistricting often 
gives a ward new voters that incumbents have not 
incorporated into their base of support. These new voters 
may provide the support that strong challengers can exploit 
to their advantage, forcing incumbents into runoffs or even 
winning the election outright. Thus I included a dummy 
variable for redistricting to test the hypothesis that 
redistricted incumbents are more vulnerable to strong 
challengers than those whose ward boundaries have not 
changed. For reasons identical to those presented above, I 
also control for ward demographic factors (percent black and 
percent Hispanic in each ward) at the time of the election. 
Having developed models to predict election outcomes, 
and to explain the incumbent advantage and nonincumbent 
candidate emergence (see Table 2), I now move to the third 
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part of this analysis of Chicago city council elections. 
Below I specify a model to understand competition for 
campaign contributions in city council elections, a factor 
that is critically important to how well candidates are able 
to advertise themselves and put their qualifications for 
office before the voters. 
Examininq the Role of Money in City council Elections 
With the exception of a Chicago Urban League study of 
campaign finance in the 1991 Chicago city council elections 
(Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner 1995), there have been no 
in-depth studies conducted on this topic in the urban 
politics literature. The analysis in Chapter Five addresses 
this question in two ways. First, I examine how candidates' 
fundraising changes throughout the election cycle. Does 
fundraising become more intense immediately before the 
election, or are candidates concerned with other campaign 
activities (such as meeting voters or community groups) at 
that time? Second, I examine the variables that affect 
candidates' ability to raise money for their campaigns. 
Because finance data are somewhat more complete in years 
later in the time frame, I analyze fundraising for 1987, 
1991, and 1995 only. 
Campaigns and Fundraising. The first way that I examine 
fundraising is by looking at the "flow" of campaign 
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contributions within election campaigns. A recent study of 
House elections indicated, not surprisingly, that incumbents 
held a fundraising advantage over nonincumbents in every 
campaign reporting period between 1985 and the 1986 House 
elections (Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994). Because campaign 
disclosure reports are required of city council candidates 
at different times before the election, it is possible to 
understand the specific points during campaigns that 
candidates are most heavily involved in fundraising. 16 This 
primarily descriptive examination of fundraising focuses on 
differences between incumbents, challengers, and candidates 
running in open seat elections, as well as candidates 
required to compete in runoff elections. 
Predicting Candidates' Fundraising. This chapter also tests 
a model of candidates' fundraising using candidates' total 
contributions as the dependent variable. Fundraising is 
examined at two points in time. The first time point is 
December 31 in the year prior to the election. The second 
time point is June 30 of the election year. By examining 
fundraising at two points in time instead of one, it is 
possible to gain a better understanding of how campaign 
fundraising is affected by different variables during the 
16Because candidates are only required to report 
spending on an annual basis (in early years) and a semi-
annual basis (in later years) it is not possible to analyze 
the "flow" of spending in a similar fashion during 1987. 
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election cycle. In addition, by including all candidates 
together I can compare incumbents to nonincumbents. After 
analyzing all candidates together I look specifically at 
factors that might influence challengers' ability to raise 
money for their campaigns. I expect that candidates' total 
contributions are largely a function of the various 
independent variables already discussed, as well as some new 
variables that will be outlined below. 
When examining fundraising at the first time point, I 
use incumbency, candidate's race or ethnicity, number of 
opponents, and fundraising effort, as predictor variables. 
If incumbents raise significantly greater amounts of money 
than nonincumbents, this should be reflected in this 
variable. I hypothesize that incumbents will be able to 
raise more money than nonincumbents for two reasons. First, 
they have probably developed more extensive contacts during 
their tenure in off ice that allow them to raise more money 
than nonincumbents, who are less likely to have developed an 
extensive network of contributors. Second, contributors are 
expected to more readily back incumbents because of the 
greater likelihood that incumbents will win reelection. 
Candidate's ability to raise money also should be 
related to their race or ethnicity. Assuming that 
candidates for local off ice raise most of their funds within 
their own wards (see Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner 1995), 
it is likely to be the case that candidates running in more 
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affluent wards will raise more money than candidates running 
in less affluent wards. Because black and Hispanic 
candidates tend to run in wards that are less affluent than 
white wards, I expect to find a negative relationship 
between candidates• race and fundraising. 
Number of opponents also should influence fundraising. 
Since it is likely to be the case that candidates are 
seeking funds from within their own wards, a candidate's 
ability to raise money might be related to the number of 
other candidates who are seeking funds from the same 
sources. Thus, I expect that number of opponents should 
have a negative effect on candidates• fundraising. 
Candidates' fundraising also should be a function of 
the effort or time they devoted to this campaign activity. 
In order to account for fundraising effort, I include a 
variable that measures number of months candidates were 
involved in fundraising prior to the election, using 
information gathered from candidates' campaign disclosure 
reports. I expect candidates• fundraising to be higher 
where candidates spend more time working on fundraising. 
In addition to incumbency, candidate's race or 
ethnicity, number of opponents, and effort, opposition 
spending also should affect candidates' fundraising. 
Spending, especially on advertising, is one of the most 
visible signs to candidates about how well their opponents 
are able to reach voters and to increase their own name 
identification. As this number increases, I expect 
candidates to counter by raising funds more aggressively. 
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Finally, I test to see if fundraising that is done 
early in campaigns relates to fundraising that occurs later. 
In other words, is successful fundraising a cumulative 
process, affected by the ability of candidates to raise 
money early? Krasno, Green and Cowden (1994) have found 
that the ability of House challengers to raise money was 
significantly related to the amount of money that they could 
generate early in their campaigns, suggesting that 
contributors were willing to give to candidates who could 
"prove" their fundraising ability. The same dynamic might 
be at work here, as candidates build on fundraising momentum 
generated early in the election cycle. Thus I expect 
fundraising totals (less the amount from the first reporting 
period) of candidates to be positively related to the total 
amount of money they are able to raise early in the 
campaign. 
Challengers' Fundraising. After I examine the correlates of 
fundraising for all candidates, I examine factors that 
affect challengers' ability to raise money for their 
campaigns. In doing so, I test all the variables that have 
been identified above, as well as a measure of challenger 
quality. The ability of challengers to raise campaign funds 
is expected to vary according to their political experience. 
The more politically experienced they are (based on the 
political experience indicator I have used throughout this 
chapter), the more campaign funds they are likely to 
receive. 
Caapaiqn Pundraisinq: A swnmary 
86 
Chapter five focuses on the dynamics of campaign 
fundraising as it occura in the election cycle. This is an 
important topic because when candidates are able to generate 
contributions often has a significant effect on election 
outcomes. If incumbents are the only candidates who can 
raise large sums of money in the month before the election, 
then this has profound implications for the competitiveness 
of these elections. If only politically-experienced 
nonincumbents can raise large amounts of money immediately 
before the election, then what are the implications for 
citizen-politicians who lack real "political" experience, 
but who nonetheless want to serve their wards as alderman? 
In order to discuss these larger questions, one needs basic 
information on campaign fundraising. This analysis seeks to 
provide that information. 
In Chapter Five I also test a model to predict 
candidates' total contributions (see Table 3). The ability 
of candidates to raise money for their campaigns is expected 
to be related to a variety of factors, such as incumbency, 
fundraising effort, political experience, opposition 
TABLB 3 
Model of candidates• Total Contributions, Chicaqo city 
council Elections, 1979-1995 
MODBL POR ALL CANDIDATES 
I. Dependent Variable: 
1. candidates' total contributions 
2. candidates' total contributions (minus 
contributions from the first reporting period). 
II. Independent Variables 
A. Candidate-Related 
1. incumbency (+) 
2. fundraising effort (+) 
3. candidate's race: black or Hispanic (-) 
B. Financial 
1. opposition spending (+) 
2. early campaign contributions (+) 
c. Environmental 
1. number of opponents (-) 
CHALLENGERS' PUNDRAISING MODEL 
I. Dependent Variable 
1. challengers' total contributions 
2. challengers' total contributions (less first 
reporting period receipts) 
II. Independent Variables 
A. candidate Variables 
1. candidate quality (+) 
2. fundraising effort (+) 
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3. candidate's race or ethnicity:black or Hispanic(-) 
B. Financial 
1. opposition spending (+) 
2. early campaign contributions (+) 
c. Environmental 
1. number of opponents (-) 
Note: The predicted direction of the relationship is in 
parentheses. 
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spending, number of opponents, and race or ethnicity. I 
also expect fundraising to be related to the ability of 
candidates to generate funds early in their campaigns. The 
findings from this portion of the analysis will extend the 
existing literature on local elections into an area of 
inquiry that has been covered extensively by those studying 
other legislative bodies such as the U.S. Congress. 
Methods and Data Sources 
This study uses both descriptive and inferential 
statistical methods to reach conclusions about the politics 
of Chicago city council elections. Ordinary least squares 
regression analysis is used to explain variation in the 
study's dependent variables (see Tables 1, 2, 3). This 
statistical method allows one to test the effects particular 
independent variables have on the dependent variable holding 
constant all other independent variables in the model. 
Ordinary least squares is useful in cases where the 
dependent variable is continuous or scaled in ratio form 
(i.e., when zero is a meaningful value). Predicting 
candidates' share of the vote is an example of a variable 
that is continuous. In any election, candidates can receive 
between zero and 100 percent of the vote. The regression 
coefficients that are produced by ordinary least squares 
represent the effect on the dependent variable of a one unit 
change in the independent variable, holding constant other 
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independent variables. 
The data for this study can be broken down into five 
general categories: candidates• background data, official 
election returns, campaign finance, incumbent-related 
variables, and ward demographics. In general, candidates' 
background data come from newspaper clippings files of 
aldermanic elections held at the Municipal Reference Desk in 
Chicago's Harold Washington Library. These files are an 
invaluable source of data on aldermanic elections because 
they include information from Chicago's major daily 
newspapers, as well as information from the hundreds of 
community and neighborhood papers that exist in the city. 
Information on candidates' background characteristics such 
as occupational status, political experience, ward 
organization connections, newspaper endorsements, and race 
were gleaned from these sources. The 1979 and 1983 election 
return data also were gathered from the Municipal Reference 
Desk's collection of official returns. Election return data 
for 1987, 1991 and 1995 were gathered from official returns 
located at the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners. 
Campaign finance data were collected from the State of 
Illinois Board of Elections, which houses the campaign 
disclosure reports filed by all candidates running for 
alderman whose expenditures or revenues exceeded $1,000 at 
any point during their campaigns (State of Illinois Board of 
Elections 1993,1). The first step in collecting these data 
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was to complete separate request forms for each candidate's 
political campaign committee(s). The completed forms were 
then mailed to the State Board of Elections off ices in 
Springfield, Illinois, where a member of the staff copied 
the campaign disclosure reports. In the end, more than 
1,000 (4x6) microfiche cards were copied and delivered. 
These cards contain both revenue and expenditure data on all 
aldermanic candidates who entered elections between 1979 and 
1995 and who were required by law to file reports. In order 
to ensure a complete set of records, an inventory was taken 
of the campaign disclosure reports that I requested versus 
the ones that I received. Ultimately, there were only a few 
disclosure reports that did not make it into the first box 
of reports that were mailed to me in late September, 1995. 
Finally, incumbent-related variables such as committee 
assignments were collected from the Harold Washington 
Library's collection of the official proceedings of the city 
council. Ward demographic data were collected from city 
government reports based on official census data (City of 
Chicago 1973, 1983, 1991, 1993; Election Data Services 
1995). 
The research design that I have presented in this 
chapter is suitable for answering the following four 
questions. First, which factors determine election outcomes 
in both aldermanic elections and runoff elections? Second, 
which factors undergird the incumbency advantage? Third, 
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which factors explain decisions by candidates to run for the 
Chicago city council? And, fourth, which factors predict 
candidates' ability to raise campaign funds? The following 
chapter presents the analysis of election outcomes, in both 
regular aldermanic elections and runoff contests. 
CHAPTER III 
DYlfAllICS AND COKPETITIOH IH CHICAGO CITY COUHCIL ELECTIOHS 
This chapter is concerned with determining which 
factors affect outcomes in city council elections. It 
presents descriptive, as well as inferential, evidence from 
Chicago city council elections in an attempt to address this 
issue. The results of the analysis will broaden our 
understanding of city council election dynamics and 
competition for office. 
The chapter is divided into several distinct sections. 
The first section discusses the results of multiple 
regression analyses performed on each election year in the 
time frame and attempts to discern which factors (e.g., 
incumbency, spending, media endorsements) are most important 
in predicting candidates' share of the vote. The second 
section presents results from regression analyses undertaken 
on nonincumbent candidates, an important subset of all 
candidates, which includes candidates who run in open seat 
contests as well as those who challenge incumbents. The 
third section examines variation in city council election 
dynamics vary between wards. For example, do the same 
factors predict election outcomes in majority black and 
majority white wards? Because there are no a priori reasons 
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for thinking that the dynamics might be different, this part 
of the analysis is somewhat more exploratory in nature than 
the analyses that precede it. The fourth section examines 
runoff elections, which are required when no candidate 
receives more than 50 percent of the vote in the initial 
aldermanic election. The final part of the chapter 
summarizes the major findings and addresses the implications 
of the results for our understanding of urban politics. 
The analyses presented in this chapter are based on a 
sample of 631 candidates who ran for the Chicago city 
council in regularly scheduled elections held from 1979 to 
1995. All special elections were excluded. I also excluded 
all candidates who received less than five percent of the 
vote in their elections. There were both theoretical and 
practical grounds for limiting the study in this fashion. 
Theoretically, because I am interested in electoral 
competition, it made sense to exclude candidates who were 
not minimally competitive in their elections. Of the 
various reasons for seeking local office {see Bledsoe 
1993,70-80), many do so simply for the publicity it gives 
them and are not seriously concerned with winning. 
Practically, it reduced to a manageable level the number of 
observations for which I had to collect data. As mentioned 
in Chapter One, more than 1,100 candidates ran for the city 
council during this period. 
To begin the analysis I present below descriptive 
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information on the nature of competition in Chicago city 
council elections, by examining who wins and who loses these 
races. Following this I test multivariate regression models 
to determine correlates of candidates' vote share in city 
council elections. 
Th• Nature of competition in Chicaqo City council Elections 
Before testing multivariate models of candidates' vote 
share in city council elections, it is instructive to know 
when competition is absent from aldermanic elections. This 
will permit some basic understanding of city council 
election dynamics and will inform the analyses that follow. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of wards in which only one 
candidate was running (i.e., was unopposed) in each of the 
five elections held between 1979 and 1995. As one can see, 
the least competitive election year was 1979. In this year, 
20 wards had only one candidate in the election. Judging 
from the number of wards with unopposed candidates, one 
might suggest that the level of competition in Chicago city 
council elections has increased over time, despite the 
upsurge in the number of wards with unopposed candidates 
during the 1995 election. 
These numbers, however, do not describe patterns in who 
wins and who loses these contests. Of 137 opposed 
candidates who won outright (i.e., were not forced into 
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runoff elections), 117, or 85.4 percent, were incumbents. 1 
Incumbents also dominated nonincumbents in terms of vote 
share. Figure 2 graphically shows the percentage of 
incumbents receiving between 51 and 60 percent of the vote. 
The percentage of incumbents falling within this category is 
important because it indicates how difficult it is for 
incumbents to win reelection. In the congressional 
elections literature, much has been written about the 
decline in the number of marginal incumbents who win 
reelection with 55 percent or less of the vote. Today, most 
House incumbents win with vote shares far in excess of this 
total, leading many to the conclusion that House elections 
are hopelessly one-sided affairs favoring incumbents (see 
Erikson 1971; Mayhew 1974a; Fiorina 1977; Ferejohn 1977; 
Jacobson 1987). 
As one can see, there is no clear pattern to the 
percentage of incumbents winning reelection with between 51 
and 60 percent of the vote (a umarginal" reelection 
percentage for incumbents) in Chicago city council 
elections. Incumbent electoral security was threatened most 
severely in 1979, 1983 and 1995, but less so in 1987 and 
1991. It is reasonable to speculate that incumbents in 1979 
1Logistic regression analysis performed on each 
election year confirmed the dominance of incumbency in 
predicting who wins Chicago city council elections. In 
1979, incumbency alone correctly predicted 86 percent of the 
cases. Between 1983 and 1995, incumbency alone correctly 
predicted over 95 percent of the winners and losers in these 
contests. 
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were less able to control election outcomes in the aftermath 
of the Cook County Democratic Party's general political 
demise. Decreased machine efficiency in aldermanic 
elections probably opened-up the political system within 
wards to more independent candidates {i.e., those not 
aligned with county Democrats). Because ward boundaries 
were redrawn before the 1983 and 1995 elections, it is 
likely that redistricting had an effect on incumbents' 
electoral security in those years, forcing many into the 
marginal category. The general picture to emerge, however, 
is that incumbents are safe bets to win reelection, very 
much like incumbents running for reelection in other 
legislative bodies. 
Figures 3 and 4 more dramatically display the incumbent 
advantage in these contests. Figure 3 shows the percentage 
of incumbent and nonincumbent candidates who received less 
than 50 percent of the vote in their elections. Nearly 100 
percent of nonincumbent candidates in each election received 
less than 50 percent of the vote, and thus were unable to 
claim victory in the first election. Figure 4, which shows 
the percentage of candidates who received greater than 60 
percent of the vote, displays almost the exact opposite 
pattern. Incumbent candidates have clearly dominated the 
field of candidates winning 60 percent or more of the vote 
in their elections. Overall, incumbents tend to cluster 
near the high-end of the vote scale, while nonincumbent 
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candidates generally fall in the low-end (below 50 percent 
of the vote) • 
Incumbent candidates are clearly at an advantage in 
city council elections. The advantage, however, is 
difficult to evaluate precisely. on the one hand, the 
number of wards with unopposed candidates, has decreased in 
every election since 1979 with the exception of the 1995 
election when it increased, but did not come near the 1979 
total of 20. The percentage of incumbents winning with 
"marginal" vote percentages has not gone below 30, and 
reached peaks of over 40 percent in both 1983 and 1995, 
suggesting that in these two elections, a greater percentage 
of incumbents faced difficult reelection battles. On the 
other hand, the percentage of wards with unopposed 
incumbents winning with 60 percent or more of the vote 
increased steadily between 1979 and 1991, only to fall 
dramatically in 1995, from 62 percent to 48 percent of all 
opposed incumbents running for reelection. 
Predicting candidates' Share of the Vote 
To precisely gauge the incumbent advantage and to more 
broadly understand the factors that are important for 
predicting success in Chicago city council elections, I 
present and test a series of multiple regression models. 
Multiple regression allows one to understand the effect 
particular variables have on the dependent variable, holding 
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constant other factors that might also affect how candidates 
perform in elections. The model presented in Chapter Two 
highlighted the importance of three categories of variables: 
candidate's political experience, media and party 
endorsements, and campaign spending. The dependent variable 
is candidates' share of the vote. The unit of analysis is 
the individual candidate. 
As described in Chapter Two, the analysis below is 
designed to test the following hypotheses: 
Political Experience. Political experience is expected to 
be a critical factor in predicting how well candidates 
perform in their elections. Of all the different types of 
political experiences one might have, incumbency is expected 
to be the most important. In addition to incumbency, I have 
included in the model of nonincumbents a variable that 
measures other types of political experience. For example, 
candidates who held other elective office are typically 
better known among voters than candidates lacking such 
experience, and therefore are expected to be more 
competitive in their elections. I have coded nonincumbents 
according to the amount of political experience they had at 
the time of their elections. Those with no political 
experience at all were coded o. Nonincumbents who had 
experience as political aides, political volunteers, former 
ward committeemen, former aldermen, or former political 
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candidates were coded 1. Incumbent committeemen, current or 
former state legislators, and upper-level political 
officials (e.g., appointed officials) were coded 2. I 
expect a strong and positive correlation between 
nonincumbent political experience and share of the vote 
received by these candidate. 
Political and Media Endorsements. I expect a strong, 
positive correlation between Democratic Party ward 
organization endorsements and candidates' share of the vote. 
In addition, candidates may also be endorsed by one, or 
both, of the city's major newspapers. Because media 
endorsements (a) lend credibility to candidates and (b) 
increase their name identification among voters, I expect a 
strong and positive relationship between this variable and 
candidates' share of the vote. 
Campaign Spending. As candidate spending increases, 
candidates' share of the vote should increase as well. I 
also expect a strong, negative correlation between 
opposition spending and candidates' vote share. Both 
candidates' spending and opposition spending were measured 
in 1995 dollars and converted into thousands of dollars to 
ease interpretation of regression coefficients. In 
addition, as the literature has shown, there is often a 
diminishing marginal return between campaign spending and 
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candidates' share of the vote (see Jacobson, 1978). Because 
this relationship violates the linearity assumption in 
multiple regression analysis (see Berry and Feldman 1985,51-
53), I used the natural log of both candidates' spending and 
opposition spending in thousands of dollars as opposed to 
the actual figure for these two variables. The natural log 
of spending corrects for the nonlinear relationship between 
spending and votes. 
Environmental Variables. In addition to the variables 
described above, a number of control variables were utilized 
in the analysis. The most important of these is expected to 
be the number of opponents candidates face in their 
elections. On average candidates face approximately three 
opponents (2.82) (data not shown). As this number 
increases, I expect candidates' vote share to decrease, as 
each candidate in the race detracts from other candidates' 
vote share. I have also included a variable denoting 
whether or not candidates who ran for alderman were running 
as members of the minority population in their wards, to 
control for the propensity of voters to support own-race 
candidates. In order to account for this possibility, all 
candidates were coded on whether or not their race or 
ethnicity matched that of the majority population in their 
wards. Non-majority race candidates were coded 1 and 
majority race candidates were coded o. I expect minority 
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candidates to receive fewer votes than majority candidates. 
Pindinqs 
Bivariate Correlates of candidates• vote Share 
Table 4 presents results of bivariate correlations 
between model variables and candidates' percentage of the 
vote. Bivariate correlations are important because they 
indicate strength of relationships between independent and 
dependent variables. The independent variables are 
categorized in four ways: candidate's experience (political 
and professional); financial variables; endorsements; and 
political environment. Of the many candidate experience 
variables, incumbency is the strongest predictor of 
candidates' vote share. In addition to incumbency, whether 
or not candidates were the incumbent Democratic Committeeman 
at the time of the election, also seems to be an important 
predictor of the vote. With few exceptions, none of the 
other experience variables are significant in the bivariate 
case. Contrary to other research (for example, Lieske 
1989), candidates' occupational status appears to have no 
influence on election outcomes. In all of the election 
years shown in Table 4, professional occupation is 
negatively signed, contrary to my expectations. 
Candidates' political experience, therefore, seems to 
be important factors in election outcomes. Not all 
experience variables are the same, however. As expected, 
TABLB 4 
Bivariate correlations between candidates• vote Percentage and Hodel variables, 
Chicago City Council Blections, 1979-1995 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 1979 1983 1987 1991 199S 
Candidates' Experience 
Incumbent .S8** .70** .77** .78** .79** 
Democratic committeeman .37** .40** .Sl** .49** .4S** 
Former alderman .02 .OS -.oo -.01 -.06 
Former Democratic 
Committeeman -.04 -.04 -.08 
Precinct captain .02 -.06 -.01 -.04 -.11 
Ward secretary -.03 .17 -.OS -.OS 
Former candidate -.2S -.06 -.lS -.12 -.09 
State legislator .09 -.oo .OS .01 .09 
Political volunteer -.18 .03 -.07 -.07 -.08 
Political aide -.07 -.OS -.02 -.09 -.OS 
Appointee .04 -.lS -.03 .lS 
Professional occupation -.09 -.17 -.20 -.21 -.12 
Community activist -.lS -.11 -.07 -.09 -.OS 
Minority status -.23 .11 -.14 .lS .06 ,_. 0 
O'\ 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
Bivariate Correlations between candidates• Vote Percentaqe and Model variables, 
Chicaqo City Council Elections, 1979-1995 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 1979 1983 1987 1991 
f inanQial Ya~iables 
Spending .46** .53** .54** .51** 
Opposition spending -.28* -.25** -.45** -.44** 
Endorsements 
Media .41** .51** .62** .71** 
Democratic Party .70** .66** .72** .72** 
fQlitiQal EnYi~Qnment 
Number of opponents -.56** -.45** -.47** -.51** 
Number of cases 79 134 133 159 
Note: ~~ means that there were no candidates with this type of experience. 
*p = .01 (one-tailed test). 
**p = .001 (one-tailed test). 
1995 
.62** 
-.35** 
.73** 
.68** 
-.43** 
126 
...... 
0 
-..J 
108 
elective office experience is the most important experience 
to have. More importantly, candidates with ward-level 
elective office experience appear to benefit greatly from 
their experience. Incumbent aldermen and incumbent 
Democratic Committeemen are the two most important elected 
officials in city wards. This experience, and name 
identification among ward voters, appears to pay dividends 
at the polls. Candidates with other types of political 
experience do not appear to benefit from it to any 
significant degree. In many instances, the sign of the 
coefficients are not in the expected direction and, when 
they are correctly signed, they are not significant. 
Financial variables -- candidates' spending and 
opposition spending -- are in the expected direction and 
significant at the .001 level. Consistent with my 
hypotheses, this indicates that campaign spending is an 
important predictor of election outcomes. In addition to 
spending, candidates who are endorsed by local media and 
their ward's Democratic party organization benefit from the 
exposure they get from this and from the legions of party 
workers who support the organization's candidate on election 
day. Candidates' vote share also appears to vary inversely 
with the number of candidates in the race. This stands to 
reason; more candidates in the race should decrease each 
candidate's vote share to a certain degree. Finally, being 
part of a minority group in one's ward also does not appear 
to hurt candidates' chances of success in city council 
elections. 
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Bivariate correlations, however, do not show the effect 
that these variables have on candidates' vote share holding 
other factors constant. They do provide some guidance, 
however, in sorting out exactly which variables ought to be 
included in multivariate regression models. For example, 
the bivariate analysis shows that incumbency and Democratic 
Committeeman variables should be controlled for in models 
predicting election outcomes. Similarly, candidates' 
spending, opposition spending, endorsements (both those 
given by media sources and local Democratic organizations), 
and number of opponents, are probably good indicators of 
election outcomes as well. Because candidate's race is a 
theoretically important variable, it is also included in the 
models that follow despite the lack of significance for this 
variable in the bivariate case. Multiple regression can 
determine if these relationships are indeed significant or 
if they weaken (i.e., are spurious) when other factors are 
controlled. 
Multivariate Model Findings 
Table 5 displays results of multiple regression models 
for each election year. The results show that all of the 
significant factors mentioned above, remain significant when 
controlling for alternative explanations of vote outcomes. 
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overall, the models perform exceptionally well; none 
explains less than 65 percent of the variation in 
candidates' share of the vote. Incumbency status exerts a 
significant and positive effect on candidates' share of the 
vote. In each election year, incumbents realize an increase 
in their share of the vote of nearly 20 percentage points, 
significant at the .001 level. Candidates who are also 
their ward's Democratic Committeeman also appear to benefit 
from their experience, although the effect is less 
consistent and less powerful than that for incumbency. 
These findings and those presented above for the bivariate 
model suggest that there is a clear hierarchy among types of 
political experience, with incumbency located at the top. 
As hypothesized, candidates' spending is a strong and 
significant predictor of candidates' share of the vote in 
each election; as candidates spend more in their campaigns, 
their vote share increases. Opposition spending also 
behaves in the predicted direction, but its effects are much 
less consistent than those shown for candidates' spending. 
In only three of the five years (1979, 1983 and 1991) is 
opposition spending significant and negatively correlated 
with candidates' share of the vote. 
Because high multicollinearity existed between 
incumbency and Democratic organization support, 2 the 
2Incumbency and Democratic organization support are 
strongly correlated and highly significant (.64, p = .001). 
In none of the election years does the bivariate 
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Democratic organization endorsement variable was excluded as 
a predictor variable from the analysis shown in Table 5. 
The other type of endorsement, from media sources, however, 
was included in the model and is a very strong predictor of 
the vote in all the elections except 1979. That media 
endorsements are not significant for 1979 is likely due to 
the fact that the 1979 analysis is based on about 40 percent 
fewer cases than is shown in the other cross-sectional 
analyses. It may also be related to the fact that the Cook 
County Democratic Party machine probably had more control 
over election outcomes in 1979, as voters looked to the 
organization more than to the media for guidance in who to 
select. In general though, as candidates move from zero 
endorsements to one endorsement, and from one endorsement to 
two endorsements, they receive a fairly substantial increase 
in the share of the vote. Voters obviously rely heavily on 
cues given by local print media late in the campaign season 
in making their choice for alderman in their ward. 
In addition to these variables, number of opponents is 
a significant predictor of candidates' vote share. As 
hypothesized, candidates' vote share decreases as this 
number increases. Each additional candidate in the race 
results in a vote share increase of over three points. This 
finding indicates that electoral environment is an important 
relationship between incumbency and Democratic organization 
support drop below .52 (p = .001). In 1991, the 
relationship reached its peak at .70, (p = .001). 
TABLE 5 
can4i4ates• Vote Percentaqe, Chicaqo City Council Elections, 1979-1995, by Election 
Year, (OLS) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 1979 
Incumbent .179*** 
(.37) 
Democratic Committeeman .093+ 
(.14) 
Spending .023*** 
(.31) 
Opposition spending -.013* 
(-.16) 
Media .022 
(.09) 
Opponents -.050*** 
(-.30) 
Minority -.058 
(.10) 
Intercept .393*** 
Adj. R2 .65 
F-value 21.848*** 
1983 
.204*** 
(. 42) 
.105*** 
( .17) 
.013** 
( .16) 
-.006 
(-.06) 
.070*** 
(.29) 
-.040*** 
(-.29) 
.043* 
(. 06) 
.288*** 
.73 
53.260*** 
1987 
.197*** 
(.37) 
.079* 
( .12) 
.020*** 
(. 24) 
-.018*** 
(-.18) 
.045** 
( .16) 
-.033*** 
(-.24) 
-.031 
(-.03) 
.316*** 
.75 
57.640*** 
1991 
.205*** 
(. 41) 
.054* 
(. 08) 
.011*** 
( .13) 
-.021*** 
(-.14) 
.071*** 
(. 27) 
-.037*** 
(-.24) 
-.044 
(-.05) 
.340*** 
.80 
91.308*** 
1995 
.215*** 
(. 43) 
.039 
(. 06) 
.019*** 
(. 22) 
-.009 
(-. 07) 
.063*** 
(. 23) 
-.031*** 
(-.18) 
-.035 
(-.02) 
.271*** 
.76 
57.579*** 
Number of cases 79 134 133 159 126 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standardized regression 
coefficients in parentheses. +p = .10; *P = .05. **P = .01. ***P = .001. ...... ...... 
N 
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part of city council elections and that variables largely 
beyond the control of individual candidates (like number of 
opponents) have discernable effects on election outcomes. 
Somewhat contrary to expectations (but consistent with 
findings in the bivariate model), whether or not candidates 
are minorities in their wards has little effect on election 
outcomes. In fact, being in the minority in 1983 appears to 
have helped those candidates. That this variable is not 
more important in predicting election outcomes is related to 
the fact that few non-majority race candidates run in these 
elections due to large amounts of racial segregation in the 
city and the presence of super-majority wards. In addition 
to these factors, many of the candidates who run in wards 
with demographics that put them in the minority happen to be 
white incumbents seeking reelection. While no minority 
represents a majority white ward, white incumbents 
historically, and in the present context, do represent 
majority black wards. 3 
The analysis of the five separate elections suggests a 
clear pattern among the variables. Examining the 
standardized regression coefficients in Table 5, one can see 
that incumbency is the strongest predictor of the vote, 
followed by number of opponents, media endorsements, 
3Larry Bloom (Fifth Ward), a white incumbent, 
represented a majority black ward from 1983-1995. Thomas 
Murphy (Eighteenth Ward), also a white incumbent, represents 
majority black residents on the city's Southwest Side. 
114 
campaign spending and the dummy variable for Democratic 
committeeman. These variables were predicted to be the 
strongest variables in the model and, indeed, that is what 
the regression models for each election year indicate. 
The pooled regression model presented in Table 6 tells 
a similar story. Pooling the cases allows for greater 
variability among the predictors and permits one to make 
broader claims about the findings than is possible through 
the type of cross-sectional analyses presented in Table 5. 
The results in Table 6 confirm much of what was found when 
looking at each election year separately. Incumbency is 
again the strongest predictor of candidates' share of the 
vote. Incumbent candidates realize a 21 percent advantage 
over nonincumbents. Number of opponents also is significant 
and inversely correlated with candidates' vote share. Media 
endorsements, candidates' spending, and opposition spending, 
also are significant and in the predicted direction. The 
least influential of the significant predictors is 
Democratic Committeeman, which reflects the inconsistent 
nature of the relationship between this variable and 
candidates' vote share found above. Likewise, the minority 
race variable also is not significant. With no exceptions, 
the unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients 
are nearly identical with those presented in the analysis of 
each election year. This suggests that these variables are 
'l'ABLB 6 
candidate•' vote Percentaqe, Chicaqo City council 
Blectiona, 1979-1995, Pooled Model (OLS) 
INDEPENDENT b 
VARIABLES coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Incumbent .209*** 
(.013) 
Democratic Committeeman .073*** 
(. 015) 
Spending .016*** 
(.002) 
Opposition spending -.014*** 
(-.002) 
Media .057*** 
(. 006) 
Opponents -.037*** 
(-.003) 
Minority .010 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
Number of cases 
***P = .001. 
(. 018) 
.313*** 
.75 
272.548*** 
631 
standardized 
coefficient 
.42 
.11 
.20 
-.13 
.21 
.25 
.01 
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robust predictors of city council election outcomes. 
overall, the model explains 75 percent of the variation in 
candidates' vote share. 
The analyses presented here confirm most of the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter Two and tested above for 
candidates' share of the vote in city council elections. 
Incumbency, spending, media endorsements, and electoral 
environment variables such as number of opponents, all are 
significant predictors of election outcomes. The most 
important variables are those that enhance candidates' name 
identification among voters. Obviously, being an incumbent 
politician in the ward (alderman or Democratic Committeeman) 
enhances the possibility that one will be recognized (and 
recognized favorably) by voters on election day. Spending 
and media endorsements play a similar role. Spending and 
endorsements give candidates exposure from which they might 
not otherwise benefit. 
candidates• Share of the Vote in Races that Involve 
Incwal:>ents 
Including all candidates together in the same model may 
understate the effect of incumbency (and thus the incumbency 
advantage) in predicting election outcomes. Because many of 
the races included in Table 5 and Table 6 do not involve 
incumbents (i.e., are open seats), the size of incumbents' 
electoral advantage may be decreased somewhat. 
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Table 7 shows results of an analysis of those races 
that involve incumbents. In this model, I expect to see the 
value of incumbency increase vis-a-vis the results in the 
tables discussed above. The results show that this is, in 
fact, the case. The size of the coefficient associated with 
the incumbency dummy variable is larger in Table 7 in four 
of the five elections studied. According to the results of 
this model, incumbents' electoral advantage over challengers 
never drops below 20 points and reaches a peak of 24 points 
in the 1995 elections. In other respects, the effects of 
these variables are very consistent with what is shown in 
Table 5 and Table 6. 
Candidates who are their ward's Democratic Committeeman 
at the time of the election realize an increase in their 
share of the vote (although the effect is not significant in 
the 1991 and 1995 elections). Candidates' spending, 
opposition spending, and media endorsements, also have 
significant effects on candidates' vote share. As is noted 
above, minority candidates are not disadvantaged in these 
elections. In fact, in four of the five elections, the sign 
of the coefficient for minority candidates is positive, 
although this variable is not significant in any one year. 
This analysis lends validity to the claim made above that 
the reason minorities are not disadvantaged in these 
elections is because many of the minority candidates happen 
TABLE 7 
candidates• Vote Percentage in Races that Involve IncUllbents, Chicago City Council 
Elections, 1979-1995, by Election Year (OLS) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 
Incumbent .220*** .238*** .203*** .204*** .242*** 
(. 51) (. 51) (. 39) (. 41) (. 50) 
Democratic Committeeman .112* .066* .085* .039 .044 
( .19) ( .11) ( .12) (. 06) (. 07) 
Spending .016** .012** .019*** .011** .013** 
(. 22) ( .14) (. 22) ( .12) ( .15) 
Opposition spending -.021** -.014** -.019*** -.022*** .002 
(-.27) (-.14) (-.20) (-.14) (. 02) 
Media .006 .061*** .048** .081*** .070*** 
(. 02) (. 25) (. 16) (. 30) (. 26) 
Opponents -.070*** ~033*** -.036*** -.035*** -.038*** 
(-.33) // (-.22) (-.20) (-.01) (-.19) 
Minority 
·;ri/ .054 -.040 .060 .113 ( . ) (. 07) (-.03) (. 05) (. 05) 
Intercept /424*** .282*** .320*** .329*** .231*** 
I 
Adj. R2 ~1 
~~~ 
.79 .77 .84 .82 
F-value 20.351*** 60.632*** 56.788*** 100.219*** 72.329*** 
Number of cases 57 109 115 132 108 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standardized regression 
coefficients in parentheses. *P = .05. **P = .01. ***P = .001. ....... ....... 
00 
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to be incumbent aldermen who typically win reelection. 
Next I examine a model to explain nonincumbent 
candidates' vote share to determine, in particular, the 
relationship between being endorsed by the ward's Democratic 
Party organization and candidates' vote share. 
Bonincumbent Candidates 
As mentioned above, because of the high correlation 
between incumbency and ward organization support, it was 
statistically difficult to accurately measure the separate 
effects of the ward organization support variable on 
candidates' share of the vote. 4 As discussed in Chapter 
Two, the Democratic Party in Chicago, via its subunits 
located in the city's wards, has been critically important 
to the success or failure of many candidates over time. 
This is still expected to be the case, despite the fact that 
the centralized political party that existed under Mayor 
Richard ~aley does n:Jexist today (Erie 1988; Kemp and 
Lineberry 1982). ~~~)ossible to speculate, however, that 
the effect of this variable will weaken over time as we move 
away from the machine's heyday in the 1970s. 
4There is also a strong relationship between incumbency 
and being the ward's Democratic Committeeman (.50, p = .001) 
and being endorsed by local media (.49, p = .001). While 
these levels of collinearity are high, they are not too 
strong to drop from multivariate models, in which some 
covariation between independent variables is expected to 
exist. 
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In order to understand the effectiveness of ward 
organizations and the effect their endorsements have on 
candidates' share of the vote in Chicago city council 
elections, I performed an analysis similar to the one 
discussed above for challengers, controlling for election 
type (i.e., whether they were running in an open seat 
election or were facing an incumbent). By including 
candidates for open seats and challengers in the same model, 
one is able to examine candidates for open seats who, 
combined, are too few in number during any election year to 
analyze separately. The results of the analysis are 
presented in Table 8. 
overall, the models perform well, predicting a large 
degree of the variance in candidates' share of the vote. 
Reading across the top row of coefficients, one can see that 
having the support of the Democratic ward organization has a 
profound effect on how well candidates do at the polls. The 
size of the unstandardized coefficient is stable, positive, 
and significant at the .001 level in each of the four 
elections between 1979 and 1991. Candidates who receive the 
backing of the Democratic organization in their wards can 
expect an increase in their share of the vote in the range 
of 15 to 18 percent. The effect of the organization support 
variable, however, drops precipitously in the 1995 election. 
Reading down the 1995 column, one can speculate why this 
might be the case. In 1995, candidate's political 
TABLB 8 
Honincuabent Candidates• Vote Percentaqe, Chicaqo City Council Elections, 1979-1995 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 
Organization support .183*** .232*** .146*** .166*** .024 
(. 41) (. 53) (.37) (. 41) (. 06) 
Election -.030 -.033+ -.066** -.003 -.069** 
(-.09) (-.10) (-.20) (-.01) (-.21) 
Political experience -.022 .002 -.001 .025* .063*** 
(. 08) (. 01) (-. 01) ( .14) (.32) 
Spending .020*** .008* .016*** .012*** .015*** 
(.34) ( .13) (.33) (. 25) (. 27) 
Opposition spending -.001 -.003 -.006 -.007 -.001 
(-.02) (-.05) (-.10) (-.06) (-. 01) 
Media .054** .074*** .008 .038** .049** 
(. 25) (. 41) (. 03) ( .19) (. 20) 
Opponents -.053*** -.026*** -.036*** -.027*** -.029*** 
(-.39) (-.27) (-.47) (-.31) (-.29) 
Minority -.020 -.025 -.021 .012 -.033 
(-.04) (-.04) (-.03) (. 02) (-.04) 
Intercept .333*** .244*** .332*** .234*** .268*** 
Adj. R2 .74 .71 .51 .57 .53 
F-value 22.217*** 32.246*** 13.955*** 20.627*** 14.244*** 
Number of cases 61 104 100 121 94 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients; standardized coefficients in parentheses.*p =.OS. **p =.01. ***p =.001 • 
...... 
N 
...... 
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experience had its largest effect on election outcomes, 
decreasing (in part} the importance of ward organization 
support for nonincumbents in the 1995 election. Political 
experience that increases candidates' name recognition and 
practical government experience are more beneficial than 
those experiences that do not have this effect. 
Election type (open seat versus one involving an 
incumbent} also exerts a significant and negative effect on 
candidates' share of the vote, suggesting that nonincumbents 
who challenged incumbents in 1987 and 1995 were at a 
disadvantage vis-a-vis candidates running in open seat 
elections. The effect of this variable is confounded 
somewhat by the fact that nonincumbents running in open seat 
elections are included with challengers. In the years for 
which election type is significant, the percentages of 
nonincumbents challenging incumbents reached peaks of 83.4 
percent and 80.8 percent, respectively. 
Media endorsements and number of opponents also behave 
in predictable ways. With the exception of the 1987 
election, media endorsements have a positive and significant 
effect on candidates' vote share. Next to organization 
backing, number of opponents is the strongest and most 
consistent predictor of the vote. Each additional opponent 
produces a decrease in candidates' vote share of 
approximately three to four percent, similar to the analysis 
of all candidates. 
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As hypothesized, candidate spending also is a strong 
predictor of the vote, although it is not as powerful as 
either organization support and number of opponents. 
overall, the variables that increase one's name recognition 
and credibility among voters -- organization support, 
campaign spending, media endorsements -- are strong 
predictors of the vote. A candidate's political experience 
and the type of election in which they are participating 
have inconsistent effects on the vote. In the case of open 
seats versus those against incumbents, nonincumbents do 
worse in elections that involve incumbents (i.e., the sign 
of the coefficient is always as hypothesized). Candidates' 
political experience is both positive and negative 
throughout the time frame, but only in two of the five 
elections is it significantly related to candidates' vote 
percentage. Clearly, the more important variables for 
nonincumbents are those that confer legitimacy on them 
(media endorsements and party backing) and those that permit 
them to advertise themselves and their campaigns to wider 
audiences (i.e., campaign spending). In addition, 
candidates' vote share is unaffected by race or ethnicity. 
In general, the results reported above indicate that 
being endorsed by the ward's Democratic organization has an 
effect on nonincumbent candidates' vote share similar to the 
effect incumbency status has on candidates' vote share when 
all candidates (incumbent and nonincumbent) are examined 
together. Somewhat unexpectedly, actual political 
experience has only a small effect on how well these 
candidates perform. The surest way for nonincumbent 
candidates to reach off ice appears to be through 
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endorsements (both political and media), spending, and being 
strategic, or running for office when seats become open, 
rather than trying to unseat incumbents. 
Elections in Majority Black and Majority White wards 
As shown, candidates' race or ethnicity has little 
effect on candidates• vote share. This was true in the 
bivariate case and in multiple regression models. Including 
all candidates together, however, may mask important 
differences among wards whose populations differ 
demographically. In order to determine if differences exist 
across wards with different concentrations of voters, I 
divided the sample of candidates into two groups based on 
majority population in their wards. In one group are 
candidates who ran in wards with a majority (51% or more) 
white population and in another are candidates who ran in 
wards with a majority black population. 5 I tested a 
regression model on these subsamples of candidates that 
included incumbency status, spending, opposition spending, 
media endorsements, number of opponents, and minority status 
5There were too few Hispanic candidates to run 
regression analysis. 
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variables. candidates' share of the vote is the dependent 
variable. 
Table 9 presents the results of the analysis for the 
majority black wards. The model explains a substantial 
percentage of candidates' vote share in each election year. 
Incumbency status again is the most significant predictor of 
candidates' share of the vote. Spending, media endorsements 
and number of opponents also are significant predictors, 
although not in every election year. 
Table 10 presents the results of the analysis for the 
majority white wards. Like majority black wards, incumbency 
is the most important predictor of the vote in these 
elections. Number of opponents appears to be a more 
consistent predictor of vote share in majority white wards 
than it was found to be in the majority black wards. This 
suggests that the fewer white candidates who run for the 
city council are able to garner a larger share of the vote 
vis-a-vis the average black candidate, which is, in fact, 
the case. 
In comparing factors that predict candidates' vote 
share in majority white wards to factors that predict 
candidates' vote share in majority black wards, it is 
apparent that incumbency status is a slightly more important 
predictor of the vote in majority black wards than it is in 
majority white wards. Nonetheless, in both cases, it is 
highly significant. Overall, however, there are no 
TABLB 9 
candidates• Vote Percentaqe, Chicaqo City Council Blections in Majority Black Wards, 
1979-1995, by Blection Year (OLS) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 1979 1983 1987 1991 199S 
Incumbent .248*** .243*** .24S*** .241*** .232*** 
(. S6) (.SS) (. 4S) (. S4) (. 48) 
Spending .018+ .019*** .020** .007 .OlS* 
(. 26) (. 2 3) (.22) ( .10) ( .17) 
Opposition spending -.012 -.021* -.037*** -.016 -.007 
(-.lS) (-.lS) (-.26) (-.11) (-.OS) 
Media .003 .046** .034 .048** .078** 
(. 01) (. 20) (. 11) ( .19) (. 29) 
Opponents -.033 -.018* -.034 -.033*** -.048*** 
(-.21) (-.14) (-.11) (-.22) (-.22) 
Minority -.oss .OS8 -.071 .072 .140 
(-.11) (. 09) (-.04) (. 09) (. 08) 
Intercept .3S2*** .2SS*** .387*** .309*** .260*** 
Adj. R2 .60 .77 .81 .72 .74 
F-value 9.328*** 43.410*** 48.180*** 36.961*** 33.487*** 
Number of cases 3S 76 66 86 69 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standardized regression 
coefficients in parentheses. 
*P = .OS. **P = • 01. ***P = .001. >-' 
N 
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TABLB 10 
candidates• Vote Percentage, Chicago City Council Elections in Majority White Wards, 
1979-1995, by Election Year (OLS) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 
Incumbent .183*** .233*** .191** .184** .199** 
(.37) (. 49) (.38) (.38) (. 41) 
Spending .032*** .007 .020* .015* .033+ 
(.37) ( .10) (.24) ( .15) (. 23) 
Opposition spending -.012*** .002 -.012+ -.029** -.026 
(-.15) (. 03) (-.16) (-.21) (-.24) 
Media .045+ .078** .056+ .085** .076* 
( .16) (. 34) (. 20) (.33) (. 28) 
Opponents -.066*** -.087** -.032** -.046* -.063* 
(-.36) (-.36) (-.32) (-.23) (-.19) 
Minority -.031 -.13 .045 
(-.05) ( .10) (. 03) 
Intercept .401*** .399*** .307*** .385*** .334*** 
Adj. R2 .67 .59 .62 .82 .81 
F-value 15.671*** 11.892*** 14.702*** 38.695*** 19.716*** 
Number of cases 44 46 51 41 23 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standardized 
regression coefficients in parentheses. +p = .10; *P = .05. **P = .01. ***P = 001. 
,_. 
N 
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differences between what it takes to get elected in majority 
black wards and what it takes to get elected in majority 
white wards. Incumbency, spending, media endorsements, and 
number of opponents are significant predictors of outcomes 
in both majority black and majority white wards. These 
findings reinforce the importance of legitimation, by 
political organizations and local media, advertising, and 
experience, for candidate success in city council elections. 
A final electoral context is that of the runoff 
election. In Chicago's nonpartisan city council election 
system, wards that do not produce a majority winner are 
required to hold runoff elections between the top two vote-
getters to determine the winner of the seat. Below I 
discuss outcomes in runoff elections, testing new variables 
shown in the literature to be important predictors of the 
vote in these kinds of elections. 
Runoff Elections 
Runoff elections for the Chicago city council are held 
when no candidate receives more than 50 percent of the vote 
in the initial aldermanic election held approximately six 
weeks prior to the runoff. Because they pit the top two 
vote-getters from the first election against one another, 
these elections are hotly contested and closely watched by 
local political elites and voters. 
Two questions addressed in studies of runoff elections 
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are pertinent to this research. The first relates to the 
idea that the leading candidate from the first election 
suffers in the runoff election as voters rally around the 
underdog. The second suggests that incumbents are 
disadvantaged in runoff elections because of their perceived 
weakness in not being able to beat back strong challengers. 
According to the hypothesis and some empirical findings, 
voters then seize the opportunity to defeat an incumbent by 
supporting the nonincumbent (see Bullock and Gaddie 1994; 
Bullock and Johnson 1985; Fleischmann and Stein 1987; 
Stewart, Sheffield and Ellis 1995). 
Bullock and Gaddie (1994) studied runoff elections in 
Chicago in order to compare findings from a northern, 
industrial city to findings of other scholars who studied 
runoff elections in southern cities. They found that both 
candidates who led the primary field and incumbents won 
their runoff elections less frequently than was found to be 
the case in studies of runoff elections in southern cities. 
The research presented here does not attempt such a 
comparison and, in fact, asks a separate question. That is, 
what effect might these variables, in conjunction with 
spending, 6 media endorsements, and party support, have on 
candidates' share of the vote in runoff elections? 
Presumably, if there is a relationship between being the 
6Both spending variables have been adjusted to reflect 
only spending that was reported immediately following the 
first election through the end of the reporting period. 
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leader in the first election or being the incumbent, and 
winning or losing in runoff elections, then there might be a 
relationship between these factors and candidates' share of 
the vote in these contests. 
Table 11 presents the results of the multiple 
regression model of runoff elections held in .Chicago between 
1979 and 1995. Because so few candidates compete in runoff 
elections during any one cycle, it was necessary to pool the 
observations into a single data set to run regression 
analysis. For the sake of parsimony, only incumbency, 
organization support, media endorsements, both spending 
variables, and a dummy variable for election leader were 
included in the model. 
Contrary to expectations, the findings indicate that 
candidates who lead the field in the first election are not 
disadvantaged in runoff elections. In other words, voters 
are not moving toward the underdog during the subsequent 
election. In addition, judging from the size of the 
standardized coefficient for the election leader variable, 
this is the single strongest predictor in the model. 
Incumbents, however, do not benefit from their 
incumbency status when forced into runoffs. The sign and 
size of the coefficient for incumbency suggest that the 
value of incumbency fades quickly when they are challenged 
hard in first elections. Challengers who succeed to such an 
extent as to force incumbents into runoffs do appear to 
TABLB 11 
candidates• Vote Percentage, Chicago City council 
Runoff Elections, 1979-1995, Pooled Model (OLS) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Incumbent 
Organization support 
Media 
Spending 
Opposition spending 
Election leader 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
Number of cases 
*P = .05. 
**P = . 01. 
***P = .001. 
b coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
-.012 
(. 014) 
.031* 
(.014) 
.025* 
(. 007) 
.012*** 
(.004) 
-.005* 
(.003) 
.053*** 
(.013) 
.422*** 
(.014) 
.36 
11.038*** 
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standardized 
coefficient 
-.07 
.20 
.27 
.16 
-.16 
.33 
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benefit from shifting momentum in their campaign. In this 
sense, the idea that incumbents are disadvantaged in runoffs 
is confirmed. 
An overall impression of the findings from the model 
of runoff elections is that the variables have a less 
powerful effect on candidates' vote share than they did in 
the analyses of the initial aldermanic election. Incumbency 
is a case in point. The coefficient for incumbency is about 
19 points lower than that reported in almost all the models 
discussed above, which partly explains the decrease in the 
ability of the model to predict candidates' vote share. 
With only two candidates in the race, and considerably 
greater amounts of media attention to these elections, the 
need for voters to rely on cues given by incumbency status, 
organization support, or media endorsements, decreases. 
Other factors, such as how candidates stand on issues, 
candidate character, and assistance from voters and 
volunteers from neighboring wards, while difficult to 
measure, might be important for understanding these 
elections. 
Discussion 
When examining all candidates simultaneously or 
examining a subset of nonincumbent candidates, the foregoing 
analysis delivers a consistent message: success in city 
council elections is a function both of being widely known 
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and having one's candidacy legitimized by outside sources. 
Incumbency, media endorsements, campaign spending, and 
Democratic party support all work to separate certain 
candidates from the rest of the pack. In very predictable 
fashion, incumbent candidates are able to separate 
themselves from other candidates most effectively, and thus 
to outperform them in elections. Incumbents, especially in 
nonpartisan elections such as those for the Chicago city 
council, have credentials and a set of experiences that 
increase their vote-getting ability. Being more widely 
known, they are able to attract votes in ways nonincumbents 
cannot. Media endorsements also are an outside source of 
legitimation for candidates that increases their ability to 
attract votes. Setting aside the troublesome statistical 
issue of whether media endorsements improve candidates' 
overall chances of success or whether those making the 
endorsement simply pick the likely winner, candidates who 
gain this type of exposure do very well at the polls. 
In addition to incumbency and media endorsements, 
spending also enhances candidates' ability to garner votes. 
The main purpose of campaign spending is to increase one's 
name identification among voters and to explain to voters 
why one would be an effective public servant. As the 
findings presented above show, this certainly is the case. 
Candidates who are able to more-thoroughly advertise 
themselves, reap electoral rewards that poorly-funded 
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candidates do not. Candidate spending is significant even 
in an environment with a strong political party that is able 
to advertise and work for particular candidates, and where 
districts are relatively small (55,000 to 60,000 residents), 
thus decreasing the need for broad-based, mass appeals. 
In addition to these factors, being endorsed by the 
Democratic ward organization improves the chances of success 
for candidates. In this regard, incumbents enjoy a two-fold 
advantage. First, they have a certain amount of legitimacy 
and stature within their wards because of their positions as 
incumbent office-holders. They have governmental experience 
and name identification that separates them from 
nonincumbents. Second, because incumbents often are 
officially endorsed by their ward's Democratic organization 
(in many instances they also are their ward's 
committeeman), 7 they have political credibility conferred on 
them as well. Presumably, party elites have evaluated 
incumbents' tenure in office and have deemed it worthy of 
official recognition and support. The positive message 
disseminated by incumbents themselves and ward organizations 
percolates through the electorate and is driven home to 
voters on election day as organization workers mobilize get-
out-the-vote efforts in support of the party's candidate. 
7The bivariate correlation between being the incumbent 
alderman and the ward's Democratic Committeeman are as 
follows: .36** in 1979; .52** in 1983; .61** in 1987; .53** 
in 1991; and .50** in 1995 (** p = .001). 
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The relative effect of being endorsed by the ward 
organization is much clearer in the analysis of 
nonincumbents. As stated above, the ability of the Cook 
county Democratic Party to "deliver" wards for the party's 
candidates in citywide races has decreased substantially 
over time. The ability of individual Democratic 
organizations to deliver votes for candidates in their 
wards, however, has not decreased over time and is very 
clearly a factor in these elections (with the exception of 
1995). In the four elections held between 1979 and 1991, 
endorsement from the ward's Democratic organization paid 
dividends at the polls. on average, endorsed candidates 
could expect to receive a 15 percent boost in their share of 
the vote as a result of this important party endorsement. 
As I have shown in the analyses of all the candidates, 
the issue of credibility and name familiarity are critical 
to the success of city council candidates. When looking at 
nonincumbents, candidate's political experience was a 
significant predictor of the vote, but only in the 1991 and 
1995 elections. Before 1991, political experience mattered 
little in predicting nonincumbents' vote share. It is 
possible that the political environment in wards is opening 
up to highly-qualified candidates who may or may not be 
associated with the Democratic organization. The lack of 
significance for the organization support variable in the 
1995 analysis of nonincumbents suggests that experienced 
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candidates did well in their elections. Only time will tell 
if organization support is no longer significant for 
nonincumbents, or if the 1995 findings were merely an 
aberration. The variables with the greatest and most 
consistent effect on the vote are those that enhance 
candidates' credibility and familiarity among voters -
organization support, media endorsements, and spending. 
These are not the only variables that have a 
significant effect on the vote, however. Included as a 
control variable, number of opponents was a consistent 
predictor of candidates' vote share. It was, without 
variation, negative and statistically significant. Although 
perhaps less theoretically interesting than the variables 
described above, that number of opponents is a significant 
predictor of candidates' vote share highlights the 
importance of electoral context in local politics. To a 
certain degree the fate of individual candidates is beyond 
their control and dictated by decisions of individual 
candidates to enter the political fray in their wards at 
different points in time. 
Another important finding that emerged from this 
analysis was the lack of significance for candidates' race 
in determining city council election outcomes. Much of the 
literature suggests that candidates' racial or ethnic 
background is an important cue for voters in nonpartisan 
elections (Herring and Forbes 1994; Pomper 1966). In other 
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words, voters refer to this feature of candidates when 
deciding how to cast their ballot because of the paucity of 
information on what candidates stand for or their 
qualifications for office. The major reason race was not an 
issue in Chicago city council elections held between 1979 
and 1995, is that district segregation often precludes the 
emergence of candidates whose racial or ethnic background 
varies from that of the ward's majority population. White 
candidates run in predominantly white wards; black 
candidates run in predominantly black wards; and Hispanic 
candidates run in predominantly Hispanic wards. Of the 
minority candidates who do run, many are their ward's 
incumbent alderman, thus helping to negate the issue of 
racial voting. 
The findings presented in this chapter both supported 
and contradicted the literature on city council elections. 
Consistent with the literature (Desantis and Renner 1994; 
Karnig and Walter 1977; Lieske 1989), incumbents were shown 
to dominate election outcomes, both in terms of who wins and 
who loses, and in terms of candidates' vote share. 
Incumbents won 85.4 percent of the time that they sought 
reelection. Political experience, campaign spending, 
opposition spending, news media endorsements and support 
from local political organizations were significant 
predictors of the vote, which is what one would expect based 
on current literature. In addition, ufixed" factors in the 
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campaign (Howell and Oiler 1981,155), such as number of 
opponents, was a consistent predictor of how well candidates 
did in their elections; a finding that is also consistent 
with the literature. In general, however, the findings 
reported in this chapter were consistent with only one 
component of Lieske's (1989,167) theory of legitimacy, which 
"explicitly assumed that the distribution of the candidate 
vote totals is largely determined by three factors: (1) 
their cultural acceptability for public office; (2) their 
social standing within the community; and (3) the political 
mechanisms and processes that legitimate or bestow group and 
institutional approval on them." Having already discussed 
the importance of factors that confer legitimacy or lend 
credibility to candidates, below I describe why the first 
two components of his theory do apply in the case of 
Chicago. 
In two major respects the findings in this chapter 
depart from the literature. Lieske (1989), for example, 
found that candidates' achieved status in life and political 
experience paid dividends at the polls, controlling for 
other factors, such as incumbency, party support and media 
endorsements. Candidates from high-status occupations 
(lawyers, businessmen) and candidates with "political 
followings" (based on votes received in prior campaigns) 
could expect to receive more votes than candidates from low-
status occupations or candidates who had never sought 
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political office before. My findings indicate something 
quite different for Chicago on these two dimensions. 
Bivariate correlations (see Table 4) between candidates' 
occupational status and vote share, and between candidates' 
status as former political candidates and vote share, did 
not reach conventional levels of statistical significance to 
warrant inclusion in the multivariate models presented 
above, a clear departure from Lieske's findings on 
Cincinnati. 
This difference is most likely related to the type of 
election system found in each city and expectations placed 
on local politicians from voters. Electorates in cities 
with at-large election systems, such as Cincinnati, are 
likely to value different types of qualifications for 
off ice. For example, they might be more concerned about 
electing the most qualified person for the position, in 
terms of background and training, who can advocate for the 
needs of the entire city, rather than choosing a political 
insider, who might have more parochial interests to serve. 
In Chicago, because of its district election system, how 
effective one is on the city council (and in city council 
elections) has little to do with articulating an overall 
vision for the city and everything to do with ensuring that 
one's ward receives its share of city services and 
improvements. In this city, where political connections are 
paramount, it might be that voters choose candidates based 
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on who they believe will be most effective as alderman, 
rather than candidates with the most impressive resumes. 
Indeed, in many aldermanic campaigns, the major issues are 
simply who will be most effective in bringing home the 
ward's share of city services and who will be a full-time 
aldermen, on call round-the-clock for ward residents in what 
are technically part-time positions. Stressing one's 
background could be a liability in a city where aldermen can 
earn two salaries, one from the city and the other from 
private pursuits, and where voters expect full-time 
attention. Finally, in a city as politically pragmatic as 
Chicago, voters are not going to waste votes on candidates 
who have lost once or twice before, the same type of 
candidates that Lieske's (1989,165) argues will keep "the 
support of at least three of every four voters who cast 
ballots for them in a prior campaign." 
In another departure from the literature, candidates' 
race or ethnicity also mattered little in predicting 
election outcomes, thus contradicting Lieske's (1989,167) 
theory about the importance of candidates "cultural 
acceptability for public office." One should expect 
candidates' race and ethnicity to matter more in at-large 
elections where candidates run citywide. In district 
elections, most of the candidates share the same racial or 
ethnic identification. In order to account for the 
propensity of voters to use race or ethnicity as a cue in 
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voting, I coded candidates on the basis of whether or not 
they were running as minorities in their wards. In all of 
the analyses, whether or not they involved incumbent 
candidates, minority candidates were not significantly 
damaged electorally due to their minority status. 
Now that I have shown which factors are most important 
in predicting success in city council elections, it is time 
to examine more thoroughly the questions of why incumbents 
are advantaged to the degree that they are, and which 
factors are important for understanding why candidates 
choose to challenge incumbents at all. These questions are 
addressed in Chapter Four. 
CHAPTER IV 
IHCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE ABD CABDIDATE STRATEGY 
IN CHICAGO CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS 
Understanding which candidates have the upper-hand in 
city council elections is important because advantage 
translates into votes received on election day. More 
importantly, the questions of who is advantaged and what 
factors affect electoral competition affect the extent to 
which public officials are held responsible to the people 
that they serve. In this chapter, I explore the nature of 
competition for off ice by focusing on two aspects of city 
council elections: incumbency advantage and candidate 
emergence. 
As the findings in Chapter Three demonstrate, 
incumbents enjoy a clear advantage over their opponents. In 
this chapter, I examine more thoroughly the factors that 
undergird this advantage in Chicago city council elections. 
By focusing on incumbents, I am able to test the effect that 
variables specific to incumbents and their electoral 
circumstances have on their ability to garner votes on 
election day. The analysis will provide information about 
the nature of competition in city council elections that 
involve incumbents and will increase our understanding of 
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the precise nature of the incumbency advantage. 
A related question deals with challengers' decisions to 
oppose incumbents. Given the enormous advantages of 
incumbency, why does anyone oppose them when they seek 
reelection? The second part of the chapter explores this 
issue by examining political circumstances in which 
candidates emerge to run for office. I first examine all 
nonincumbent candidates to see if any general patterns exist 
that might explain when candidates run for the city council. 
I then move to a more in-depth analysis of the emergence of 
incumbent challengers. 1 This is an important facet of city 
council elections because most elections involve incumbents. 
By examining candidate emergence I seek to understand the 
electoral conditions that encourage or discourage candidates 
from entering city council races. 
Knowing when candidates decide to run for off ice, 
however, is different than knowing when highly qualified 
candidates run for office. In order to explore this issue, 
I examine factors related to the emergence of high quality 
challengers. Examining challenger political quality may 
also shed light on the advantage incumbents have in city 
council elections. For example, if we know that incumbents 
are consistently challenged by politically inexperienced 
1Throughout this discussion, nonincumbents who 
challenge incumbents are referred to as challengers. By 
definition, therefore, all other nonincumbents ran for open 
seats. 
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candidates, or that the quality of opposition makes no 
difference to how well incumbents do on election day, this 
moves us forward in terms of understanding why incumbents 
rarely fail to be reelected. Both topics -- incumbency 
advantage and candidate emergence -- have received only 
slight attention in the urban politics literature. 
Bxplaininq Incumbency Advantaqe and Challenqer Behavior 
After controlling for spending, media and political 
organization endorsements, and number of opponents, 
incumbents maintain a 20 point advantage against their 
challengers. While it is clear that incumbents realize an 
electoral boost simply because they are current 
officeholders, it is unclear why this is the case. 
Consistent with aspects of democratic theory, the 
literature that informs this analysis suggests that 
understanding the incumbency advantage is important for 
reasons of "electoral accountability" (Abramowitz 1991,35). 
Several competing explanations have been offered by those 
who study congressional elections for why incumbents in that 
legislative body are difficult to defeat. For example, some 
have suggested that the incumbency advantage is rooted in 
the system of perquisites (e.g., franking privilege) and 
institutional power (e.g., committee positions), which 
members of Congress exploit to enhance their reelection 
prospects (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974b; but see Cover 1977). 
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others have argued that the weakening of partisan 
identification in the electorate (Ferejohn 1977) and the 
increased presence of gerrymandered districts favoring 
incumbents (Tufte 1973), have improved the ability of 
incumbents to withstand electoral competition. Related to 
these explanations are those suggesting that incumbents 
insulate themselves from electoral competition by 
cultivating loyalty from their constituents via personal 
services (Fiorina 1977). More recent examinations of this 
subject have focused on the lack of quality opposition to 
incumbents (Jacobson 1992), differences between incumbents 
and challengers in how much they spend on their campaigns 
(Abramowitz 1991), and how media exposure affects 
incumbents' ability to win votes (Goidel and Shields 1994). 
Thus, while there is a clear recognition of the incumbent 
electoral advantage, there is little agreement as to why it 
exists in the first place. 
This chapter tests similar explanations for the 
incumbent advantage in local elections. For example, it may 
be the case that incumbents enjoy an electoral advantage 
because of a lack of viable or high quality opponents on 
election day. If incumbents regularly face candidates who 
do not provide serious alternatives to voters, then this 
should improve the ability of incumbents to compete. An 
alternative explanation might be that incumbents use their 
institutional positions (e.g., committee chairmanships) to 
satisfy the interests of their constituents, thus further 
solidifying their base of political support in the 
community. From their positions within the council, 
incumbents may be able to more effectively satisfy 
constituency concerns. 
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I also examine how redistricting, scandal, incumbent 
seniority, and method of achieving office (election or 
appointment) affect election outcomes. In addition to these 
factors that are more specific to incumbents, I also examine 
how incumbents• spending, opposition spending, media and 
political organization endorsements and number of opponents 
affect the ability of incumbents to win votes. 
Related to why incumbents enjoy a distinct electoral 
advantage is the practical question of why anyone would want 
to challenge an incumbent, given how hard it is to defeat 
one. Because choices about when to challenge incumbents may 
alter election outcomes, it is important to explore the 
circumstances in which nonincumbent candidates make that 
decision. The literature on congressional elections is 
informative. It has suggested that the strongest 
challengers (i.e., those with the most political 
experience), emerge to face incumbents when circumstances 
indicate that they (incumbents) are politically weak (Bond, 
Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; 
Lublin 1994; Squire 1989). Research has indicated that the 
best challengers emerge when national and local political 
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conditions improve their chances of winning. Research also 
has shown that the most experienced challengers avoid 
running against incumbents with large amounts of cash-on-
hand to fund their reelection campaigns (Box-Steffensmeier 
1996). 
In this chapter, I apply this theory to local 
elections, relying both on personal factors related to 
incumbents and more historical or political factors 
affecting their wards. Because there is little relationship 
between urban and national political outcomes, only local 
factors are considered. In addition to examining the 
conditions that affect how many candidates emerge in these 
contests, I also focus on predictors of challenger quality. 
Below I present the results of my analyses of incumbency 
advantage and candidate emergence. Following that is my 
analysis of candidate emergence. 
Findings 
Incumbency Advantage in Local Elections 
The electoral advantage of incumbents in city council 
elections is very clear. Figure 5 shows the percentage of 
opposed incumbents who won reelection in the first 
aldermanic election, thereby avoiding runoff contests. 
Incumbents have won reelection more than 60 percent of the 
time in the last three aldermanic elections (1987, 1991, and 
1995). Not only are incumbents winning at very high rates, 
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they also have enjoyed a fairly steady increase in average 
vote margin over the five elections held from 1979 to 1995. 
In other words, the distance between incumbents' vote share 
and vote share of their closest competitors has increased, 
suggesting that the competitiveness of these elections has 
decreased over time. 
While these patterns identify a clear pattern, they do 
not explain why incumbents are electorally advantaged to the 
extent that they are. Table 12 presents results from the 
estimation of two multiple regression models predicting 
incumbents• share of the vote. The equation estimated in 
Model 1 is designed to show the effects of variables that 
were not tested in models presented in Chapter Three. 
For example, incumbents were coded on the basis of 
whether or not they were city council committee chairmen at 
the time of the election. As mentioned, committee 
chairmanship may provide incumbents with an institutional 
base of power that they can use to enhance their reelection 
prospects. Incumbents also were coded on the basis of 
whether or not they were appointed to off ice by the mayor 
and were therefore running in their first election. The 
expectation here is that appointed incumbents are more 
vulnerable politically than those who have been around for a 
number of years and have won at least one election to the 
office. In addition, I have included a dummy variable for 
redistricting, which indicated whether or not the election 
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TABLB 12 
Incual:>ents• Vote Percentaqe, Chicaqo City Council 
Blections, 1979-1995 (OLS) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Challenger Quality 
Committee Chairman 
Appointed 
Redistricting 
Seniority 
Scandal 
Spending 
Opposition Spending 
Media 
Opponents 
Organization Support 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
Model 1 
-.086*** 
(. 015) 
.006 
(.029) 
-.055 
(.043) 
.010 
(.023) 
.002 
(.003) 
-.075+ 
(.042) 
.608*** 
(. 028) 
.17 
7.103*** 
Model 2 
-.020 
(. 014) 
-.015 
(.023) 
.032 
(.035) 
.004 
(. 018) 
.002 
(.002) 
.023 
(.034) 
.010* 
(. 005) 
-.026*** 
(. 005) 
.060*** 
(. 012) 
-.051*** 
(. 008) 
.076*** 
( . 02 3) 
.577*** 
(.039) 
.59 
20.70*** 
Number of cases 176 150 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Unopposed incumbents 
are excluded. +p = .10; *P = .05; ***P = .001. 
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was held under new ward boundaries. I expect that 
incumbents• vote share should decrease under new and 
untested district boundaries. Finally, I control for the 
effects of scandal by including a dummy variable coded 1 for 
incumbents tainted by scandal at the time of their election 
and o otherwise. 2 As another indicator of vulnerability, 
scandal should be negatively associated with incumbents• 
vote share and incumbents• vote margin. 
The two variables that are not dummy variables are 
seniority and challenger quality. Seniority is simply 
number of years incumbents had served on the city council at 
the time of the election. I expect more senior councilors 
to be perceived as politically vulnerable because of their 
susceptibility to attack from political newcomers. 
Challenger quality also should be negatively associated with 
incumbents• vote share and vote margin. In quantifying 
challenger quality, I have used the political experience 
score of incumbents' strongest or highest quality 
challenger, using the measure of nonincumbent political 
experience developed in earlier chapters. 3 The most 
2This is necessarily subjective. In determining which 
incumbents were tainted by scandal, I tried to focus only on 
very serious charges (e.g., indictments) or allegations that 
were recurrent during the course of the campaign. 
3There were two instances where incumbents faced-off 
against one another because of redistricting. These were 
Joseph Bertrand against Larry Bloom in the Fifth Ward (1983) 
and Carol Bialczak against Mike Wojcik in the Thirtieth Ward 
(1995). 
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experienced challengers are expected to perform better than 
others because they are probably more widely known to the 
electorate and to important political elites. They also are 
expected to be somewhat more politically sophisticated, and 
therefore better able to run more effective campaigns than 
candidates who lack this experience. Being known to the 
electorate (even if only moderately) should peel votes away 
from incumbents. 
Overall, Model 1 explains 17 percent of the variation 
in incumbents' vote share and shows that challenger quality 
is the most significant predictor variable. Incumbents who 
face politically experienced challengers see their vote 
share reduced by 8.6 percent. Contrary to expectations, 
however, none of the other new predictor variables are 
significant at the .05 level. The scandal variable, 
indicating whether or not the incumbent was tainted by 
scandal at the time of the election, however, is in the 
expected direction (negative) and significant at .10. 
Model 1, however, is intentionally underspecified in 
order to show how the new predictor variables affect 
incumbents' vote share in a multivariate model, and to make 
comparisons between it and Model 2. Because none of the new 
predictor variables are significant in Model 1, there is 
little reason to believe they will be significant after 
adding several other predictor variables. Model 2 shows 
that this is the case. This model adds variables (e.g., 
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spending, media endorsements, Democratic organization 
support, and number of opponents} shown in Chapter Three to 
be important in predicting candidates' vote share generally. 
overall, Model 2 explains a much greater proportion of the 
variation in incumbents' vote share {59% compared to 17%) 
and considerably reduces the effect of challenger quality. 
This model indicates that the incumbent advantage in city 
council elections is related to the same factors that 
predict candidates' vote share in the first place, and that 
incumbents do well in their elections despite the quality of 
their opposition. In other words, factors such as spending, 
and endorsements from local media and political 
organizations undergird incumbents' electoral performance in 
the same way they bolster candidacies of nonincumbents. 
With the exception of challenger quality, none of the new 
predictor variables even behave as anticipated. 
These findings indicate that one way for challengers to 
compete seriously with incumbents is to spend large sums of 
money advertising themselves and making voters aware that 
they are viable alternatives to incumbents. 4 Unfortunately 
for challengers, average opposition spending during the time 
frame is only $34,747, compared to average incumbent 
spending, which is $78,624. Figure 6 shows the disparity 
between average incumbents' spending and average opposition 
40pposition spending is the total amount of money spent 
by all nonincumbents in races involving incumbents. 
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spending. While average incumbent spending was actually 
lower than average challenger spending in the 1979, it has, 
in every election since then, doubled and nearly tripled 
average opposition spending. 
A second way to explore incumbency advantage in city 
council elections is to analyze incumbents• vote margin. 
Instead of explaining vote share, this analysis tries to 
explain the distance between incumbents' vote share and that 
of their nearest competitor (in some cases, the dependent 
variable is negative, which means that someone other than 
the incumbent finished first in the aldermanic election). 
This dependent variable is different from vote share because 
it measures the competitiveness, or closeness, of elections 
involving incumbents. Table 13 shows the results from two 
models designed to predict incumbents' vote margin. 
Results from Table 13 are very consistent with results 
from Table 12. In Model 1, none of the new variables 
significantly affect incumbents' vote margin, with the 
exception of challenger quality and, overall, the model 
predicts less than 10 percent of the variation in 
incumbents' vote margin. 
fully specified equation. 
Model 2 presents results from a 
The predictors added to model 2 
behave as expected and are statistically significant (the 
exception being number of opponents, which, although 
negatively signed, is not significant). The model performs 
reasonably well with an Adjusted R2 of .46. 
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TABLB 13 
IncUllbents• Vote Marqin, Chicaqo City Council Elections, 
1979-1995 (OLS) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Challenger Quality 
Committee Chairman 
Appointed 
Redistricting 
Seniority 
Scandal 
Spending 
Opposition Spending 
Media 
Opponents 
Organization Support 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
Model 1 
-9.995*** 
(2.367) 
4.595 
(4.445) 
-3.133 
(6.533) 
1.867 
(3.494) 
.083 
(.388) 
-4.264 
(6.483) 
33.462*** 
(4.351) 
.09 
3.870*** 
Model 2 
-2.992 
(2.304) 
-.731 
(3.780) 
4.287 
(5.801) 
.440 
(3. 002) 
.144 
(. 351) 
7.944 
(5.519) 
1.961** 
(. 753) 
-4.479*** 
(.802) 
10.161*** 
(. 351) 
-.826 
(1.320) 
14.011*** 
(3.695) 
12.679* 
(6.449) 
.46 
13.337*** 
Number of cases 176 150 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Unopposed incumbents 
are excluded. *P = .05; **P = .01; ***P = .001. 
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TWo findings from Model 2 are noteworthy, especially when 
compared to the same model in Table 12. First, number of 
opponents has a negative, but insignificant, effect on the 
closeness of these elections. This relationship runs 
counter to the analyses from Chapter Three and from Table 
12. Thus, while number of opponents affects incumbents' 
vote percentage in general terms, it has little effect on 
the distance between incumbents and their nearest 
competitors in terms of vote share. This finding suggests 
that incumbents cannot be defeated by forcing them to 
compete with large numbers of challengers and that number of 
opponents has only marginal influence on the closeness of 
these elections, despite the fact there is a relationship 
between number of opponents and incumbents• vote share. 
Table 13 also shows that organization-supported 
candidates are distinctly advantaged. This is the single 
most important predictor variable and indicates that 
incumbents backed by the Democratic organization in their 
wards realize a 14 point edge over their closest rivals. 
This finding lends considerable empirical validation to a 
claim made in the previous chapter that one of the major 
reasons why incumbents are such formidable opponents is due 
to their ability to secure support from the Democratic 
political organization in their wards. 
These two analyses show that the incumbency advantage 
in Chicago city council elections is a function of 
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organization backing, media support, and campaign spending. 
Incumbents' advantage can be lessened somewhat by large 
amounts of opposition spending, all else being equal. It is 
rarely the case, however, that opposition spending 
approaches that of incumbents. In fact, the trend is in the 
opposite direction; incumbents' spending has increased over 
time, while opposition spending has remained fairly constant 
(and at considerably lower levels). Considering the 
advantage incumbents have over nonincumbents, under what 
circumstances do any candidates seek to unseat them? The 
analyses that follow provide some answers to this question. 
candidate Emergence and Candidate strategy 
Before examining the conditions or circumstances that 
affect challenger emergence, it is important to understand 
circumstances in which nonincumbent candidates run for the 
city council in general. This is distinct from questions 
about why candidates seek office (i.e., what are their 
personal motivations?) and questions about candidate 
recruitment (Bledsoe 1993; see also Kazee and Thornberry 
1990). Instead, this part of the analysis applies the 
"strategic politicians" theory developed by Jacobson and 
Kernell (1983) to local elections. By looking at the 
question in this way, I am able to shed light on how the 
political environment shapes candidates• decisions to run 
for office. 
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In addition to examining the total number of candidates 
who might seek off ice in particular wards in given 
elections, I also try to predict the emergence of high 
quality nonincumbent candidates. This is accomplished by 
taking the score of the most politically-experienced 
nonincumbent in the race as the dependent variable. The 
unit of analysis is the ward. 
Five independent variables are used to predict number 
of candidates running in each ward: redistricting, machine 
ward, open seat/non-open seat election, and two demographic 
factors, percentage of the ward that is black and percentage 
of the ward that is Hispanic. As mentioned above, 
redistricting is a dummy variable coded 1 for wards that 
were redistricted and that were holding their first election 
under the new boundaries and o otherwise. I expect a 
positive correlation between redistricting and number of 
candidates. It is my hypothesis that candidates will 
consider their chances for victory to be greater under new 
ward boundaries and therefore run more frequently in these 
situations. Machine is a dummy variable coded 1 for wards 
that were considered machine wards at the time of the 
election and O otherwise. 5 Due to the ability of machine 
5There are 26 wards that I have defined as machine 
wards. Machine wards are those that, historically, have 
been loyal to the Cook County Democratic Party. Most, but 
not all, are machine wards throughout the time frame. Some, 
because of changes in ward boundaries brought by 
redistricting and/or changes in political control, were only 
considered machine wards in certain election years. 
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ward political organizations to control access to the ballot 
and competition for office (Kemp and Lineberry 1982; Rakove 
1975), I expect a negative correlation between the machine 
ward variable and number of candidates. Open seat/non-open 
seat is a dummy variable coded 1 if there was an incumbent 
running in the election and O if the seat was open. I 
expect fewer candidates to run in wards where incumbents are 
seeking reelection and more candidates to run in open seat 
elections. Candidates who behave strategically will wait to 
run in open seat elections rather than risk challenging 
incumbents, where they are almost sure to lose. Finally, 
because more candidates run in minority wards (see Chapter 
Three), I have included measures in the model for the size 
of wards' black and Hispanic populations. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 14. 
The model explains 27 percent of the variation in number of 
candidates who run in Chicago's wards. Redistricting has no 
effect on candidate emergence, and the sign of the 
regression coefficient is negative, contrary to my 
hypothesis. It is possible to speculate that instead of 
encouraging candidates to run, redistricted boundaries serve 
to insulate from competition incumbents who run for 
reelection in the vast majority of city council elections. 
Machine wards have a significant and negative effect on 
TABLE 14 
IJUm))er of candidates by ward, Chicago City council 
Blections, 1979-1995 (OLS) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Redistricting 
Machine 
Open Seat/non-Open 
Seat 
Percent Black 
Percent Hispanic 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
b coefficient 
(standard error) 
.013 
(.167) 
-.571** 
(.194) 
-1.153*** 
(. 253) 
1. 582*** 
(.270) 
.936+ 
(. 492) 
3.540*** 
(.307) 
.27 
19.602*** 
Number of cases 250 
standardized 
coefficient 
.oo 
-.18 
-.25 
.41 
.12 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
+p = .10; **P = .01; ***P = .001. 
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number of candidates. In machine wards, .57 fewer 
candidates enter city council races. In addition to wards' 
machine status, the most important variables are whether 
elections involve incumbents, and size of the black 
population. Judging from the sign of the regression 
coefficient, more candidates choose to run in open seat 
elections and more candidates run in wards with higher 
percentages of blacks. Elections involving incumbents have 
1.2 fewer candidates than do open seat contests. These two 
findings reflect a) strategic behavior on the part of 
candidates to run in open seat contests; and b) the more 
politically open character of elections in wards with 
greater concentrations of blacks (number of candidates being 
a measure of political openness). 
There also seems to be a general tendency for higher 
quality candidates to run for open seats as well. Table 15 
shows the results of a regression model predicting 
nonincumbent candidate quality. The dependent variable is 
coded 0,1, or 2 and indicates the level of political 
experience of the most experienced nonincumbent candidate in 
the race. The results indicate a strong and negative 
relationship between races that involve incumbents and 
nonincumbent political quality. The quality score for the 
most qualified nonincumbents in races against incumbents is 
lower by .72, when compared to the most qualified 
nonincumbents in open seat races. Similarly, the most 
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qualified nonincumbent candidates avoid running in machine 
wards that, in addition to being represented by long-time 
incumbents, also are more likely to be tightly controlled by 
party organizations that will more than likely put their 
support behind candidates loyal to the party, rather than 
behind the most qualified candidates. 
The results also suggest that nonincumbent candidate 
quality is related to number of black residents in wards. 
Wards with higher concentrations of blacks are more likely 
to experience elections with at least one highly qualified 
nonincumbent candidate. It is possible to speculate that 
this is related to two factors. First, because more 
candidates tend to run in black wards generally, the 
probability of one of those candidates being politically 
experienced is higher. Second, because ward redistricting 
that occurred during the time frame resulted in many new 
black wards, this probably presented the first opportunity 
for many qualified nonincumbent candidates to run for the 
city council. Based on evidence showing that more 
candidates run in wards with high concentrations of black 
residents, it is reasonable to suggest that city council 
seats in these wards are more highly sought-after than seats 
in predominantly white wards. The value placed on these 
posts and the competition for off ice in black wards also 
appears to encourage the emergence of at least one (maybe 
more) well-qualified candidate(s). 
TABLB 15 
Ronincumbent Candidate Quality, Chicaqo City Council 
Blectiona, 1979-1995 (OLS) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Redistricting 
Machine 
Open Seat/non-Open 
Seat 
Percent Black 
Percent Hispanic 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
b coefficient 
(standard error) 
-.018 
(.088) 
-.296** 
(.102) 
-.724*** 
(.133) 
.438** 
(.142) 
-.047 
(.256) 
1. 307*** 
(.162) 
.19 
13.009*** 
Number of cases 250 
standardized 
coefficient 
-.01 
-.19 
-.31 
.23 
-.01 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
**P = .01; ***P = .001. 
164 
165 
llWll:>er of candidates and candidate Quality: 
A suaaary of Findinqs 
In general, evidence suggests that candidate emergence 
in city council elections is mainly a function of political 
and demographic circumstances. Wards with traditional 
machine organizations and incumbent aldermen seeking 
reelection have fewer candidates (and fewer well-qualified 
nonincumbent candidates) running in them. By contrast, 
wards with high concentrations of black residents tend to 
have aldermanic elections contested by more candidates. In 
addition, there is a greater chance that at least one 
nonincumbent candidate will be politically experienced in 
wards with higher concentrations of blacks, than in 
predominantly white or Hispanic wards. Nonincumbent 
candidate quality also appears to be related to political 
circumstances. Higher quality nonincumbent candidates tend 
to emerge in open seat elections, where their chances of 
victory are greater, rather than in elections involving 
incumbents. 
These analyses have demonstrated patterns in the 
behavior of nonincumbent candidates. However, because 
elections that involve incumbents characterize most city 
council elections, it is useful to examine the behavior of 
candidates who challenge incumbents. Because their behavior 
might affect the competitiveness of city council elections 
involving incumbents, it will be informative to determine if 
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challengers' behavior is random in nature or more 
systematically geared toward defeating incumbents. In order 
to provide an answer to this question, the analyses that 
follow examine the number, and political experience, of 
challengers who face incumbents in city council elections. 
Challenger Emergence 
Based on findings presented above, the number and 
political experience of nonincumbent candidates is related 
to political and demographic factors. The evidence suggests 
that nonincumbent candidates pref er to run in open seat 
elections, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of running against 
incumbents. In addition, the most politically experienced 
nonincumbents also prefer to avoid incumbents. Because 
election outcomes are often dictated by the individuals who 
decide to run for office {see Lieske 1989), determining when 
challengers choose to run against incumbents is an important 
question. In order to answer this question, I examine a) 
the number of challengers who emerge to face incumbents; and 
b) the political experience of those challengers. 
The assumption here is that "strategic" challengers are 
those who emerge to face vulnerable incumbents. For 
example, incumbents might be vulnerable in years when their 
ward boundaries are new. Conversely, challengers might 
avoid running against powerful committee chairs, or against 
incumbents with large campaign war chests {i.e., cash-on-
hand) to spend on their elections. 6 As discussed above, 
challengers might also make decisions to run against 
incumbents based on incumbents' previous election vote 
share. 
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The results of the analysis predicting number of 
challengers by ward are presented in Table 16. Three models 
are shown. Model 1 tests the same variables that were used 
in predicting candidate emergence, shown in Table 14 and 
Table 15 {redistricting, ward status as independent/machine, 
open seat/non-open seat, percent black, and percent 
Hispanic). This model explains 19 percent of the variation 
in number of challengers. Consistent with earlier analyses, 
challenger emergence is shown to be a function of ward 
demographic factors such as percent black and percent 
Hispanic. Contrary to expectations, however, whether the 
ward is a machine ward or not is unrelated to predicting 
number of challengers. This is most likely due to the fact 
that incumbents who ran unopposed were excluded from the 
analysis. Many of the city's machine wards are controlled 
by incumbents who regularly face no opposition. In three 
elections {1979, 1983, 1987), Fred Roti {First Ward) faced 
no opposition. It was not until he went to prison on a 
corruption charge, and his ward boundaries were redrawn, 
that competition returned to the First Ward. Likewise, 
6Cash-on-hand is the amount of money incumbents 
reported having in their campaign finance accounts on July 1 
in the year prior to the election. 
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Edward Burke of the Fourteenth Ward faced no opposition in 
each of the five elections under study here. Of the 
remaining machine wards, this aspect of ward politics 
appears to matter little in deterring incumbent opposition. 
Model 2 adds the other variables hypothesized to 
influence challenger behavior. Overall, this model adds 
little to the explanatory power of Model 1 (only 1 percent 
more in explained variation). Again, ward demographic 
factors are the most important variables predicting 
challenger emergence. None of the factors related to 
incumbent vulnerability or strength are statistically 
significant at the .05 level, although ward status as 
machine and scandal do reach the .10 level of significance. 
The only variable that is not in the predicted direction is 
seniority. I expected more senior incumbents to be 
perceived as politically vulnerable because of their time in 
office. These incumbents have more identifiable public 
records that challengers can run against, might be 
vulnerable to challenger arguments that "it's time for a 
change," and might be perceived as out-of-touch with 
district sentiment. This, however, is clearly not going on 
in Chicago, as more senior members of the city council 
attract fewer challengers relative to their more junior 
colleagues. 
TABLB 16 
lfUaber of Zncumbent Challenqera, Chicaqo City council 
Blectiona, 1979-1995 (OLS) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Machine 
Redistricting 
Percent Black 
Percent Hispanic 
Seniority 
Committee Chairman 
Scandal 
Cash-on-Hand 
Vote Percentage1 
Appointed Incumbent 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
Model 1 
-.206 
( . 2 04) 
.035 
(.171) 
1.397*** 
(.267) 
1. 206* 
(.509) 
1.677*** 
(.235) 
.19 
11.040*** 
Model 2 
-.442+ 
(. 245) 
-.046 
(.175) 
1.107*** 
(. 281) 
1.135* 
(. 546) 
-.011 
(.021) 
.216 
(.214) 
.618+ 
(.327) 
.004 
(.004) 
-.007 
(. 005) 
1.978*** 
(.336) 
.20 
5.326*** 
Model 3 
-.369 
(.228) 
-.046 
(.174) 
1.305*** 
(.280) 
1.133* 
(.529) 
-.000 
(. 020) 
.197 
(.222) 
.521 
(.328) 
(.004) 
(.004) 
.988** 
(.326) 
1.565*** 
(.282) 
.22 
6.312*** 
Number of cases 177 154 169 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Unopposed incumbents 
are excluded. 
1In the incumbent's previous election. 
+p = .10; *P = .05; **P = .01; ***P = .001. 
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In Model 3 I have substituted incumbents' status as an 
appointee for incumbents' vote percentage in the previous 
election as a sign of political vulnerability. In cases 
where vacancies occur on the city council, the mayor has the 
power to appoint new council members subject to council 
approval. I expect appointed incumbents to attract more 
challengers because, due to their limited time in office, 
they are less likely to have developed the type of 
constituency loyalty that elected incumbents typically have 
achieved. Although the overall explanatory power of the 
model improves little, the incumbent appointee variable is 
correctly signed (positive) and statistically significant. 
Appointed incumbents attract approximately one more 
challenger than do elected incumbents. 7 
Challenger Quality 
As shown above, the political experience of incumbents• 
challengers is related to how well incumbents perform on 
election day, even if only marginally. They are better able 
to mount credible campaigns than those challengers who lack 
experience. Thus, it is important to know if decisions by 
politically experienced challengers to seek office are based 
on perceptions of incumbents• political strength in the 
ward. 
7It should be clear that these appointees are competing 
in their first election for the office. 
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Table 17 presents results of analyses that explain 
challenger quality. The assumption of this analysis and the 
models tested here is identical to the analysis presented in 
Table 16. Higher quality challengers are expected to emerge 
when incumbents are vulnerable and will avoid challenging 
incumbents who appear difficult to unseat. The unit of 
analysis is wards in which incumbents are seeking 
reelection. 
Model 1 presents results of the regression analysis 
using machine, redistricting, percent black, and percent 
Hispanic as predictors of challenger quality. The quality 
of challengers in machine wards is clearly lower than that 
found in non-machine wards. Experienced political 
candidates therefore appear to make a negative judgment 
about the probability of their own success in these kinds of 
wards and act accordingly. This table also indicates that 
none of the other predictors are significant and, overall, 
the model predicts only 8 percent of the variation in 
challenger quality. 
Model 2, by contrast, is a fully specified equation 
that includes the other indicators of incumbent 
vulnerability and strength. This model performs 
considerably better than Model 1, although percentage of 
explained variation (R2 ) not overwhelming (18%). Again, the 
quality of incumbent opposition in machine wards is 
'l'ABLB 17 
Challenger Quality, Chicago City Council Elections, 
1979-1995 (OLS) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Machine 
Redistricting 
Percent Black 
Percent Hispanic 
Seniority 
Committee Chairman 
Scandal 
Cash-on-Hand 
Vote Percentage1 
Appointed Incumbent 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
Model 1 
-.359** 
( .130} 
-.045 
(.109} 
.233 
(.267) 
-.196 
(.325) 
.833*** 
( .150) 
.08 
4.915*** 
Model 2 
-.413** 
(.157} 
-.018 
(.112} 
.102 
( .180) 
-.003 
(.348} 
.018 
(. 013} 
.020 
(.137) 
.038 
(. 209} 
-.002 
(.003) 
-.010*** 
(.003} 
1.346*** 
(. 215} 
.18 
4.617*** 
Model 3 
-.465*** 
(. 144} 
-.038 
(.110) 
.176 
(.177) 
-.168 
(.335} 
.002 
(. 013} 
-.025 
(.140) 
.122 
(. 208} 
-.002 
(.003) 
-.296 
(.206) 
.894*** 
(.178} 
.11 
3.195*** 
Number of cases 177 154 169 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
1In the incumbent•s previous election. 
**P = .01; ***P = .001. 
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generally lower than that found in independent (non-machine) 
wards. The only indicator of incumbent vulnerability that 
is significant is incumbents' vote share in their previous 
elections. As this percentage increases, challenger quality 
in the subsequent election decreases. This is in marked 
contrast to the findings presented in Table 16, where it was 
shown that incumbent vulnerability (as indicated by their 
previous vote share) was not significant in predicting 
number of challengers. The findings indicate that 
incumbents who did poorer than their colleagues in their 
previous elections tend to face higher quality challengers, 
although not greater numbers of them, a finding that is 
consistent with my hypothesis. 
Model 3 attempts to determine if being an appointed 
incumbent affects the quality of challengers who emerge to 
face incumbents. Holding constant all other predictors and 
excluding incumbents' previous vote share (appointed 
incumbents do not have a previous vote share), this model 
indicates that it does not. Judging from the findings 
presented in Table 16 and Table 17, appointed incumbents 
might face a greater number of challengers than incumbents 
who have won an election, but they do not necessarily face a 
better crop of challengers. This may have do with the fact 
that these aldermen are appointed by incumbent mayors, and 
thus can typically rely on mayoral endorsements and support 
in their first election battle, a fact that higher quality 
174 
challengers might consider when making decisions about when 
to run for office. 
challenqer Emerqence an4 Challenqer Quality: A summary 
The findings reported here suggest that challenger 
emergence is mainly a function of ward demographics. More 
challengers emerge in black and Hispanic wards than in white 
wards, and there is evidence to suggest that more 
challengers emerge to face appointed incumbents who are 
running in their first election for their seats. The 
findings also show that higher quality challengers are 
strategic in two ways: a) they do not challenge incumbents 
in machine wards; and b) they tend to challenge incumbents 
whose support in the ward appears soft (based on previous 
vote share). Comparing Table 16 and Table 17, the evidence 
shows that political candidates make decisions to challenge 
incumbents on the basis of some indicators of incumbent 
vulnerability and not others. 
Discussion 
This chapter has sought to uncover the basis for the 
incumbent advantage in Chicago city council elections and to 
predict candidate emergence in these contests. The findings 
indicate that the basis for the incumbent advantage is 
organization backing, campaign spending, and media 
endorsements. None of the other factors specific to 
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incumbents or their unique political circumstances appear to 
affect outcomes in these elections. These findings are 
consistent when predicting both incumbents• vote percentage 
and incumbents' vote margin. Incumbents' electoral 
advantage also is only marginally affected by the quality 
of opposition, a finding which represents a clear 
theoretical departure from other studies of legislative 
elections (see Abramowitz 1991; Jacobson and Kernell 1983). 
The basis for the incumbent advantage in city council 
elections is an important issue that gets to the heart of 
questions related to representation and competition in city 
council elections. This analysis has provided some answers 
to why incumbents dominate local election outcomes. The 
question is: what are challengers to do? The analyses 
presented above indicate that the most promising thing that 
challengers can do to decrease the size of the incumbent 
advantage is to spend money, a finding that is consistent 
with studies done on U.S. House elections (see Abramowitz 
1991). While this is one possible way to make aldermanic 
elections involving incumbents more competitive, the down 
side is that average opposition spending (by all incumbent 
challengers) lags far behind average incumbent spending, a 
fact which is unlikely to change anytime soon. Knowing the 
difficulty of unseating incumbents, and more than likely 
satisfied with the status quo, contributors give to 
incumbents in far greater amounts than they do to 
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challengers (see Chapter Five). Thus we are likely to 
continue to see the most competitive races taking place in 
open seat elections. 
The second part of this chapter was devoted to learning 
more about factors related to candidate emergence, 
especially in races against incumbents. In general, the 
findings indicate that more candidates run in minority wards 
than in white wards, in open seat elections, and in non-
machine or independent wards. That more candidates run in 
minority wards is likely related to two factors: Harold 
Washington's 1983 and 1987 campaigns for mayor and the 
political activism that they spawned, and minority group 
success in ward redistricting battles. Washington's mayoral 
campaigns, combined with hostility toward both incumbent 
Mayor Jane Byrne and President Ronald Reagan, mobilized 
black voters and activists in dramatic fashion. In addition 
to increasing the size of the black electorate, Washington's 
political movement also educated black activists in how to 
run effective campaigns for local office (Grimshaw 1992,168-
169). Minority activism was likely encouraged further as a 
result of minority group success in ward redistricting 
battles, which increased the number of city council seats 
for which black and Hispanic candidates would be 
competitive. 
The creation of majority minority wards in the late 
1980s and early 1990s may also have encouraged more 
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candidates to run in the 1991 and 1995 elections. Because 
of ward redistricting success, there has been little time 
for incumbents in these wards to solidify their electoral 
base and to entrench themselves in office. As the 
coefficient for incumbent seniority suggests, challengers 
are not going after long-term incumbents, preferring instead 
to challenge newer members. These newer members tend to be 
black and Hispanic, and to represent black and Hispanic 
wards. 8 
Candidate emergence also is a function of whether seats 
are open or involve incumbents seeking reelection. This 
stands to reason as one would expect candidates who are 
serious about winning to avoid running against incumbents. 
Machine wards also had a negative effect on the number of 
city council candidates who ran for off ice in these wards 
during the time frame. This, however, is most likely an 
artifact of the few machine wards that, throughout much of 
the time frame, featured only the incumbent alderman running 
for reelection. When the sample of candidates is restricted 
to incumbent challengers (excluding unopposed incumbents), 
the findings suggest that whether wards are independent or 
not has little direct effect on number of challengers and 
8In the 1991 elections, 59 percent of black incumbents 
and 100 percent of Hispanic incumbents had served five years 
or less, compared to 38 percent for white incumbents. At 
the time of the 1995 elections, 53 percent of black 
incumbents and 100 percent of Hispanic incumbents had served 
5 years or less, compared to 43 percent of white incumbents. 
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that the most important variable is minority population 
size. In addition to this factor, incumbents who were 
appointed to office (and running in their first elections) 
tend to attract larger numbers of opponents than incumbents 
who reached off ice via the normal election route at least 
once before. It is likely the case that within wards, there 
are several individuals who desire office and who think they 
should be considered to fill appointments. Knowing that the 
odds of defeating entrenched incumbents are long, they run 
in the first election following an appointment, when the 
appointed incumbent is still relatively unknown to voters. 
The political character of wards and incumbents• 
previous election vote share, however, while having little 
effect on number of challengers, do have discernable effects 
on the quality of opposition that emerges to challenge 
incumbents. Regardless of how challenger quality affects 
incumbents• vote share, the expectation that politically 
experienced candidates base their decisions to run on 
measures of incumbent vulnerability is born out. Higher 
quality candidates tend to emerge against vulnerable 
incumbents and to avoid running in machine wards. Research 
on city council careers indicates that marginal incumbents 
are twice as likely as electorally secure incumbents to 
remain marginal five years after their initial election 
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(Bledsoe 1993,89). 9 Based on the findings from Chicago city 
council elections, this may be due to the fact that higher 
quality candidates are more likely to run against vulnerable 
incumbents than they are to run against safe ones. Thus we 
see a certain amount of strategy and calculation on the part 
of city council candidates when deciding to run for local 
off ice, a finding that is consistent with results from 
studies of other types of legislative elections (see Bond, 
Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; 
squire 1989). 
In all of the analyses contained in Chapter Three and 
Chapter Four, the ability to spend money has been shown to 
be of great value in determining outcomes and dynamics in 
city council elections. Related to this question is what 
factors affect the ability of candidates to raise campaign 
money in the first place. Chapter Five examines variation 
in campaign fundraising and how one might characterize 
fundraising patterns within election years. 
9Bledsoe's (1993,89) research also showed that a 
majority (54%) of incumbents who were considered vulnerable 
after their first election had increased their electoral 
margins to comfortable levels five years later. For 
incumbents who had won their first election with comfortable 
margins, 76 percent remained electorally safe five years 
later. 
CHAPTER V 
CAMPAIGN PUHDRAISING IN CITY COUNCIL BLBCTIONS 
In previous chapters I have shown that campaign 
spending is a critical variable in predicting candidates' 
share of the vote in Chicago aldermanic elections. This is 
true both for incumbents and nonincumbents, and indicates 
that how extensively candidates are able to advertise 
themselves to the electorate is important for improving name 
identification among voters and increasing the number of 
votes candidates receive on election day. Candidates spend 
money to advertise themselves via billboard and media ads, 
to print and produce campaign leaflets, and to raise money. 
Most studies dealing with campaign finance have focused 
on candidates for national office (Alexander 1992; Jacobson 
1980; Sorauf 1988), while others have examined campaign 
fundraising in the states (Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; 
Dow 1994; Huckshorn 1985; Redfield 1995). Very few 
scholars, however, have examined fundraising in local 
campaigns. The reasons for this are unknown, but it might 
be related to the fact that there is no one source of data 
on city council campaign finance. While the research 
presented in this chapter does not make use of a 
comprehensive database on local campaign finance, it does 
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utilize data on candidates who ran in the last three (1987, 
1991, and 1995) Chicago aldermanic elections. Because city 
councils off ice often constitutes a starting point for those 
wanting careers in politics (Bledsoe 1993, 169-173), 1 the 
findings presented in this chapter will provide an important 
addition to existing literature. 
Campaign fundraising is examined instead of spending 
because spending is typically viewed as an independent 
variable, rather than as something to be explained. 
Explaining fundraising is more theoretically important than 
explaining spending because candidates cannot spend what 
they do not have. And, as the linkage between spending and 
votes becomes clearer (Arrington and Ingalls 1984; Jacobson 
1980; Lieske 1989), this campaign activity (fundraising) 
assumes greater relevance for candidates' success. 
Understanding which candidates (incumbents, challengers, and 
those running in open seat elections) are best able to raise 
money for their campaigns, therefore, is an important 
question because of its linkage to electoral competition. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze campaign 
fundraising by city council candidates. Specifically, I 
look at three questions. First, what are the differences in 
fundraising among candidates and how might one characterize 
the pattern of fundraising during the election cycle? 
1In addition, as Bledsoe (1993,156) points out, many 
councilors in large cities view the city council as a step 
up the political ladder, rather than as a step down. 
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Second, what factors explain variation in candidates' 
ability to raise money for their campaigns? And third, what 
effect does early fundraising success have on subsequent 
efforts to raise money? The answers to these questions will 
provide needed insights into the ability of candidates to 
compete in the drive to raise money for their campaigns. It 
will also provide needed insights into the dynamics of 
campaign fundraising and how this varies among candidates. 
I specifically examine the 1987, 1991, and 1995 Chicago 
aldermanic elections. 2 Chicago is a particularly useful 
place to study patterns in campaign fundraising due to the 
size of its city council (50 members) and because of the 
availability of campaign finance data. 3 These two factors 
enable one to analyze variation in fundraising for a large 
number of candidates over time. While scholars have 
examined many aspects of city council campaigns including 
campaign research, advertising, and mass mobilization 
{Howell and Oiler 1981; Raymond 1992), the issue of 
fundraising has largely been ignored. 
The chapter proceeds in four sections. Below I discuss 
literature relevant to this research. The second section 
presents descriptive data on campaign fundraising in the 
2Because the 1991 and 1995 campaign disclosure reports 
require more extensive reporting of campaign contributions, 
I spend the most time in this chapter looking at these 
elections. 
3Chicago city council candidates were first required to 
file campaign disclosure reports in 1975. 
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1987, 1991 and 1995 elections and breaks down candidates' 
campaign spending reports by reporting periods to determine 
when candidates are most active in soliciting funds. Using 
these data and research findings in the literature as 
guides, I develop and test a model to explain variations in 
candidates' fundraising, the results of which are presented 
in the third section. The final section discusses the 
chapter's implications for our understanding of campaign 
fundraising in city council elections. 
Campaign Fundraisinq 
As mentioned above, campaign fundraising is an 
important strategic element of campaigns because of the 
relationship between spending and votes. While the effects 
of campaign spending in determining candidates' vote share 
in national elections are well-known (Abramowitz 1991; Green 
and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1980), less work has been done on 
this question as it relates to local elections. The limited 
number of studies that have been done, however, indicate 
that candidates' ability to spend money to enhance their 
name recognition pays-off electorally. Arrington and 
Ingalls (1984), for example, found that campaign spending 
was a significant predictor of vote outcomes in local and 
state legislative elections in North Carolina. Campaign 
spending also was shown to be a significant predictor of 
total votes received, even after controlling for candidate 
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qualifications, political following, and race in a study of 
Cincinnati city council elections (Lieske 1989,158). 
similarly, in a study of the 1991 Chicago aldermanic 
elections conducted for the Chicago Urban League, Lewis, 
Gierzynski, and Kleppner (1995,44) found that campaign 
spending was second in importance only to incumbency in 
predicting candidates' vote percentage. In general, 
campaign spending bridges the gap between candidates and 
voters and helps to educate the public about candidates' 
platforms and qualifications for off ice. 
With the exception of the Chicago Urban League's 
research (which also looked at fundraising), however, there 
have been no in-depth studies conducted on the topic of 
fundraising in the urban politics literature. In the Urban 
League study, fundraising was shown to be mainly a function 
of candidates' race, political organization support, pre-
election name identification, and number of opponents 
(Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner 1995,45). Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, incumbency was not found to be a 
significant predictor in a multivariate model of total 
contributions, although incumbents were shown to dominate 
nonincumbents in terms of average levels of fundraising 
(Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner 1995,25). Other treatments 
of fundraising in local politics have been primarily 
journalistic in nature and have focused on mayoral 
elections, rather than city council contests (see Sorauf 
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1988,291-292). 
Fundraising in state and national elections, however, 
has received considerably more attention due in large 
measure to the availability of campaign finance data, which 
became available on the national level in 1972 (Alexander 
1992; Jacobson 1980). Several studies inform the research 
presented in this chapter. For example, the ability of 
candidates to raise campaign money has been linked to the 
quality of their campaign organizations (i.e., whether or 
not they use paid consultants, high-tech polling, legal 
counsel) (Herrnson 1992), and to how aggressively candidates 
pursued campaign contributions (Grenzke 1989,259). In 
addition to these factors, other research has shown that 
candidates who experienced fundraising success early in 
their campaigns were able to generate greater contributions 
than their opponents (Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994,465). 
Thus, certain candidates (e.g., incumbents, white 
candidates), who pursue funds aggressively, are expected to 
be advantaged in terms of how much money they can raise for 
their campaigns. In addition, research on the dynamics of 
fundraising has indicated that early money has a positive 
effect on fundraising conducted at later points in 
campaigns. 
Thus, I expect a number of factors to influence 
variation in candidates' ability to raise money for their 
campaigns. Incumbency, candidates' political experience, 
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number of opponents, candidates• race, and fundraising 
effort, all are expected to influence the ability of 
candidates to raise money. Candidates who are successful in 
raising funds early also are likely to experience 
fundraising success as their campaigns progress. Below I 
present descriptive data on fundraising differences among 
candidates in city council elections. 
Findings 
Average contributions by Type of candidate 
In this section I present data that show variations in 
candidates' fundraising. Understanding these basic 
differences is important because it helps inform hypotheses 
tested later in the chapter and because it helps to 
establish a context within which to analyze these questions. 
Figure 7 shows average contributions for incumbents, 
challengers, and candidates for open seats in each of the 
three election years. 4 As expected, incumbents dominate all 
other candidates in terms of how much money they can raise 
for their campaigns. Moreover, incumbents are the only 
candidates who have experienced steady increases in their 
fundraising totals. Between 1987 and 1991, average 
incumbents' contributions grew, in constant dollars, by 17.5 
percent {$48,986 to $57,562), and from 1987 to 1995 average 
4All analyses in this paper include only candidates who 
faced opposition. 
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incumbents' receipts grew by more than 50 percent. 
The same cannot be said for nonincumbents. Virtually 
no change in average contributions for challengers occurred 
in these elections. From 1987 to 1991, average challenger 
contributions grew by $126 (1%), and between 1987 and 1995, 
average challenger contributions increased by $1,644, from 
$17,246 to $18,890 (9.5%). The story is somewhat different, 
however, for candidates running in open seat races. While 
the differences between 1987 and 1995 are small (5%), these 
candidates are able to generate significantly greater 
amounts of money for their elections than are challengers. 5 
In general, these elections are more competitive, compared 
to elections involving incumbents, 6 thus stimulating public 
and media interest, and campaign dollars. On average, 
candidates in open seat races also have more political 
experience than those who challenge incumbents. 7 These 
descriptive findings are consistent with the literature that 
has examined other legislative elections (Jacobson 1980), 
and consistent with what one might expect based on limited 
5Unreported analysis indicated that these differences 
were significant. 
6The percentage of candidates from open seats who were 
forced to compete in runoff elections was 35 percent in the 
time period, compared to 26 percent for incumbent 
candidates. 
753 percent of candidates in open seat elections had 
some type of political experience, compared to only 37 
percent for challengers. 
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research on local fundraising. 
There are clear fundraising differences between 
candidates, a factor that ultimately affects candidates' 
ability to wage competitive campaigns. Incumbents are able 
to raise the most funds, while those candidates in the most 
difficult political situations (challengers) raise the 
least. While knowing average differences among candidates 
is important, it is also important to understand when 
candidates are most active in terms of fundraising. 
Candidates who are able to raise large amounts of money in 
the weeks before the election should be able to advertise 
themselves and their campaigns better than those who are 
unable to raise such funds. Moreover, timing is important 
because voters are more likely to pay greater attention to 
campaigns as the election date approaches. Below I present 
descriptive data on candidates' average daily receipts at 
various time points in the 1991 and 1995 election cycles. 
Pun4raisinq Patterns 
Because candidates are required to file periodic 
reports disclosing their campaign fundraising activity, it 
is possible to understand at what point in their campaigns 
candidates most actively pursue funds and how this might 
vary among candidates. After meeting a $1,000 threshold in 
either contributions or expenditures, candidates for the 
Chicago city council are required to file campaign finance 
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disclosure reports. Candidates file two semi-annual reports 
each year, as well as pre-election reports thirty days in 
advance of an election. Because I have limited this study 
to the twelve-month period beginning July 1 of the year 
prior to the election, I have three time points for all 
candidates, one covering campaign activity through December 
31; another from January 1 to a date thirty days prior to 
the primary election; and a third report covering activity 
from the end of the pre-election report through June 30. 8 
Candidates who compete in runoff elections are required to 
complete a fourth report, which they file with state 
authorities thirty days prior to the runoff. 
Because reporting periods vary in length, it was 
necessary to create a standard measure for contributions. 
This was done by dividing total contributions received 
during the reporting period by the number of days in the 
period, to derive an average daily contributions total. 9 By 
standardizing this variable, it is possible to make 
comparisons concerning the relative amount of fundraising 
8This third period is not a legal reporting period. 
Instead, I subtracted the amount of revenue reported in the 
January reporting period from the semi-annual report ending 
June 30, to determine the amount of fundraising activity by 
candidates in the period following the first pre-election 
report. 
9For 1991, the periods (in days) were: 7/1/90-12/31/90 
(184 days); 1/1/91-1/27/91 (27 days); for runoff candidates 
only, 1/28/91-3/3/91 (35 days); and 1/28/91-6/30/91 (154 
days). For 1995, the periods were: 7/1/94-12/31/94 (184 
days); 1/1/95-1/29/95 (29 days); for runoff candidates only, 
1/30/95-3/5/95 (36 days); and 1/30/95-6/30/95 (153 days). 
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activity for each candidate during each reporting period. 
The following reporting periods were analyzed for the 1991 
election: 
1. Semi-annual report: 7/1/90-12/31/90 
2. Pre-election report: 1/1/91-1/27/91 
3. Pre-election report (runoff candidates only): 1/28/91-
3/3/91 
4. Semi-annual (less first pre-election report): 1/28/91-
6/30/91 
The following reporting periods were analyzed for the 1995 
election: 
1. Semi-annual report: 7/1/94-12/31/94 
2. Pre-election report: 1/1/95-1/29/95 
3. Pre-election report (runoff candidates only): 1/30/95-
3/5/95 
4. Semi-annual (less first pre-election report): 1/30/95-
6/30/95 
This descriptive analysis will permit some understanding of 
the internal dynamics of fundraising, when it occurs most, 
and how it varies across candidates. It will also show how 
much money runoff candidates are able to raise for their 
general election campaigns. 
Figure 8 shows average daily campaign contributions for 
three classes of candidates in the 1991 elections: 
incumbents, challengers, and those running in open seat 
elections. As one may have guessed, incumbents hold a 
distinct advantage over their opponents (challengers) in 
terms of total funds raised, and also raise far more than 
open seat candidates. Incumbents raise more money than 
their opponents, on average, in each of the reporting 
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periods shown. During the period ending December 31, 1990, 
incumbents averaged $123.56 per day in contributions. By 
contrast, challengers averaged only $30.16 per day in 
contributions. At the end of the pre-election reporting 
period, incumbents averaged $376.68 per day in 
contributions, while challengers, although improving their 
average daily contributions total, lagged far behind 
incumbents at only $112.57 per day. During the third 
period, which includes the month prior to the election and 
three months after the election in which one would expect 
less fundraising activity (at least for those not 
participating in April runoff elections), incumbents raised 
$201.62 per day, compared to challengers who raised $56.75 
per day. 
Candidates for open seats, like challengers, have 
limited fundraising success during the six month period 
prior to the election year, averaging only $39.42 per day in 
total contributions. Open seat candidates, however, pick up 
the pace considerably (vis-a-vis those who challenge 
incumbents) as the election day approaches, averaging 
$240.01 per day in contributions during January. They also 
do better than challengers in the third period shown, 
averaging $91.45 more than challengers in average daily 
contributions. 
The pattern for the 1995 aldermanic elections is nearly 
identical to that seen in 1991 (see Figure 9). The only 
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real differences are in the totals reported by open seat 
candidates. In general, they reported slightly lower 
average totals than in 1991 ($76.77 in the first period; 
$216.52 in the second period; and, $167.28 in the third 
period). Incumbents and challengers reported nearly 
identical amounts in both elections. 
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Because they are required to file an additional pre-
election report of campaign contribution activity, an 
analysis of runoff candidates' reports paints a more 
accurate picture of the ebb and flow of campaign money 
during the election year. This is because runoff candidates 
are required to file a report thirty days prior to the April 
election, and thus their second pre-election report covers 
the month in which the primary election occurs. Figure 10 
shows average daily contributions for incumbents, 
challengers, and open seat candidates who ran in 18 
aldermanic runoff elections in 1991. 
The data indicate that candidates are busiest raising 
money during the month of February. This is clearly what 
would be expected as candidates race to finish first in the 
primary and as the demand for money intensifies. Incumbents 
lead other candidates during the period from January 28 to 
March 3, averaging $593.17 per day in contributions. Open 
seat candidates and challengers also raise impressive 
amounts of money, averaging over $300 per day during this 
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Figure 10. 
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month. Second, the top open seat and challenger candidates 
make dramatic improvements in their ability to raise money, 
increasing their average daily totals from only $50 per day 
to over $300 per day in the span of three months. This is 
most likely a reflection of two factors: a) time committed 
to fundraising vis-a-vis other campaign activities, and b) 
success in primary elections. Third, while incumbents 
raise, on average, approximately $300 more than 
nonincumbents during the month of February, this is most 
likely a sign of electoral desperation than electoral 
strength. The inability to raise significantly greater 
amounts of money than challengers during the first two 
reporting periods might be why they are forced into runoff 
elections in the first place. They are able to generate 
funds as the election approaches in February, but this may 
not be enough to avoid the April runoff election to retain 
their seats on the council. 
The 1995 data for runoff candidates {see Figure 11) 
also show that candidates are most involved in fundraising 
during the month of the primary election. Unlike the 1991 
elections, however, the data indicate that among runoff 
election candidates, those in open seat contests were the 
ones raising the most money. In fact, the 1995 data show 
that open seat candidates raised similar amounts of money as 
did incumbents forced into runoffs in 1991. Challengers in 
runoff elections also were able to eclipse their incumbent 
198 
opponents in terms of average daily receipts. 
surprising as the 1995 data may be, they are most 
likely due to the fact that among the 22 candidates in 11 
runoff elections, several of the challengers, and many of 
the candidates in open seat races, had high degrees of pre-
election name identification and political experience. Of 
the six runoff candidates for open seats on the council, 
four (Jesse Granato and c. Victoria Almeida in the First 
Ward; Janet Oliver-Hill in the Fifth Ward; and Vilma Colom 
in the Thirty-Fifth Ward) had some political experience, 
either as candidates themselves, or as staff members to 
incumbent aldermen. Two of these candidates, Almeida and 
Oliver-Hill, were the incumbent Democratic committeeman in 
their wards at the time of the election. Colom was 
similarly advantaged. Having run once before for citywide 
office, she was also the beneficiary of substantial support 
from powerful alderman and ward committeeman Richard Mell 
from the neighboring Thirty-Third Ward. 
Among challengers, Geraldine Laury was endorsed by the 
Second Ward Democratic Organization and also is the sister 
of former alderman, now congressman, Bobby Rush. In the 
Southeast Side Tenth Ward, former state representative and 
incumbent ward committeeman Clem Balanoff squared-off 
against the incumbent Alderman John Buchanan. Hal Baskin in 
the Sixteenth Ward, who faced incumbent Shirley Coleman, 
received substantial pre-election news coverage for being 
Figure 11. Runoff Fundraising, 
Chicago City Council Candidates, 1995 
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not only a one-time felon, but also allied with 21st Century 
vote, a political action committee founded by gang leaders 
on the city's South Side. Walter Burnett in the Twenty-
Seventh Ward received similar exposure and also had the 
benefit of being endorsed by Cook County Recorder of Deeds 
Jesse White, his employer at the time of the election. 
Finally, in the city's Thirty-Ninth Ward, Anthony Fornelli, 
who faced incumbent Margaret Laurino, most likely benefited 
from his experience and contacts in the legal profession, as 
well as from his experience in civic affairs as a member of 
the Chicago Plan Commission. Clearly, 1995 saw the 
emergence of several highly qualified nonincumbents, and 
patterns in fundraising reflected this fact. While one 
cannot generalize from the patterns established in the 1995 
runoff elections, it is instructive to see that highly 
qualified candidates can be effective in the fundraising 
arena, even against incumbents. 
The data and anecdotal evidence for the 1995 runoff 
elections indicate that candidates are quite active during 
the month of February raising money in order to make 
contacts with voters that they hope will translate into 
votes on election day. Comparing the results from 1991 and 
1995 runoff elections, one is struck by the ability of 
nonincumbent candidates in the more recent election to 
generate revenue for their campaigns. As discussed, this is 
most likely due to the fact that these candidates were 
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politically-involved and politically-connected prior to 
their campaigns, advantages that apparently paid dividends 
in terms of their ability to finance their campaigns. 
The Bbb and Plow of Campaiqn Dollars: A SUllllary of Pindinqs 
Challengers clearly have the hardest time raising money 
for their campaigns, as is evidenced by their relatively low 
average daily totals shown in each of the three reporting 
periods in 1991 and 1995. This is most likely a reflection 
of strategic behavior on the part of those contributing 
money to campaigns. Because the odds of unseating 
incumbents are long, and because most contributors prefer to 
back winners, contributions flow more readily to incumbent 
candidates. It is also very likely that due to the lack of 
political experience of challengers (see Chapter Four), they 
find it difficult to make and sustain the kinds of contacts 
in the business and political communities to help them raise 
money for political campaigns. Because open seat candidates 
have more political experience than other nonincumbents in 
general, and because their ability to compete seriously for 
office is enhanced by not having to face incumbents, these 
candidates are able to raise considerably more funds than 
challengers during each reporting period. 
Although these descriptive data tell an important part 
of the story, it does not allow one to rule out alternative 
hypotheses. Incumbency may be a very important predictor of 
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candidates' ability to raise money. Based on the evidence 
presented thus far one might guess that this would be the 
case. It may also be the case, however, that black and 
Hispanic candidates find raising money more difficult than 
white candidates, or that fundraising is a dynamic process 
influenced by early contributions. Fundraising may also be 
related to electoral competition. In order to explore these 
possibilities, I test multivariate models of campaign 
fundraising. 
A Hodel to Explain Campaign Fundraisinq 
A number of variables are expected to influence 
candidates' ability to raise money. Some of these factors 
relate to candidate attributes (such as race or political 
experience), while others relate to candidates' electoral 
circumstances. Because incumbents typically win reelection, 
and because contributors are usually pragmatic in their 
donating practices (i.e., they give to likely winners) (Box-
Steffensmeier and Dow 1992,624), I expect significant 
fundraising differences to exist between incumbents and 
nonincumbents. To account for this, I have included a dummy 
variable coded 1 for incumbents and o for nonincumbents. In 
general, I expect incumbency to be a positive and 
significant predictor of total campaign contributions. 
In addition to incumbency, I expect candidates' race or 
ethnicity to be an important predictor of contributions 
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received. Because candidates draw contributions from their 
own wards primarily, and because racial and ethnic 
minorities run in wards with lower levels of personal 
income, I expect minority candidates to report fewer 
contributions than white candidates who run in more affluent 
wards. To control for this possibility, I have included a 
dummy variable for candidates' race. 
I also expect total contributions to be related to the 
amount of time or effort (in months) that candidates devote 
to fundraising. Using a combination of when campaign 
committees were created and when candidates filed their last 
reports, I was able to estimate the amount of time 
candidates devoted to raising money for their campaigns 
during the period under study. Because incumbents' 
committees exist from one election to the next, they were 
all credited with 12 months of fundraising activity. 
Nonincumbents typically create their committees much closer 
to the primary election10 and therefore the amount of time 
they engage in fundraising is much shorter and varies more 
extensively than for incumbents. Unlike state and national 
politicians who employ professional campaign consultants and 
organizations, local candidates in Chicago are more likely 
10Throughout this chapter I use the term primary when 
referring to aldermanic elections. Technically, these 
elections are not primaries because candidates can win their 
seats by getting more than 50 percent of the vote. Runoff 
elections are held between the top two vote-getters when no 
one candidate receives a simple majority. 
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to rely on personal campaigning. This is not to say, 
however, that they are not serious or professional in their 
attempt to win off ice. One measure of their devotion and 
professionalism as it relates to their campaigns is the 
amount of time they allocate to fundraising. 
Candidates' fundraising also should be related to the 
amount of competition they face on election day. 
Competition is measured according the amount of resources 
opposition candidates can mobilize in support of their 
efforts. Opposition spending, for example, should affect 
candidates' fundraising, as this is a visible sign of the 
quality of opponents' campaigns and should elicit a response 
on the part of others to increase the intensity of their own 
fundraising. Because of this I expect that as opposition 
spending increases, candidates will try to keep pace by 
increasing their own fundraising. 11 
Number of opponents also is included as a measure of 
electoral competition. Because the overall amount of money 
available in wards for campaign contributions is likely to 
be limited, I expect greater numbers of opponents to have a 
negative effect on candidates' total revenues. With more 
candidates seeking money from the same pool of funds, each 
additional candidate in the race should have a negative 
110pposition spending is the sum total of all spending 
by one's opponents. 
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effect on any one candidate's ability to generate revenue. 12 
Number of opponents is simply the number of candidates in 
the race, minus one. 
The dependent variable is candidates• total campaign 
fundraising (minus in-kind gifts), which was taken from 
candidates' campaign finance disclosure reports filed with 
the state. Fundraising is measured at two points in time. 
The first time period is the one ending December 31 of the 
year prior to the election, and the second period is the one 
ending June 30 of the election year. 13 Although there are 
other reporting periods, I focus on these two time periods 
because this is when most fundraising activity takes place. 
I test separate models for each period, expecting that 
fundraising will be influenced by different variables at 
different points in campaigns. Independent variables 
include incumbency, candidates' race or ethnicity, number of 
opponents, fundraising effort, previous contributions, 
challenger quality, and opposition spending. The results of 
my analysis are presented below. 
In all cases, total contributions for each candidate 
120f course, candidates can raise money throughout the 
city, but most tend to generate revenue within their wards 
(see the Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner (1995), pages i-
ii) . 
13I have not analyzed the 1987 elections because the 
nature of candidates' campaign finance disclosure reports 
prohibits one from determining how much money candidates 
raised in the six month period ending the year prior to the 
election and in the first six months of the election year. 
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were converted into constant dollars (1995=100) and divided 
by 1,000 to simplify interpretation of regression 
coefficients. Candidates who did not file reports were 
coded as raising no money for their campaigns. Because the 
vast majority of candidates were either incumbents or 
challengers (85%), I focus primarily on these candidates. I 
examine the 1991 and 1995 election years separately for 
different groupings of candidates. The unit of analysis is 
the candidate and ordinary least squares regression is used 
to analyze the data. 
Table 18 presents results from an analysis of 
incumbents and challengers who ran in the 1991 election. 
The results from the first time period are somewhat 
surprising. Incumbency, expected to be the strongest 
predictor, is not significant in this time period. By 
contrast, what appears to matter most is the amount of time 
(in months) candidates devote to fundraising. Candidates 
who devote more time to fundraising raise more money than 
those who devote less time. Judging from the size of the 
coefficient, candidates produce about $911 each month they 
raise funds during this part of the election cycle. The 
coefficients for candidates' race and number of opponents, 
while in the predicted direction, are not significant, and 
the variable denoting candidates' ethnicity (Hispanic) is 
neither significant, nor in the predicted direction. 
The results from the model predicting fundraising in 
TABLB 18 
Factors Influencinq Fundraisinq by Chicaqo City council 
candidates in the 1991 Blectiona 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Incumbent 
Black 
Hispanic 
Number of Opponents 
Fundraising Effort 
Previous 
Contributions 
Opposition Spending 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
First Reporting 
Period1 
4.713 
(3.455) 
-2.750 
(2.932) 
2.182 
(5.084) 
-.977 
(1.013) 
.911** 
(.305) 
10.723*** 
(3.241) 
.23 
7.628*** 
Second Reporting 
Period2 
20.248*** 
(5.737) 
-7.227 
(5.255) 
-11.175 
(9.099) 
-2.292 
{l.824) 
.695*** 
( .169) 
-.164 
( .116) 
14.655* 
(6.365) 
.41 
13.575*** 
Number of cases 111 110 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
1Period ending December 31, 1990. 
2Period ending June 30, 1991. 
*P = .os. 
**P = .01. 
***P = .001. 
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the subsequent time period are presented in the second 
column. The dependent variable is total contributions as of 
June 30 of the election year. To this model I have added 
two variables: candidates' total contributions at the end of 
the first time period, to determine whether or not raising 
money is a dynamic process that builds on early fundraising 
success, and total opposition spending, as one measure of 
electoral comepetition (the other being number of 
opponents). This model excludes the fundraising effort 
variable because it is constant for most candidates during 
this period. 14 
These results indicate that the model explains 41 
percent of the variation in candidates' fundraising. The 
coefficient for the incumbency variable shows that 
incumbents realized a $20,000 advantage over their 
challengers in this period of the 1991 election cycle. In 
addition to incumbency, each $1,000 of contributions in the 
first period is matched by approximately $700 in the second 
period. Thus, as hypothesized, the most important 
predictors are incumbency and previous contributions. Both 
of these indicators measure candidate viability. Incumbents 
are clearly favored to win elections and therefore are able 
to attract large sums of money. Similarly, candidates who 
14There were a few instances when candidates did not 
get credit for 6 months of fundraising in the second time 
period but, in general, there is very little variation on 
this variable. 
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are able to raise money early in campaigns demonstrate their 
seriousness and ability to win elections. Other findings 
show that the coefficients for candidates' race, ethnicity, 
and number of opponents, while in the predicted direction, 
are not significant. Also, contrary to my hypothesis, 
opposition spending exerts a negative, but insignificant 
effect on candidates' fundraising. 
Table 19 shows results of identical models tested on 
the 1995 aldermanic elections. Overall, the model for the 
first reporting period explains 53 percent of the variation 
in candidates' fundraising. Contrary to 1991, in the first 
reporting period the incumbent dummy variable is a positive 
and significant predictor of fundraising. The size of the 
coefficient suggests that incumbents raised about $17,000 
more than the average challenger in this election. 
Candidates' race also is highly correlated to fundraising. 
Black candidates, on average, raised about $14,000 less than 
white candidates. If one assumes that campaign funds are 
generated locally (within wards), then ward socioeconomic 
status (on average lower for black candidates than for white 
candidates) might be important in determining overall 
contributions. 15 This, in conjunction with the fact that 
the overwhelming number of black candidates run in majority 
black wards (only 3% of all black candidates ran in non-
15Indeed, this is what the Chicago Urban League found 
in their study of campaign finance in Chicago city council 
elections (see pages 22-24 of their report). 
TABLB 19 
Factors Influencinq Pundraisinq by Chicaqo City council 
candidates in the 1995 Blections 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Incumbent 
Black 
Hispanic 
Number of Opponents 
Fundraising Effort 
Previous 
Contributions 
Opposition Spending 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
First Reporting 
Period1 
16.587*** 
(3.458) 
-14.373*** 
(3.418) 
-8.778+ 
(4.592) 
-1.549 
(1.403) 
.459 
(.342) 
20.951*** 
(3.775) 
.53 
22.830*** 
Second Reporting 
Period2 
20.277*** 
(5.867) 
-8.862 
(6.041) 
-.912 
(7.089) 
-3.040 
(2.221) 
.775*** 
( .161) 
.018 
( .113) 
18.709* 
(8.296) 
.62 
13.575*** 
Number of cases 96 96 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
1Period ending December 31, 1994. 
2Period ending June 30, 1995. 
+p = .10. 
*P = .05. 
***P = .001. 
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majority black wards), might explain this finding. By 
contrast, the coefficient for Hispanic candidates, while in 
the predicted direction (negative) is considerably smaller 
and significant only at the .10 level. 
The findings for the second time period are very 
consistent with the same model presented in Table 18. 
Incumbency is the strongest predictor, suggesting that 
incumbents enjoyed a $20,000 advantage over challengers in 
the 1995 election. In addition to incumbency, fundraising 
early in the campaign cycle also is a strong predictor of 
later fundraising success. For each $1,000 raised in the 
period ending December 31, $775 was raised in the subsequent 
time period. The other variables in the model, while not 
significant, are in the predicted direction. In general, 
the model performs very well with an Adjusted R2 of 62 
percent. 
As expected, the findings presented in Table 18 and 
Table 19 show that incumbency is a very strong predictor of 
campaign fundraising. These findings are consistent with my 
hypotheses and the descriptive data presented above. The 
only case where incumbency was not a significant predictor 
of fundraising was during the first period of the 1991 
elections. It is possible to speculate that incumbents felt 
more electorally-secure during this election, than they did 
in 1995. For example, in 1995 incumbents were running under 
new ward boundaries and therefore may have been more 
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concerned with raising money earlier in the process in order 
to reach "new" ward voters. In 1991, they did not face this 
sort of pressure, as ward boundaries were last changed in 
1986. That black candidates had a more difficult time 
raising money in 1995 than in 1991 when compared to white 
candidates is more difficult to speculate on. It is 
possible that increased fundraising by incumbents (a 
majority of whom are white) exacerbated differences between 
black and white candidates generally, to produce the 
significant differences found in the first time period for 
1995. 
In the second time period, incumbency status and 
previous contributions were found to be significant 
predictors of fundraising. Both of these findings suggest 
that contributors to local political campaigns make 
pragmatic decisions about which candidates to support. 
Incumbents are very likely to win their elections and, 
therefore, receive more in contributions. Incumbents also 
have relationships with contributors that most challengers 
must develop from scratch, a distinct disadvantage for 
challengers who typically emerge fairly late in the campaign 
process. These findings also support the hypothesis that 
candidates who prove that they can raise money early in the 
campaign season reap fundraising advantages over those who 
are less successful. That candidates benefit from their 
fundraising success early in campaigns also suggests that 
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there is a dynamic to fundraising unseen in descriptive 
data, one which suggests that fundraising is a dynamic 
process. Both of these findings are consistent with 
conclusions reached by scholars who have studied other 
legislative elections (see Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994). 
While incumbents raise significantly greater amounts of 
money than challengers, it is unclear what factors explain 
fundraising differences among challengers. Because the 
ability to raise and spend money is closely connected to 
election outcomes, and because challengers have the most 
difficult time getting elected, it is important to 
understand what variables might affect challengers' 
fundraising. Below I present results from regression models 
designed to predict challengers' fundraising in the 1991 and 
1995 elections. 
Challenqers• Fundraisinq 
In predicting challengers' fundraising I again look at 
the 1991 and 1995 elections separately. I also divide the 
fundraising process into two periods which, together, 
encompass the six months before the start of the election 
year and the first six months of the election year. While 
the dependent variables in this analysis are the same as 
those tested above, I have added a new predictor variable. 
In place of incumbency I substitute a variable measuring 
challenger political quality. In all other respects, the 
models developed to predict challengers' fundraising are 
consistent with those tested above. 
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As much of the literature on legislative elections has 
shown, higher quality challengers give incumbents their most 
difficult reelection battles (Bond, Covington and Fleisher 
1985; Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; 
Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994,471). One of the reasons that 
they give incumbents tough reelection fights is because 
their political experience enhances their ability to raise 
money. For example, challengers with state legislative 
off ice experience or ones with previous experiences as staff 
members to elected officials are expected to generate more 
revenue for their campaigns than challengers without this 
political background. They are expected to know the 
fundraising "ropes" somewhat more extensively than 
inexperienced challengers and to benefit accordingly. Thus, 
I have coded challengers according to the amount of 
political experience they had at the time of their 
elections, using the measure of challenger political 
experience outlined in previous chapters. I expect a 
positive and significant relationship between challenger 
political experience and fundraising. 
The findings in Table 20 show results of challengers' 
fundraising in the 1991 elections. The first column shows 
results from the model predicting fundraising in the first 
period. The model explains 31 percent of the variation in 
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challengers' fundraising. Candidate political experience, 
contrary to my hypothesis, is unrelated to fundraising 
success during the early part of the campaign. Number of 
opponents and fundraising effort, however, are significant 
and the signs of the coefficients are in the predicted 
direction. The coefficient for number of opponents 
indicates that each opponent decreases challengers total 
contributions by approximately $1,500. Greater attention to 
fundraising by challengers can offset this somewhat. 
Challengers are able to generate approximately $1,000 each 
month they are involved in raising money. 
The second column shows results of challengers' 
fundraising in the second fundraising period under 
examination here. The findings indicate that challengers' 
fundraising in this period is primarily a function of early 
campaign contributions. For every $1,000 in contributions 
they bring in during the first period, they raise slightly 
over $1,200 in the subsequent period. In contrast to the 
results for the first period, number of opponents is 
seemingly unimportant for predicting fundraising in the 
second period. Challenger political quality, race or 
ethnicity, and opposition spending also appear unrelated to 
challengers' fundraising. 
The findings for the first reporting period in 1995 
TABLB 20 
Factors Influencinq Fundraisinq by Chicaqo City council 
Challenqers in the 1991 Blections 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Candidate Quality 
Black 
Hispanic 
Number of Opponents 
Fundraising Effort 
Previous 
Contributions 
Opposition Spending 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
First Reporting 
Period1 
1.047 
{ 1. 480) 
-1. 099 
{2.173) 
-3.617 
{3.538) 
-1.487* 
(.690) 
.964*** 
{.197) 
11.473*** 
{2.317) 
.31 
8.615*** 
Second Reporting 
Perjod2 
2.153 
{2.061) 
-2.713 
{3. 002) 
-2.470 
{4.920) 
-.879 
(.988) 
1.232*** 
{.137) 
.072 
{. 061) 
4.132 
{3.753) 
.58 
20.251*** 
Number of cases 85 84 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
1Period ending December 31, 1990. 
2Period ending June 30, 1991. 
*P = .05. 
***P = .001. 
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mirror those for the 1991 election, with one exception {see 
Table 21). In this model, challengers' race is related to 
how much money they can raise for their campaigns. During 
this part of the 1995 election, black challengers raised 
approximately $6,500 less than white challengers. This is 
consistent with the analysis of all candidates. When 
incumbents are dropped from the model, the difference 
between black and white candidates decreases. One might 
inf er from this that even larger differences exist between 
black and white incumbents. In addition to candidates' 
race, the amount of time challengers put into fundraising 
is, once again, significant and in the predicted direction, 
although the effect of effort is somewhat less than in 1991. 
This finding indicates that it may be beneficial for 
candidates to begin raising money well in advance of the 
election in order to build a fundraising base and to 
generate momentum for their campaigns. The other predictor 
variables 
ethnicity 
significant. 
challenger quality, number of opponents, and 
are in the predicted direction, but are not 
The findings for the second half of the 1995 election 
cycle also are similar to those in 1991. This model 
explains 59 percent of the variation in challengers' 
fundraising. In 1995, however, challenger political 
experience is significantly more important than in 1991. A 
one unit change in quality produces about $5,400 in 
TABLB 21 
Pactors Influencinq Pundraisinq by Chicaqo City council 
Challenqers in the 1995 Blectiona 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Candidate Quality 
Number of Opponents 
Black 
Hispanic 
Fundraising Effort 
Previous 
Contributions 
Opposition Spending 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
First Reporting 
Period1 
1.380 
(1.415) 
-1.254 
(.943) 
-6.471** 
(2.406) 
-5.050 
(3.142) 
.752*** 
(.201) 
14.126*** 
(2.588) 
.39 
9.901*** 
Second Reporting 
Period2 
5.429* 
(2.189) 
-1.967 
(1.404) 
-1.563 
(3.882) 
5.995 
(4.427) 
1.084*** 
(.162) 
.044 
(.067) 
6.205 
(5.306) 
.59 
17.568*** 
Number of cases 71 71 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression 
coefficients. standard errors are in parentheses. 
1Period ending December 31, 1994. 
2Period ending June 30, 1995. 
*P = .OS. 
**P = .01. 
***P = .001. 
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additional campaign revenues (significant at .05). The 
greater significance of quality in this election reduces the 
effect of early money, although this variable is still 
highly significant. The coefficient suggests that for each 
$1,000 in revenues generated early in campaigns, challengers 
raise almost $1,100 during the subsequent period. Indeed, 
early money appears to be more important for challengers 
than for incumbents, as one might expect. The results from 
Table 18 and Table 19, which included incumbent candidates, 
showed that early money had a significant effect on later 
fundraising, and that for each $1,000 in prior 
contributions, candidates received $695 and $775 in 1991 and 
1995, respectively. Excluding incumbents from the analysis, 
one sees the size of the coefficient for previous 
contributions increases dramatically for challengers (to 
$1,232 in 1991 and $1,084 in 1991 and 1995, respectively). 
It is most likely that incumbents have much less need for 
funds than do challengers and that, if forced into serious 
contests, they can raise the money they need fairly quickly. 
Challengers do not enjoy such a luxury and, as this analysis 
shows, they clearly benefit from their ability to 
demonstrate fundraising success early on in their campaigns. 
candidates• Pundraisinq and the Effect of Early Money: 
A Summary of Findings 
As expected, candidates' fundraising is largely a 
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function of incumbency, financial success early in 
campaigns, and amount of time devoted to this campaign 
activity. Incumbents enjoy enormous advantages over 
challengers, a finding that was shown in both descriptive 
and inferential data analysis. The effect of early money is 
greatest for aldermanic challengers who typically must raise 
name identification with voters quickly to be competitive 
against their more widely-known and better-funded 
incumbents. The ability to raise large amounts of money 
early in campaigns sends signals to the political and 
financial community that challengers might be able to 
compete well against incumbents. Without this fundraising 
advantage it is impossible for challengers to overcome the 
enormous advantages, both political and organizational, that 
keep incumbents nearly invulnerable to defeat or strong 
challenges. Because they start at such high funding levels 
and because residents and political leaders within their 
wards are already well aware of their records in off ice, 
incumbents do not reap the same fundraising advantages from 
early money as do challengers. In fact, intense fundraising 
during the reporting period ending December 31, probably 
sends a negative signal to potential contributors that the 
incumbents are in political trouble. Candidates who spend 
more time (in months) raising money are typically more 
successful than those who spend less time on this activity. 
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Discussion 
This chapter has sought to determine which factors are 
most important in predicting candidates' campaign receipts. 
It started with the assumption that campaign fundraising is 
important not only because of the time devoted to it by 
candidates, but also because of the link between campaign 
spending and candidates' vote share. 
The descriptive data indicated that incumbents and 
candidates in open seat races are able to generate the 
largest sums of money for their campaigns (although the 
differences between what incumbents raise and what open seat 
candidates raise are vast). The differences between 
incumbents and the men and women who challenge them, 
however, is even larger, a finding that was shown in 
multivariate models to be statistically significant. 
campaign fundraising activity also varied depending on the 
time period in which candidates were working. As the data 
from the analysis of the various reporting periods 
indicated, candidates were most actively involved in 
fundraising during the first two months of the election 
year. 'This applied to both the 1991 and 1995 elections. 
In general, the multivariate models showed that 
incumbency and the ability to generate funds early in 
campaigns are the most important predictors of campaign 
contributions. The amount of time candidates devote to 
fundraising also is a consistent predictor of fundraising 
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totals. To a lesser extent, candidates' race is an 
important variable. Black candidates, in general, raise 
less money than white candidates. Hispanic candidates also 
received less than whites in contributions but, in general, 
the differences were not significant. Because of intense 
racial concentration within wards, however, these findings 
about candidates' race may have little overall significance 
for political representation in Chicago's city council. 
Very few black or Hispanic aldermanic candidates run against 
white candidates. In the vast majority of elections, they 
faced candidates of their own racial grouping. 16 The 
comparative fundraising disadvantage experienced by black 
and Hispanic candidates does, however, have implications for 
citywide office. Unless slated by the Cook County 
Democratic party in citywide races, black and Hispanic 
candidates may be forced to run high-tech campaigns, 
requiring significant amounts of revenue, without a 
fundraising base. These conditions likely give white 
candidates for citywide office significant advantages in 
advertising their campaigns and stimulating interest in 
their candidacies. 
The findings also suggested that persistence pays off 
16This is not to say that non-majority race candidates 
do not win in Chicago city council elections. Chicago's 
Fifth Ward, a majority black ward following the 1981 
redistricting {Fremon 1988,48), elected a black alderman for 
the first time in 14 years. However, there are no black or 
Hispanic incumbents representing majority white wards. 
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when it comes to raising campaign money. Those candidates 
who devoted more time to fundraising generated more in total 
contributions than those who made less of an effort. In 
addition to amount of time candidates put toward raising 
money, candidates who experienced fundraising success early 
in their campaigns were the same candidates to experience 
success later in their campaigns. This finding indicated 
that fundraising in these elections was a dynamic process 
influenced by candidates' effort and early campaign 
receipts. 
More generally, the findings showed that there was a 
momentum to fundraising, as was evidenced by the 
relationship between early fundraising totals and later 
contributions. Candidates and their campaigns build a 
certain amount of momentum as elections approach, momentum 
that often translates into winning and losing. This finding 
was especially important for challengers. 
This chapter has presented the third of three analyses 
chapters dealing with the politics of city council elections 
in Chicago. The final chapter attempts to summarize the 
study's major findings and implications for our 
understanding of competition for local office. It also 
relates these findings to other research and attempts to 
draw some conclusions about how this research fits into the 
broader study of elections. 
CHAPTER VI 
UllDBRSTAJIDIBG CITY COUllCIL BLBCTIOBS: THB CASB OP CHICAGO 
This study has evaluated factors associated with 
electoral competition in local politics by focusing on four 
different dimensions of city council elections in Chicago: 
variables that affect election outcomes, the advantages of 
incumbency, candidate emergence, and campaign fundraising. 
The findings indicate that much of the electoral process in 
city council elections is affected by incumbency, not only 
in terms of predicting candidates' vote share, but also in 
terms of when candidates decide to run for office. In 
addition, while incumbency is not significantly related to 
overall levels of fundraising, its effect is seen in more 
subtle ways. For example, incumbents enjoy large 
fundraising advantages over nonincumbents and, in general, 
are better able than nonincumbents to respond to opposition 
spending by generating funds of their own. 
I undertook this study because in contrast to the 
literature on congressional and state legislative elections 
that is rich and diverse, very little is known about many of 
these areas of inquiry on the urban level. This final 
chapter presents a summary of the study's major findings and 
places these findings into a broader theoretical framework. 
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In so doing, I will explain how my research fits into and 
complements the literature on urban politics. 
The Chicaqo City Council Elections Project 
To examine the different aspects of local elections 
that I focused on, I developed a data set on approximately 
700 candidates who ran for the Chicago city council in 
regularly-scheduled elections held between 1979 and 1995. I 
chose Chicago as the setting for this study for a number of 
reasons. First, in each election a large number of 
individual candidates sought to win a seat on the city 
council. For example, in 1995 approximately six candidates, 
on average, ran in each ward of the city. Because the 
number of individual candidates seeking seats on the council 
is large, there is fairly stiff competition for these posts, 
a prerequisite for any study of this nature. 
Second, I chose Chicago because of its election 
structure. In many respects Chicago is representative of 
other large cities that currently employ nonpartisan ballots 
with district election systems, or ones that are moving 
toward district election systems because of court-ordered 
changes. 1 Because of its district election format, Chicago 
offered an opportunity to test some of the claims made in 
similar studies of city council elections in jurisdictions 
1Dallas is an example of a large city required by 
federal courts to adopt a district election system (see 
Christensen 1995,148). 
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that use at-large election systems. 2 
Third, Chicago is an important place to study because, 
unlike other cities, it has strong party organizations in 
many of the city's 50 wards. Chicago is unique in this 
regard because its ward-based Democratic party organizations 
have, in many respects, withstood the pressures of official 
nonpartisanship, which have hurt local parties in other 
cities (see Welch and Bledsoe 1988). Although not as strong 
as they once were, ward organizations still play an 
important role in city politics. As a result, I have been 
able to gauge the strength of local party structures, and 
their role in elections, over a period of years. 
For these reasons, Chicago is a useful place to study 
city council elections. City council elections dynamics 
also tend to be a fairly under-researched subject in city 
politics. For this reason, much of my work borrows from 
models of congressional elections. With this in mind, I 
summarize the study's major findings below. 
Sumaary of Major Findings 
Factors That Affect Election outcomes 
The first question that I asked was: what factors 
2Cincinnati, for example, uses an at-large election 
format, although its ballot structure is nonpartisan like 
Chicago's (see Lieske 1989). Due to the limited number of 
studies that have been done on this topic, it was important 
to test some of the theories put forth in the Cincinnati 
study in a different electoral environment. 
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affect election outcomes? For the purpose of this study, 
election outcomes were measured in terms of candidates' vote 
share. Vote share is a standard way to measure election 
outcomes and permits one to compare the effects of different 
variables on the dependent variable, controlling for 
differences in district-by-district voter turnout. 
In order to explain variation in candidates' vote share 
I used data on their background characteristics, such as 
their race or ethnicity and amount of political experience 
they had prior to their campaigns for office. I also 
included different measures of candidates' political 
resources. This included such variables as campaign 
spending, media endorsements, and party organization 
support. I also controlled for the competitive context of 
their elections by taking into account both the number of 
opponents each candidate faced on election day and total 
opposition spending. 
The findings indicate that incumbents have a decided 
electoral advantage over nonincumbents. In general, the 
typical incumbent enjoys a 20 point advantage over 
nonincumbents in terms of vote share. While the direction 
and significance of the coefficient was not surprising, it 
was somewhat startling to see how large a role incumbency 
plays in predicting election outcomes. Other political 
resources are important as well, although their impact is 
not as large as that of incumbency. campaign spending, 
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media endorsements, and support from ward political 
organizations play an important role in deciding which 
candidates receive the largest share of the vote, suggesting 
that the ability to get one's name before voters and to 
receive political legitimation from outside sources are keys 
to success in these elections. 
The competitive context also plays a role in 
determining candidates' vote share as election outcomes are, 
in part, a reflection of the number of individual candidates 
vying for each seat. Although less theoretically important, 
this aspect of local elections should be controlled for in 
future studies, unless the elections under examination 
involve only two candidates. 
The Incumbency Advantage 
Because incumbents hold a sizable advantage over 
nonincumbents, it was important to explore the underlying 
cause(s) of that advantage. This was done by focusing 
specifically on incumbents' vote share and the margin of 
difference between incumbents' vote share and that of their 
closest competitor. In predicting incumbents' vote share 
and incumbents' vote margin, I tried to distinguish 
variables related specifically to incumbents, from other 
variables shown to predict election outcomes generally. For 
example, I expected that institutional positions (e.g., 
committee chairmanships) might be one factor undergirding 
incumbent electoral strength. I also expected seniority, 
challenger quality, scandal, whether or not the incumbent 
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was appointed to off ice or had run in at least one election 
before, and redistricting to affect incumbents' vote share 
and vote margin. The findings indicate, however, that 
incumbents' electoral strength is statistically unrelated to 
all these factors, with the exception of challenger quality, 
which, in the case of predicting vote share, is only 
moderately significant. None of the other predictor 
variables are significant, contrary to my expectations. 
The factors that explain incumbents' advantage are the 
same ones that explain candidates' advantage in the first 
place. Factors such as spending, media endorsements, 
organization support, number of opponents, and opposition 
spending, all are significantly correlated to incumbents' 
vote share and vote margin. Recall, however, that 
organization support was not included in the model designed 
to explain vote share of all candidates. 3 Its inclusion and 
significance in models explaining incumbents' vote share and 
vote margin therefore indicates that a major reason why 
incumbents enjoy an electoral advantage is due, in part, to 
this variable. Party organizations do play a critical role 
in Chicago aldermanic elections. This is shown for 
3Analyses related to Chapter Three showed a high degree 
of multicollinearity between incumbency and organization 
support. Because of this multicollinearity, I excluded the 
organization support variable from the model predicting 
candidates' vote share (see Table 5 and Table 6). 
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incumbents and for nonincumbents alike. 
candidate Baerqence 
This part of the analysis focused on the environmental 
circumstances that predict when candidates run for off ice 
and that predict when high quality nonincumbents run for 
office. I hypothesized that factors such as redistricting, 
ward-level historical factors {i.e., whether the ward had a 
history of machine politics), ward demographics, and nature 
of the election {i.e., open seat/non-open seat) would affect 
the quantity and quality of candidates running in these 
elections. In addition to addressing this issue, I also 
attempted to explain challenger emergence and challenger 
quality. 
In general, ward-level historical factors, size of the 
ward's black population, and whether or not the election 
involved an incumbent are the best predictors of both number 
of candidates running in each ward and the emergence of 
quality nonincumbents. Two of these factors -- machine ward 
and open seat/non-open seat were viewed as contextual 
factors capable of influencing perceptions of one's 
prospects for victory. Based on the evidence, I argue that 
candidates, in general, are calculating and strategic when 
they decide to enter city council campaigns and that their 
behavior is not random. For example, fewer candidates 
choose to enter races that involve incumbents or that take 
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place in machine wards. The quality of the most experienced 
nonincumbent also is affected by the presence of an 
incumbent on the ballot and whether or not the ward has a 
history of strong machine politics. 
I then examined incumbents' challengers. In this 
analysis I also sought to uncover the political-
environmental circumstances that would compel candidates to 
challenge incumbents, looking for evidence of strategic 
behavior on the part of these individuals. I hypothesized 
that challengers would emerge when incumbents appeared weak, 
using such factors as redistricting, committee positions, 
incumbents' seniority, cash-on-hand, previous election vote 
percentage, whether or not incumbents' were appointed to 
off ice, and ward demographic factors as predictors of both 
strength and weakness. I also examined whether or not 
incumbents• involvement in scandal at the time of the 
election, had any bearing on challenger behavior. 
In general, the findings indicate that number of 
challengers is unrelated to any of the variables designed to 
measure incumbents' weakness or strength. However, a second 
model indicates that incumbents who are appointed to off ice 
before running in their first election to the seat did, in 
fact, attract more challengers than incumbents who had won 
the seat at least once before. Thus, challengers appear to 
be making strategic calculations to run against appointed 
incumbents. 
232 
I also looked at the quality of incumbents' strongest 
challengers in these wards, utilizing the same model. The 
findings indicate incumbents' previous vote share does make 
a difference in the quality of candidates that emerge to 
face incumbents. As this number increases, the quality of 
incumbents' strongest challenger decreases accordingly. 
Although somewhat less striking than the findings for 
nonincumbents generally, the research suggests that 
challengers do behave strategically when they decide to run 
against incumbents. Number of challengers is, in part, a 
function of the extent to which incumbents are entrenched in 
office. Incumbents just appointed to office, who have not 
competed in real elections for their seat, attract more 
challengers. Similarly, high quality challengers are 
deterred somewhat by incumbents' previous election vote 
share. This measure indicates to politically- experienced 
challengers just how electorally strong incumbent are in 
their district. 
Caapaiqn Pun4raiainq in City council Elections 
The third major area of interest in this research dealt 
with campaign finance. Specifically, I focused on factors 
that explain candidates' ability to raise revenue for their 
election bids. In addition to studying factors that explain 
variations in fundraising, I also examined the timing of 
contributions to better understand the ebb and flow of 
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fundraising during the course of the campaign itself. 
Descriptively, the findings indicate that incumbents 
enjoy enormous fundraising advantages over their challengers 
and that they outraise those candidates who run in open seat 
elections as well. Data also show that candidates are 
intensely involved in fundraising during January and 
February of the election year. Thus most candidates are 
busiest raising money for their campaigns in the weeks 
immediately prior to election day and not all year long. 
Incumbents' fundraising advantages are seen more 
definitely by examining results of multivariate regression 
models. As the models show, incumbency is clearly the most 
powerful predictor of fundraising. Other factors such as 
fundraising effort, candidate's race, number of opponents, 
and candidate quality are often strong predictors of total 
contributions as well. In addition to these factors, 
candidates who raise money early in the electoral process 
are more effective at raising funds later in the process, 
suggesting that there is a certain momentum to fundraising. 
This is even more important in light of the fact that 
candidates are busiest raising money for their campaigns in 
the few weeks prior to their elections. Fundraising is not 
a well-ordered process where candidates build their base of 
revenue and then set out to reach as many voters as they can 
prior to election day. Their ability to raise money 
develops over time and reflects, in large part, early 
financial success. 
Chicago city council Blectiona and the 
Broader Study of Local Politics 
Pactors that Affect Election outcomes 
234 
Throughout this research I have argued that the 
literature on city council elections is incomplete, 
especially when compared to the literature on congressional 
and state legislative elections. This is unfortunate 
considering that the number of city councils in the United 
States far exceeds the number of other legislative 
institutions. In addition to their presence in most 
incorporated places, city council members are required to 
make policy decisions that affect areas of everyday 
importance to citizens. Understanding how these individuals 
attain power on the local level is therefore an important 
theoretical question. 
Scholars have approached the study of city councils in 
a variety of ways. Some have examined how structural 
features of local government {e.g., nonpartisan ballots, at-
large elections) affect the representation of racial and 
ethnic minorities and the representation of women on city 
councils {Alozie 1992; Bullock and MacManus 1991; Engstrom 
and McDonald 1981, 1982; Welch and Karnig 1979). Others 
have examined patterns of racial bloc voting in city council 
elections, in attempts to understand the variables that 
affect voter choice (Herring and Forbes 1994; Vanderleeuw 
1990, 1991). A third group of scholars has examined city 
council elections from the perspective of factors that 
affect the ability of candidates to attract votes on 
election day (Lieske 1989; Merritt 1977; Raymond 1992 
Sheffield and Goering 1978; Stein and Fleischmann 1987). 
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The number of studies falling into this category is 
considerably smaller than the number of studies found in the 
other two areas that I have identified. 
The research presented in the preceding chapters 
clearly falls into this third category. Indeed, it directly 
builds on the work of Joel Lieske (1989), who studied 
factors affecting outcomes in Cincinnati city council 
elections held between 1969 and 1977. Because his study 
represents the most exhaustive of its kind in the urban 
politics literature, I pay particularly close attention to 
it now. He found that size of candidates' political 
following, newspaper and partisan endorsements, and racial 
identification of the candidates were the most important 
variables predicting total votes received (Lieske 1989,163-
165). 
More generally, Lieske articulated a "legitimacy" 
theory of local election outcomes. He suggested that 
candidate vote totals were a result of their perceived 
acceptability to the public. The most important factor was 
one's political following. Lieske (1989,168) argued that 
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incumbents and candidates who had run for off ice once before 
retained "75 percent of all voters who backed them in their 
most recent try for elected office." Because incumbents 
have the largest political following, they enjoy the largest 
advantage in council elections. Nonincumbent newcomers (for 
the most part unknown to the public), by contrast, benefited 
most from newspaper and partisan political endorsements. 
In many respects, my findings mirror those of Lieske's. 
Although I did not measure political following directly, I 
have found incumbency to be the most significant predictor 
of election outcomes in these contests. The value of 
incumbency, as was shown in Chapter Four, is largely related 
to the ability of incumbents to secure partisan endorsements 
and to mobilize a large segment of the voting population in 
their favor. One might speculate from this finding that 
incumbents retain a sizable portion of their support in 
their constituency from one election to the next, an 
argument that is similar to the one made by Lieske. I have 
also found that newspaper and partisan endorsements play a 
critical role in predicting electoral success. Thus, many 
of the same factors shown to predict election outcomes in 
at-large Cincinnati also are at work in a district-based 
election system such as Chicago. 
In some ways, however, my findings are inconsistent 
with those of Lieske's. For example, the only background 
characteristic that I found to be important in predicting 
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election outcomes was political experience4 and, generally, 
these findings were inconsistent across election years. 
The relationship between other background characteristics 
such as occupational status and vote share were so weak in 
bivariate analyses that they did not warrant inclusion in 
the multivariate models of election outcomes. 
The different findings on the value of particular 
background characteristics between Chicago and Cincinnati, 
however, are most likely related to structural features of 
city council elections in each city. One might naturally 
expect candidates' occupational status (such as being 
attorneys or businessmen) to be more influential in at-large 
elections than it is in district elections. Indeed, the 
literature on this topic suggests that upper-status 
candidates (a category into which attorneys and businessmen 
would fall) do perform better in these contests than other 
candidates because of their greater ability to mount viable 
citywide campaigns (Welch and Bledsoe 1988). 
In addition to these factors, the findings on Chicago 
city council elections indicate a much more significant role 
for campaign spending in predicting election outcomes, 
holding constant other important predictor variables. In 
this regard, my findings are much more consistent with those 
4Lieske did not consider candidates' political 
experience, choosing instead to examine such factors as 
educational training, occupational studies, and political 
resources such as endorsements from newspapers and party 
organizations. 
of the Chicago Urban League in their study of the 1991 
Chicago aldermanic elections and other research on local 
election outcomes (see Arrington and Ingalls 1984). 
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Knowing precisely how spending affected outcomes in 
Cincinnati city council elections is unclear because Lieske 
(1989,163-167) excluded campaign spending from his 
multivariate model, despite there being highly significant 
bivariate correlations in his initial analysis. 5 Direct 
comparison to his findings, therefore, is difficult. I have 
shown that spending is important in a city with district-
based elections, a finding that one might not have expected 
considering that it is easier in districts for candidates to 
canvass voters door-to-door (which requires less money) than 
it is in at-large contests. 
Finally, the fact that the racial characteristics of 
candidates are unimportant in predicting outcomes also is 
related to structural features of Chicago politics. While 
candidates' race does matter in at-large elections (see also 
Herring and Forbes 1994), it is relatively unimportant in 
Chicago, a city with intense racial segregation and numerous 
uniracial wards. Because there are few mixed race wards in 
Chicago, voters generally choose from a list of candidates 
who share each other's racial or ethnic identification. 
This fact of Chicago politics forecloses the possibility of 
racial bloc voting in city council elections. In addition, 
5See Lieske (1989, 158) Table 1. 
many of the minority candidates who run in Chicago city 
council elections also happen to be incumbent aldermen, a 
factor that lessens the effect of candidate's minority 
status. 
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In general, however, I conclude that the similarities 
between my findings and those of other scholars far outweigh 
the differences. Incumbents dominate local election 
outcomes and political resources that lend legitimacy to 
candidates (such as media and party endorsements) do improve 
vote share. campaign spending also is critically important 
in determining the outcomes of these contests. Below I 
discuss how my findings regarding incumbency advantage, 
candidate emergence, and political fundraising add to or 
enhance existing theory in these areas of the literature. 
The IncUIDbency Advantage 
In this part of the analysis I explored factors 
underlying the incumbency advantage in city council 
elections. Because no one has really examined this issue as 
it relates to local elections, I turned to the literature on 
Congress to inform the analysis. Attempts to quantify the 
incumbency advantage on the congressional level, however, 
have reached mixed conclusions. Some have suggested that 
the incumbency advantage is based in the system of 
congressional perquisites, institutional power, and the 
ability to provide personal services to constituents (Fenno 
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1973; Fiorina 1977; Mayhew 1974a). Others have argued that 
changing patterns in mass behavior have insulated incumbents 
from competition because voters make their choices on who 
they know rather than on political partisanship (Ferejohn 
1977). still others have questioned the entire notion of 
incumbency advantage, arguing instead that incumbents are as 
vulnerable to def eat now as they have been in the past 
(Jacobson 1987; but see Bauer and Hibbing 1989). 
My findings on this subject do not lend themselves to 
any firm conclusions. In fact, because city councils are, 
in important ways, unlike the U.S. Congress, it was 
difficult to isolate institutional factors that might 
explain the incumbency advantage. First, aldermen do not 
have the same kinds of staff resources upon which they can 
build powerful constituency service operations and to build 
apolitical bonds with ward residents. They are, of course, 
expected to run errands for constituents and many are quite 
effective at this part of their job. However, trying to 
understand constituency operations on the local level is a 
difficult task that would most likely require personal 
interviews with incumbents. Second, because council 
elections are nonpartisan, changes in voters' perceptions of 
political parties was necessarily removed as an alternative 
explanation for the incumbency advantage. 
As a proxy measure for the ability of incumbents to 
service constituency needs, I included a dummy variable for 
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whether or not incumbents were committee chairmen at the 
time of their election. I hypothesized that incumbents who 
held committee chairmanships at the time of their election 
would be better able than those who did not hold such 
positions to direct city resources into their wards or to 
claim credit for particular ward improvements. The findings 
indicate that this is not the case. Whether or not 
incumbents are committee chairmen at the time of their 
election has no bearing on their electoral performance. 
Instead, other factors far outweighed the importance of 
institutional power on incumbents vote share. Incumbents 
vote share is explained by spending, opposition spending, 
media and party endorsements and number of opponents. 
How do these findings affect existing theory in this 
area of the literature? In some ways they confirm the idea 
that city councils are weak local institutions. If 
incumbent aldermen cannot use the institutional resources 
available to them to improve their electoral positions, it 
means either that the institution is weak or that people 
outside the institution are paying very little attention to 
the policy-making role of aldermen. It may also be 
reflective of the fact that voters in Chicago expect 
aldermen to pay closer attention to ward interests and 
running errands for constituents, than to policy-making in 
general. 
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candidate Bllerqence 
Due to a lack of research on the urban level about the 
influence of environmental factors on candidates• decisions 
to run for off ice, I also relied heavily on the 
congressional elections literature to inform this part of my 
analysis. In examining this question I did not focus on how 
formal agents within the political process (for example, 
parties or interest groups) affect candidates' decisions to 
enter the political fray, but rather how the political 
context affects the kinds of races candidates choose to 
compete in and how context affects the behavior of 
politically experienced candidates. 
The literature has shown that candidates in other 
legislative elections decide to run based on perceptions of 
their ability to win (Bond, Covington and Fleisher 1985; 
Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Squire 1989). For example, 
political challengers make choices about when to challenge 
incumbents based on objective measures of incumbents' base 
of support in their districts or states, such as national 
political tides or local political conditions. In applying 
this theory to local elections, I have found that candidates 
for local off ice also take into consideration objective 
conditions in the political environment that might affect 
their chances of winning. As mentioned above, more 
candidates enter open seat races and, of those candidates, 
there is a greater likelihood that they will be more 
243 
politically-experienced than candidates who challenge 
incumbents. Those candidates who do run against incumbents 
are more likely to challenge ones who were recently 
appointed to office, rather than those who have been in 
off ice longer and who have won a previous election. In 
addition, high quality challengers appear to base their 
decisions to run for office on incumbents' previous election 
vote share, an important summary measure of the strength of 
incumbents' electoral position in their ward. 
In this regard, my findings support the notion that 
aldermanic candidates in Chicago are strategic in their 
political behavior. However, in a departure from the 
congressional elections literature, the findings presented 
above on candidate emergence also indicate that district 
demographics play an important role in predicting when 
candidates' run for office. A larger number of candidates, 
and a larger number who have political experience, run in 
wards with high concentrations of black residents. I have 
argued that this is a uniquely urban political phenomenon 
that has been affected by mayoral politics, the rise of a 
new political party (the Harold Washington Party), and 
success in ward redistricting battles. All of these factors 
are reflective of broader changes in Chicago politics. 
Instability and change, especially in black areas and black 
wards of the city, manifest themselves in city council 
politics. With little change taking place in white areas 
and white wards of the city, the same type of political 
dynamic is not present. 
Caapaiqn Pun4raisinq in City council Elections 
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Very little is known about campaign fundraising in 
local politics. What is known comes from studies conducted 
by public interest groups such as the Urban League. Due to 
paucity of studies in this area of inquiry (especially on 
the local level), the findings that I have presented on 
campaign fundraising greatly enhance our understanding of 
this issue. 
Like the previous three topic areas that I examined, I 
have also looked to the literature on other legislative 
elections to inform this part of my analysis. The findings 
on Chicago city council elections suggest that fundraising 
dynamics in this city are very similar to dynamics found in 
other legislatures. Overall, incumbents have a distinct 
fundraising advantage over nonincumbents. Candidates for 
open seats raise the second highest amounts of money and 
challengers, like challengers elsewhere (see Jacobson 1980), 
raise the least amount of money for their campaigns, despite 
having the greatest need for funds. This most likely 
reflects the shortage of quality candidates who emerge to 
challenge incumbents (being inexperienced they probably have 
fewer money-raising contacts), and decisions by contributors 
to give to likely winners (incumbents). Also candidates who 
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are able to raise money early in their campaigns are the 
ones who achieve fundraising success later in their 
campaigns. 6 This is very consistent with Krasno, Green and 
Cowden's (1994) recent findings. In these respects, money 
raising dynamics on the local level closely resemble 
dynamics on the national level. 
The significance of the fundraising effort variable 
reflects the "amateur" character of local politics. The 
more sophisticated candidates begin raising money earlier in 
the process, with the knowledge that money increases the 
likelihood of electoral success. They gear their campaign 
operations in this direction and experience greater 
fundraising as a result. Greater fundraising permits them 
to spend more and to make contact with larger numbers of 
voters. Success in fundraising helps produce success on 
election day. 
The findings on campaign fundraising in Chicago also 
reflect the peculiar nature of local politics. The negative 
sign of the regression coefficient for black candidates is 
indicative of the fact that most candidates raise money not 
from political action committees, like we see in Congress 
and state legislatures, (see Jacobson 1992; Redfield 1995), 
but within their communities (Lewis, Gierzynski, and 
Kleppner 1995). Because community economic status varies 
6Because of a small number of cases, I did not test 
this assumption for candidates running in open seat 
contests. 
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dramatically throughout Chicago (white wards are generally 
more affluent than black wards), fundraising also varies 
between candidates on the basis of their race. 
council Blections and the study of Local Politics: A SUllllary 
The research presented above on city council election 
dynamics has, on the one hand, provided additional empirical 
evidence for claims made by others who have examined factors 
affecting council election outcomes. Most notably, I have 
shown that many of the factors used by Lieske (1989) to 
predict council election outcomes in that city, also were 
useful in predicting Chicago aldermanic election outcomes. 
In the three other areas of local elections that I have 
examined, however, I have extended the urban politics 
literature by applying models developed in studies of other 
legislative elections (e.g., Congress) to city council 
elections. My findings show that there are many 
similarities in the nature of city council elections in a 
large city such as Chicago and those of national legislative 
elections. For example, incumbents enjoy enormous electoral 
advantages over their challengers. Second, nonincumbent 
candidates, for the most part, consider the broader 
political environment and how it might affect their chances 
for victory before running for office. Third, many of the 
same factors that influence patterns in fundraising in 
national elections play a large role in explaining variation 
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in fundraising on the local level. 
Discussion: Putting Chicago Into Context 
Much of what we have come to understand about city 
councils is based on studies done in the early 1970s on 87 
communities in the Bay Area of Northern California. Those 
findings suggested that councils are, for the most part, 
composed of individuals who are unmotivated by political 
concerns and who want to serve their communities in the 
capacity of volunteers {Prewitt 1970,210-212). Because 
these cities were fairly homogeneous in terms of population 
and because they had similar governmental forms, 
generalizations were inherently difficult. 
Recent studies have begun to fine-tune this 
understanding of city councils. Bledsoe {1993,176), for 
example, argues that while there are those in city councils 
who are motivated by civic duty, there are others who are 
motivated by the "thrill of political competition, the sheer 
enjoyment of politics, and the possibilities of seeking 
higher political prizes in the future." Bledsoe {1993,176-
178) also identifies city councilors who are motivated by 
other factors such as serving their particular neighborhood, 
political partisanship, single issues, or self promotion. 
Clearly, there is wide variation in the kinds of individuals 
who seek local office and in their motivations for so doing. 
One of the factors that might affect the political 
environment in cities is size and diversity of the 
population. Larger and more diverse cities are likely to 
produce larger councils, which are required to address a 
larger number of issues than councils in smaller, less 
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diverse cities. In order to address the greater volume of 
issues and to manage demand from the political environment, 
councils in large cities are often established as full-time 
institutions. 7 They also are likely to create the kinds of 
internal mechanisms (e.g., standing committees) to deal with 
environmental pressures that are placed on them (Pelissero 
and Krebs N.d.) and to be expected to respond to 
constituency concerns over public policy matters 
(Clingermayer and Feiock 1993, 1994). Clearly, these kinds 
of city councils are more similar to legislatures on other 
levels of government, than they are to city councils in 
smaller, homogeneous cities. 
Understanding city councils through the lens of the Bay 
Area studies therefore may not be very informative when 
examining cities such as Chicago. The findings presented 
throughout this research, and the findings from other 
recently published studies, provide support for this idea. 
Although I have only examined the individuals who seek to 
serve on the council, it is clear that these people do not 
ignore political considerations in their attempts to win 
7Although the Chicago city council is technically a 
part-time legislature, it functions more like a full-time 
council. 
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off ice. All told, candidates spend sizable amounts of money 
making political appeals, a campaign activity that becomes 
more intense as elections approach. That politically-
experienced candidates run for the Chicago city council 
suggests that the dynamics and expectations about the 
councilor's job in that city are considerably more political 
than conventional wisdom might suggest. In addition, 
candidates also make calculated and sophisticated decisions 
about when to run for off ice to increase the likelihood of 
their own success. These findings indicate that political 
motivation and political practice are very much a part of 
big city politics, unlike what we might find in cities with 
smaller, homogeneous populations, and reformed political 
structures. 
In what way are these findings generalizable? To the 
extent that the research presented above is generalizable, 
it is to other cities with large populations, nonpartisan 
ballots, and ward or district-based elections. Because the 
findings on the factors affecting election outcomes in 
Chicago are quite similar to those of other cities such as 
Cincinnati, one might also be able to make claim that they 
will apply in large cities generally, despite whatever 
differences might exist between them in terms of election 
structure. 
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Th• Rature of coapetition in City Council Blections 
City council election dynamics are determined in large 
part by incumbency and money. Incumbency determines who is 
advantaged in these contests and it determines in large 
measure the number and quality of candidates who decide to 
run in particular wards. Incumbency also affects campaign 
fundraising which, due to its linkage to campaign spending, 
is a critical feature in Chicago city council elections. 
The outcomes of Chicago politics also are determined in 
large part by political party organizations. Candidates 
supported by their ward's Democratic party are considerably 
more likely to win, than candidates who rely largely on 
their own political organizations. 
The implications of these findings for competition in 
Chicago city council elections are many. If one desires a 
local political system where all candidates have an equal 
opportunity to inform voters about their campaign ideas and 
that ensures regular turnover among elected officials, 
several reforms might be offered. Equalizing candidates' 
ability to inform voters would require some means of 
equalizing spending between candidates, because spending 
represents the primary means by which candidates make 
contacts with would-be constituents during election 
campaigns. Equalizing spending would probably require some 
form of public financing of campaigns, systems that are 
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already in place in some large cities. 8 
Instituting limits on expenditures might also improve 
the ability of underfunded candidates to compete. By 
capping spending, you reduce the need for candidates to 
continually seek funds. This, however, might have the 
unintended consequence of decreasing the ability of 
challengers to compete against incumbents, who are much more 
widely known in their constituencies than are challengers. 
Likewise, limiting contributions may force candidates to 
appeal to a larger segment of the community for funds but, 
like spending limits, may simply limit the ability of 
challengers to overcome incumbents' name identification 
advantages. 
Ensuring electoral turnover could be accomplished 
rather easily through term limitations. By limiting the 
terms of incumbents, turnover in office is assured. These 
reforms -- public financing of campaigns, spending and 
revenue limits, and term limitations -- face serious 
difficulties in Chicago, where political culture and history 
would indicate that it is less susceptible to reform ideas 
than other localities. In addition, a system that 
advantages incumbents is unlikely to be changed by the ones 
benefiting. The one element of political reform that 
Chicago has adopted (nonpartisanship of council elections) 
8New York and Los Angeles are examples of two large 
cities that have adopted public financing plans. See Lewis, 
Gierzynski, and Kleppner (1995,31-38). 
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has not eliminated the role of party organization in city 
politics. Indeed, this is still one of the major factors 
that affects competition in these elections, especially in 
terms of who wins. Actions of government, however, can have 
little effect on the presence or absence of political 
organizations within particular districts. The only agent 
that might decrease the advantage secured by candidates 
backed by the Democratic party is a viable alternative 
structure, namely a strong opposition party capable of 
matching the ability of the established organization to get-
out-the-vote and to spread the word in support of chosen 
candidates. In Chicago, the Republican party has never had 
a very strong presence and the independent political 
movement has largely succeeded in taking control of the 
Democratic party in many wards. 9 
conclusion 
While this study has examined four critical aspects of 
city council elections -- factors that affect election 
outcomes, the incumbency advantage, candidate emergence, and 
fundraising -- it has only done so for one city. Future 
studies should test these hypotheses in other cities that 
have different political systems and different political 
histories. It might be the case that smaller cities with 
9Historically, Democrats in Chicago have been 
distinguished on the basis of whether or not they were 
aligned with the machine or if they were independent. 
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less diverse populations and at-large elections exhibit none 
of the patterns found in Chicago. It might be that these 
findings are generalizable only to similarly situated city 
councils. 
Future studies also should seek to explain the 
incumbency advantage in greater detail. Less quantifiable 
variables such as constituency services or favors, the 
ability to claim credit for district projects, and 
participation in previous elections may have cumulative 
effects on voters that shape their perceptions of 
incumbents' work and that heightens incumbents' name 
identification. It might be that intensive interviewing of 
members and staff would be necessary to understand more 
clearly the incumbency advantage. 
Future research also should examine more extensively 
issues related to campaign finance in city politics. On the 
urban level, scholars have not paid much attention to these 
topics. This may have to do with the fact that city 
councils are generally perceived as weak institutional 
actors in city government. Regardless, the political 
process is fundamentally unlike the governing process, and 
such things as city council campaigns, city council 
elections, campaign finance, and candidate strategy warrant 
more attention than they have been given. This study 
represents a contribution to that wider understanding of 
city council elections. 
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